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## THE DIFFICULTIES OF A POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL MISSION IN LIBYA

*ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to review the situation in Libya, one of the most significant strategic issues for Europe. As a consequence of the Arab Spring, a civil war broke out against Moammar Kaddafi and his regime; NATO intervened to protect the civilians against Kaddafi's army. After Kaddafi's death, the European Community left Libya in a chaos. Presently, Libya is still an unresolved hotspot. Thousands of migrants leave Libya over the Mediterranean Sea heading for Europe. There are radical militias and uncontrolled armed groups all around the country. Organized crime, such as weapons smuggling and drug trafficking, is an undoubtedly profitable business in the region. Radical Islamist militias and Islamist fundamentalism are continuously gaining ground. The European Union is certainly responsible for the current situation in Libya. But besides those of the European Union, there are other geopolitical, financial and other interests involved, making solution difficult. The Libyan crisis is a tremendous issue for the European Union.*

*KEYWORDS: Libya, international mission, the crisis in Libya, Moammar Kaddafi, Arab Spring, Kaddafi's regime, armed groups, militias, Islamic State, mass migration, instability. NATO Operation Unified Protector*

### INTRODUCTION

Nowadays Libya is one of the most significant security challenges for Europe. This hotspot is right at the doorsteps of Europe. The shortest distance between the Libyan coasts and the Italian Island of Lampedusa is about 296 km on sea.<sup>1</sup> Before the Arab Spring, Libya was one of the most stable countries in the Maghreb region. After the civil war and Moammar Kaddafi's death, this country became a "powder keg".

Today the European Union is facing thousands of migrants<sup>2</sup>, uncontrolled illegal drugs and weapons smuggling.<sup>3</sup> The political chaos and anarchy are a breeding ground for extremist religious beliefs and terrorism. The European Union and the western world are just beginning to understand that they must make some political, economic and military efforts to stabilize Libya; Libya has strategic relevance for Europe.

<sup>1</sup> "Distance between Tripoli and Lampedusa". <http://www.distancefromto.net/between/Tripoli/Lampedusa>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

<sup>2</sup> "Thousands of migrants rescued off Libya". BBC. 30 August 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37216881>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

<sup>3</sup> Burke, P. "Libya's criminal Economy of Arms, Drugs, People Shakes Prospects for Transition". United States Institute of Peace. 19 March 2014. <http://www.usip.org/olivebranch/libya-s-criminal-economy-of-arms-drugs-people-shakes-prospects-transition>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.



Source: Libya's strategic relevance for Europe<sup>4</sup>

## LIBYA IN THE KADDAFI ERA

In the Kaddafi era, Libya was one of the most stable countries in the region and it was a vital partner both in security and energy issues. It played a significant role in the European energy supply and it helped the European Union to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. A shining example of this cooperation is the Greenstream pipeline linking Italy and Libya.<sup>5</sup>

The production of fossil fuels, such as oil and gas, make up 90 percent of Libyan economy. In 2004, 95 percent of the profit came from European oil export. In 2010, oil production was 1.8 million barrels a day. With these results, Libya was the 18<sup>th</sup> highest producing country in the world. Its most important export partners were Italy (31.6 percent), France (13 percent), China, (9.2 percent), Spain (9.1 percent) and Germany (8.4 percent)<sup>6</sup>

Another relevant issue for Europe is controlling migration. Between 1980 and 1990, there were many bloody and serious conflicts in the region, such as the civil war in Chad and in Sudan, and the crisis in the Western-Sahara. Thousands of hopeless refugees fled to escape these conflicts and wars, and start a new life in Europe.

It was not just conflicts and civil wars, but also economic decline and poverty which drove people to migration.<sup>7</sup> In the 2000s, Kaddafi concluded an agreement with Italy and France on various Libyan interests so that in exchange he would stop African migrants who wanted to travel to the European Union over the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>8</sup>

Besides holding thousands of African migrants back, the Kaddafi Regime had another issue for the European Union: the fight against extremism and terrorism. As a dictator,

<sup>4</sup> "Hundreds feared dead as boat capsizes off Libya coast". Al Jazeera. 20 April 2015. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/report-hundreds-feared-dead-boat-capsizes-libya-150419074946551.html>, Accessed on 21 July 2017.

<sup>5</sup> "New gas pipeline linking Libya to Italy opened". Alexander's Gas&Oil Connections. 8 October 2004. <http://www.gasandoil.com/news/europe/747d13a1666a36a2e86cf571bfbc0aad>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

<sup>6</sup> Besenyő, J. and Marsai, V. *Országismertető: Líbia*. Székesfehérvár: MH Összhaderőnemi Parancsnokság, 2012. 27–29.

<sup>7</sup> Marsai, V. "A líbiai helyzet és az európai nagysztratégia hiánya". *Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont Elemzések* 3. 2014. 2.

<sup>8</sup> Bredeloup, S. and Pliez, O. "The Libyan Migrant Corridor". European University Institute. 29 March 2011. 8–11. <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/16213/EUUS%20Immigration%20Systems%202011%20-%2003.pdf?sequence=1>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

Kaddafi fought against everyone who endangered his power. Although Libya is an Islamic country and 96.6% of the population are Sunni Muslims,<sup>9</sup> Kaddafi still ruled a moderate Islamic country. He helped and sponsored guerrilla and terrorist groups all around the world, but he did his best against religious extremism and fundamentalism within Libya. He did not tolerate any political opposition including the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, during the Kaddafi regime only one terrorist attack happened in Libya between 2001 and 2011. In 2012, the number of attacks was 6. In 2013, this increased to 145. There were 201 incidents in 2014. Although the number decreased to 100 last year, it is still very high.<sup>10</sup>

## THE ARAB SPRING AND THE FALL OF KADDAFI

There was stability before the so-called “Arab Spring”. The terms “Arab Spring” or “Arab Uprising” were first published in the western media in 2011. The entire political scene changed during that time in the Middle East.

According to the definition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, “the Arab Spring” was a “*wave of pro-democracy protests and uprisings that took place in the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010 and 2011, challenging some of the region’s entrenched authoritarian regimes. Demonstrators expressing political and economic grievances faced violent crackdowns by their countries’ security forces. For detailed coverage of the Arab Spring in individual countries, see Jasmine Revolution (Tunisia), Egypt Uprising of 2011, Yemen Uprising of 2011–12, Libya Revolt of 2011, and Syria Uprising of 2011–12.*”<sup>11</sup>

This paper summarises only the North African events of the Arab Spring. There were demonstrations and conflicts in Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and Jordan as well, however, the events in the Middle East did not influence directly the processes in North Africa, specifically in Libya.

The process began with protests in Tunisia in December 2010. A 26 year old vendor selling fruits in the street sparked the events. He had some conflict with a police, he got fined and his goods were seized. Afterwards he set himself on fire thus committing suicide. Protests started to spread throughout the county. President Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali attempted to use force against the protesters but in vain. People demonstrated against unemployment, widespread corruption, and demanded freedom of speech. As a consequence, President Ben Ali lost power and lost control of the military and police forces. He resigned from his political position on 14 January 2011. Due to those political changes, today secular Tunisians are concerned about the influence of ultra-conservative Islamists because their power is increasing.<sup>12</sup> Various Salafist and Jihadist movements, such as the Ansar al-Sharia, came into being because of the fall of the Ben Ali regime, and this process is especially gaining strength nowadays.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>9</sup> “The World Factbook”. CIA. 21 January 2017. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

<sup>10</sup> Yonah, A. “Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2015”. Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, 2016. 6–7. <http://potomac institute.org/images/TerrNASahel2015.pdf>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

<sup>11</sup> “Arab Spring, pro-democracy protests”. Encyclopaedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Spring>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

<sup>12</sup> “Tunisia Country Profile”. BBC. 22 January 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14107241>, Accessed on 21 January 2017.

<sup>13</sup> Besenyő, J. and Prantner, Z. “Tunisia’s Security Concerns”. *AARMS volume 14 Issue 1*. 2015. 5–7.

In Egypt, the mass protests started on 25 January 2011 with the aim of forcing Hosni Mubarak to resign. Thousands of protesters occupied the central Tahrir Square in Cairo. The government blocked the social media, such as Twitter and Facebook, and also the mobile telephone networks. In the following days, the security forces used force and tear gas against the masses. Hundreds were injured and arrested.<sup>14</sup> Despite the action of the security forces, the unrests continued. Just as Ben Ali in Tunisia, the Egyptian president also lost control over the military too. The military traditionally is one of the most influential pillars of the political power in Egypt because it has always played a significant role in modern Egyptian history.<sup>15</sup> On 11 February 2011, Mubarak resigned, but then the Mubarak regime and the fundamentalist Islamist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, won the elections together under the name of Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). The unrests continued; finally the military removed the FJP from power.<sup>16</sup>

In Libya, the mass protests started against Moammar Kaddafi on 15 February 2011 when the President of Egypt resigned. Kaddafi used force against the protesters as well.<sup>17</sup> In Libya, these mass demonstrations escalated into a civil war. Upon Kaddafi's orders, the military intervened against the protesters and the civilians.

Libya was the first country in the Arab Spring where demonstrations and uprisings evolved into civil war. In March 2011, NATO forces launched Operation Unified Protector to intervene on the side of the opposition rebel movement<sup>18</sup>. As a result of NATO intervention, the armed opposition rebels took most of the country by August 2011. Finally, Kaddafi was killed on 20 October 2011.<sup>19</sup>

When the Libyan civil war erupted, nearly two thousand civilians got killed in the first month. The United Nations Security Council declared a "No-Fly Zone" over Libya to protect the civilians. France and Great Britain immediately took military action. Finally, the NATO Operation Unified Protector began on 31 March 2011. This was the first NATO Operation in history when NATO was at war with an independent Arab country. The aim of the operation was to provide protection for civilians from the sea and from the air.<sup>20</sup> The NATO operation was stopped on 31 October 2011.

According to the NATO Operation Unified Protector Final Mission Stats, 8,000 troops were involved in the mission in addition to 260 air assets and 21 naval assets. In the air mission, 26,500 sorties were flown, including 9,700 air strikes. Officially, 5,900 Libyan military

<sup>14</sup> Shenker, J. "Bloody and bruised: the journalist caught in Egypt unrest". *The Guardian*, 27 January 2011. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/27/egypt-riot-security-force-action>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>15</sup> Besenyő, J. and Miletics, P. *Országismertető: Egyiptom*. 2. ed. Budapest: MH Összhaderőnemi Parancsnokság, MH Képzési és Doktrinális Központ, MH Geoinformációs Szolgálat, 2014. 192–194.

<sup>16</sup> Manfreda, P. "The Arab Spring Uprisings". ThoughtCo. 18 June 2016. <http://middleeast.about.com/od/human-rightsdemocracy/tp/Arab-Spring-Uprisings.htm>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>17</sup> Black, I. "Libya's day of rage met by bullets and loyalists". *The Guardian*, 17 February 2011. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/17/libya-day-of-rage-unrest>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>18</sup> "Operation Unified Protector: February-October 2011". NATO. NATO and Libya. 27 March 2012. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/71679.htm>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>19</sup> "Muammar Gaddafi: How he died". BBC. 31 October 2011. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15390980>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>20</sup> Gaub, F. *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing operation unified protector*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013.1–3.

targets were destroyed including 400 artillery assets and over 600 main battle tanks and armoured vehicles.<sup>21</sup>

The above data prove that without the international mission, the opposition rebels would not have been able to take most of Libya. It is also a fact that without international assistance, the rebel groups could not have overthrown the Kaddafi regime. After Kaddafi and his regime's downfall – the main reason for the ongoing Libyan crisis today – the international community did not give any assistance in securing and stabilising the ruined state.

More conflicts and crises erupted after Kaddafi's death among the former opposition groups, and anarchy still prevails in Libya.

The fourth country in North Africa where the Arab Spring hit was Morocco. On 21 February 2011, forty thousand protesters gathered in Rabat and in another 57 cities to demand greater social justice, reforms, and restricting King Mohammed IV's powers.<sup>22</sup> The king responded to the demands with constitutional reforms and parliamentary elections.<sup>23</sup> Despite the demonstrations and clashes, the Arab Spring in Morocco was more peaceful than in other North African countries, compared to Tunisia or Egypt and in particular to Libya.

In summary: the Arab Spring caused sweeping changes in North Africa and in the Middle East. It was a chain-reaction which destabilized the region and significantly empowered the radical Islamist organizations all over North Africa and in the Middle East.

The civil war in Syria was the result of the Arab Spring and it caused critical political and security concerns for the European Union. Libya was the only country during the Arab Spring where the western world (the European Union with the support of the US) intervened in order to protect civilians.

Following the NATO operation, a peace reconstruction mission should have started.

There were no significant efforts to rebuild and restore Libya. After Kaddafi's death, the former opposition rebel groups lost the "common enemy" and the civil war continued.

After Kaddafi's death, the National Transitional Council (NTC) declared the freedom of the country. The NTC was supported by the people.

The infrastructure in Libya did not suffer irreparable damage in the civil war and under the NATO operation either.

Thus after Kaddafi's death, there was no common enemy anymore. The groups and militias participating in the civil war were divided. There were a lot of actors in the post-civil war Libya: Kaddafi's former military personnel who joined the rebel forces, revolutionary brigades, other militias as post-revolutionary brigades, and some armed groups consisting of students, workers, or ordinary civilians and even tribal fighters.

Some groups and militias were formed to fight against the Kaddafi's Regime as rebel forces and some other groups were established for security purposes. Such militias and groups had different capabilities, backgrounds, and combat experience, and had come from different parts of the country. Some of the militias committed ordinary crimes, some were involved in war and organized crime, while others had absolutely different backgrounds<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>21</sup> "Operation Unified Protector final mission stats". NATO. 02 November 2011. [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2011\\_11/20111108\\_111107-factsheet\\_up\\_factsfigures\\_en.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_11/20111108_111107-factsheet_up_factsfigures_en.pdf), Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>22</sup> Tremlett, G. "Morocco riots leave five deaths". *The Guardian*, 21 February 2011. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/21/morocco-riots-five-dead>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>23</sup> Manfreda, P. "The Arab Spring...".

<sup>24</sup> Chivvis, S. C. and Martini, J. *Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2014. 13–16.

The groups and militias had different interests so they were not able to unite. For example, the revolutionary brigades deeply involved in the fight against Kaddafi's Army had more combat experience and they had more and modern weapons as well.<sup>25</sup>

Just as in other conflicts, these militias and armed groups did not lay down their weapons after the war and they did not disband. After the fall of the regime, a serious security and political vacuum evolved and the militias started to compete against each other. Most of the groups claimed to be the Guardians of the Revolution.<sup>26</sup>

The National Transitional Council tried to register and integrate these militias and armed groups into the Ministry of Defence, in order to give legitimacy to many armed groups if they had become parts of the Libyan National Army.<sup>27</sup>

It was a milestone in the procedure when on 11 September 2012, terrorists attacked the US consulate in Benghazi. As a result of the attack, three contracted security guards and the US ambassador were killed<sup>28</sup>. This attack was a clear evidence of the chaos in Libya and showed the weakness of the government and pointed to the uncontrollable, legally, semi-legally, or illegally operating armed groups and militias which were involved in the act. The government was unable to disband these militias, and the government's weakness combined with the lack of international action helped to cause the outbreak of the second Libyan civil war.<sup>29</sup>

The second Libyan civil war broke out due to the uncontrolled and independent militias. Those rival groups fought for power, territory, money, and some other interests.<sup>30</sup>

The conflict erupted between the GNC and the House of Representatives (HoR), which was legally elected in the summer of 2014 and accepted by the international community. It was called the Libyan government. Its seat was in the eastern part of Libya, in Tobruk.

The rival government was the so-called General National Congress (GNC). The seat of the GNC was in the formal capital, Tripoli.

Between 2012 and 2014, the so-called General National Congress (GNC) was the official government, recognised by the international community. In 2014 the two political actors agreed to accept the results of the election. The GNC was called now the Islamic Government.

Despite the original agreement, the GNC did not accept the results of the election<sup>31</sup>.

<sup>25</sup> Kirkpatrick, D. D. "In Libya, Fighting May Outlast the Revolution". *The New York Times*, 01 November 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/world/africa/in-libya-the-fighting-may-outlast-the-revolution.html>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>26</sup> Meo, N. "Libya: revolutionaries turn on each other as fears grow for law and order". *The Telegraph*. 31 October 2011. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8860684/Libya-revolutionaries-turn-on-each-other-as-fears-grow-for-law-and-order.html>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>27</sup> Abuzaakouk, A. "America's Own War Criminal in Libya". *Huffington Post*. 08 August 2016. [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/americas-own-war-criminal-in-libya\\_us\\_57a851f4e4b034b258956cc6](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/americas-own-war-criminal-in-libya_us_57a851f4e4b034b258956cc6), Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>28</sup> "Benghazi Mission Attack Fast Facts". *CNN*. 12 December 2016. <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/10/world/benghazi-consulate-attack-fast-facts/>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>29</sup> "Benghazi US Consulate attack: Timeline". *BBC*. 16 November 2012. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19587068>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>30</sup> Cruickshank, M. "Libya's Second Civil War: How did it come to this?" *Conflict News*. 05 December 2014. <https://web.archive.org/web/20150320232806/http://www.conflict-news.com/libyas-second-civil-war-how-did-it-come-to-this/>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>31</sup> "The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for a Reset". *International Crisis Group*. 04 November 2016. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/libyan-political-agreement-time-reset>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.


The HoR controls the eastern part of Libya. Its army is the revolutionary militia: the Libyan National Army, supported by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. The rival Islamic government controls the western part of Libya, supported by Qatar, Sudan and Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood, Libya Dawn and other Islamist militias.

Besides two governments, there are more armed groups and militias, such as the Shura Council in Benghazi, Ansar al-Sharia (Libya), the so-called Islamic State (Daesh), and the Libyan Provinces. The southwest and the desert areas are controlled by the Tuareg militias of Ghat. There are other local armed groups which control the Misrata district or Bani Walid, Tawergha.<sup>32</sup>

There were new political developments in 2015: the so-called “Skhirat Agreement”<sup>33</sup>. As a result of UN pressure, on 5 April 2016, the Islamist Government announced handing power over to a new integrated government, the so-called Government of National Accord.<sup>34</sup> They agreed to reunify the National Oil Corporation on 2 July 2016. According to plans, in January 2017, the main oil terminal was to restart and operate again<sup>35</sup>. In the end, however, this unity did not happen, and both HoR and GNC still exist.

This cooperation is still very volatile; there are too many questions and many conflicting interests. It is not yet clear how this will operate in the future because there is no agreement on some issues. Furthermore, the problem with the other brigades, militias and armed groups is still unresolved.<sup>36</sup>

According to the Libya Special Intelligence Report, in August 2016 the situation was the following:



(Source: *Territorial Control in Libya*)<sup>37</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Wehrey, F. and Lacher, W. "Libya's Legitimacy Crisis". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 06 October 2014. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/10/06/libya-s-legitimacy-crisis/hr9j>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>33</sup> "The Libyan Political Agreement as signed on 17 December 2015". UNSMIL. <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=miXuJYkQAQg%3D&tabid=3559&mid=6187&language=fr>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>34</sup> "Libya's Unity government leaders in Tripoli power bid". BBC. 31 March 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35929232>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>35</sup> Sarrar, S. and Wardany, E. S. "Libyan Oil Port Said to Re-open as OPEC Nation Boosts Output". Bloomberg. 05 January 2017. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-04/libya-oil-export-terminal-said-to-re-open-as-crude-output-rises>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>36</sup> Elumami, A. "Libya's self-declared National Salvation government stepping down". Reuters. 05 April 2016. <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-libya-security-politics-idUKKCN0X22MD>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

<sup>37</sup> Berkowitz, O. "Libya Special Intelligence Report-Projections on Stabilization and the Challenges Ahead-August". August 2016. <http://www.max-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/pic1-current-territorial-control-in-Libya.jpg>, Accessed on 22 January 2017.

## THE CURRENT SITUATION

The European Union plans to meet the challenges and solve the issues in the framework of an international mission. The radical Islamist groups, such as the Islamic State, expanded to the neighbourhood of Europe. Earlier the Islamic State, Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operated far from Europe, but now they are only in some 300 km from the borders or the European Union.

Nowadays one of the most serious challenges is that members of terrorist or Islamist groups can mingle among migrants. Actually, it is impossible to identify someone among the thousands of migrants who does not have any documents. There is no way to check someone's background. In practice, there is little chance to find the radicals or terrorists among the thousands of migrants.<sup>38</sup>

Another significant challenge for the European Union is illegal arms trafficking. During the chaos of the first civil war in Libya, large amounts of weapons, rifles, surface-to-air missiles and explosives were lost from the military bases and warehouses. Then they reappeared in other conflicts in Darfur, Central-African Republic, Nigeria or Mali. The proliferation of Libyan weapons has certain implications.

First, these weapons destabilized other regions and gave fuel to fire in other conflicts, where other international or European missions may operate, so those weapons endanger European soldiers and staffs as well. Secondly, the international community cannot build peace if every involved party has weapons. Thirdly, it is the only a question of time when those weapons, explosives, and detonators arrive in Europe and are used for criminal or terrorist purposes. Actually, large amounts of drugs arrive in Europe from North Africa. If drugs can be smuggled to Europe, so can weapons.

Chaos and the civil war, and in general all conflicts result in refugees. There are not only Sub-Saharan Africans who want to travel to Europe, but people from Libya too. If they have no chance for a normal life, they want to start a new one. Security aspects are not everything, but they are certainly necessary. There are economic and financial aspects as well. *“For most people with empty stomach democracy and dictatorship do not differ very much. Several changes would be vital for the establishment of secure North Africa, such as stabilizing the financial environment, reinforcing private sector vs. state ownership and increasing the integration of local industries into regional and international economy.”*<sup>39</sup>

People need work in order to live a normal life, but without international assistance and help it is almost impossible. The European Union and the international community should put money and investment into the restarting of the country.

## THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL MISSIONS

In the outlined situation, the only solution for the stabilization in Libya seems to be an international mission.

The background and the necessity of the first NATO mission, Operation Unified Protector:

Winds of change blew in Libya in 2011. The Libyan people demanded changes. The Libyan tribes did not trust Kaddafi and his regime anymore. The Arab Spring was just more

<sup>38</sup> Marsai. “A libíai helyzet...”. 4.

<sup>39</sup> Besenyő, J. “Can the „Arab Spring” present a real threat to Europe?” *Strategic Impact* 1. 2014. 39.

fuel to the fire. Compared to Tunisia or Morocco, in Libya there was no chance for peaceful transition. Moammar Kaddafi was not open for any dialogue or cooperation. He did not want to resign or give up his power and position. When mass protests started, the Libyans systematically turned against Kaddafi and established their own unified opposition as the National Transitional Council.<sup>40</sup> Kaddafi's response to the Libyans' demands was aggression and violence. The protests turned into civil war.<sup>41</sup>

The European Union and the international community had two options. The first one is that the European powers let the "dictator" kill thousands of innocent civilians who wanted to remove him from power. This scenario caused serious ideological controversy to Europe and it is contradictory to European ideology and human rights which are fundamental for the European Union. Besides the ideological dispute, the European interest was to try to influence the processes and events in Libya. The other option was a military intervention with the aim of protecting civilians, overthrowing Kaddafi, assisting peaceful transition, and securing European interests in Libya. Finally, giving in to the pressure by Great Britain and France, NATO intervened and launched Operation Unified Protector. The European powers and NATO made a fatal mistake. After the fall of Kaddafi and the international intervention they left Libya in chaos and they did not assist in stabilizing the country, and they did not help Libyans to rebuild their country.<sup>42</sup>

Operation Unified Protector was not the only international mission in connection with Libya. There was another NATO Operation in the Mediterranean Area: Operation Sea Guardian was a flexible maritime operation which was created at the Warsaw Summit in July 2016. The mission statement of the operation was "*to provide support to maritime situational awareness, to fight terrorism at sea and to contribute to maritime security capacity-building.*"<sup>43</sup> The first operation in the Mediterranean Sea was Operation Active Endeavour which was launched by NATO in response to the "9/11 2001 terror attack" in the United States. In the framework of Operation Active Endeavour NATO ships conducted patrols to detect terrorist activities at sea, such as weapon smugglings, and also to protect against other terrorist activity. Operation Active Endeavour ended in October 2016 and it was followed by Operation Sea Guardian.<sup>44</sup>

The European Union was also involved in an international maritime mission, EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA. The aim of the mission was to respond to the migration issue. The core mandate of EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA was to disrupt the business model of trafficking in human beings, to fight against human trafficking networks, and to prevent more losses of life at sea. Its mandate was "*extended for training of the Libyan coastguards*

<sup>40</sup> "The National Transitional Council, Libya". NTC. 24 January 2017. <http://ntclibya.org/>, Accessed on 24. January 2017.

<sup>41</sup> Sinjab, L. "Syria conflict: from peaceful protest to civil war". BBC. 15 March 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21797661>, Accessed on 24 January 2017.

<sup>42</sup> Marsai, V. "A migrációs diskurzus margójára III.: A líbiai válság európai migráció tükrében". *Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont Elemzések* 1. 2017. 2–3.

<sup>43</sup> "Operation Sea Guardian". NATO. 27 October 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_136233.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136233.htm), Accessed on 27 January 2017.

<sup>44</sup> "Operation Active Endeavour". NATO. 27 October 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_7932.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_7932.htm), Accessed on 27 January 2017.

*and navy, furthermore contributing to the implementation of the UN arm embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya”.*<sup>45</sup>

The most serious issue which the European Union had to face was the fact that it did not have the resolution of the United Nations Security Council. EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA had no right to operate on Libyan waters and land therefore they were not able to take back the rescued migrants to Libya, and the ships participating in the operation had to carry the migrants to Europe. Practically, the European Maritime Operation was assisting the migrants to reach Europe and was also assisting the man-smuggling and human trafficking organizations because it was the EU ships which took the migrants into Europe instead of those of the human smugglers.<sup>46</sup>

On 15 March 2015, the High Representative of the European External Action Service Federica Mogherini proposed to the 28 EU Member States that they consider sending soldiers and police to Libya to monitor the ceasefire, to protect airports, other critical infrastructure, and ships to help to enforce the arms embargo. According to the proposal, the EU should have considered sending military force and civilian teams to Libya. The military force was to protect the government and the police, and civilians were to help with fighting terrorism and restart the industry and the economy. The proposal was met with skepticism by the EU governments and it was not implemented.<sup>47</sup>

The challenges of a potential and effective international mission are derived from the following factors:

The EU MS are sceptical about a new, potential EU mission which requires the request of the UN-backed Libyan Government – an independent legitimate country – as well as the mandate of the United Nations Security Council, where two countries with veto right, Russia and China, presumably would not support any international mission.

The potential veto from Russia and China has geopolitical reasons. A hotspot close to the European Union and mass migration may be beneficial for both of them because the Libyan crisis may result in political and economic tension within the European Union.<sup>48</sup>

The Libyan Government has two undisputed reasons against any international intervention or mission.

First, the Libyans do not want any foreign or international force to be stationed in Libya.

Second, the Libyan Government does not want the European Union to deport the migrants back to Libya.

According to the International Organization of Migration – a UN Related Organisation – the migrant population in Libya is about 700,000 – 1,000,000. They come mostly from Egypt, Niger, Sudan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Syria, and Mali. These people are often victims of slavery, prostitution, and other abuses and harassments. As a consequence of such conditions,

<sup>45</sup> “EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA”. European External Action Service. 01 March 2016. [https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eunavfor-med/36/about-eunavfor-med-operation-sophia\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eunavfor-med/36/about-eunavfor-med-operation-sophia_en) Accessed on 27 January 2017.

<sup>46</sup> “Mediterranean crisis: UN welcomes EU measures on migrants, urges more comprehensive action”. UN News Centre. [http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50677#.WKoeom\\_hDIU](http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50677#.WKoeom_hDIU), Accessed on 27 January 2017.

<sup>47</sup> Croft, A. “EU proposal to send soldiers to Libya met scepticism”. Reuters. 15 March 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/libya-security-eu-idUSL6N0WH0JU20150315>, Accessed on 27 January 2017.

<sup>48</sup> Marsai, V. “A migrációs diskurzus...”. 11–12.

a lot of people choose to take the dangerous journey to Europe. In 2016, 278,327 migrants arrived in Europe over the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>49</sup>

On the one hand, mass migration is a profitable business for the Libyans, but on the other hand, it causes serious security and social problems for the country.

## CONCLUSION

After the Arab Spring that later evolved into a civil war and Kaddafi's death, the former stable country in the vicinity of Europe turned into a conflict zone. Libya is a serious challenge for the European Union in political, security, and economic aspects. There are many security challenges in Libya, such as mass migration, the presence of militias and armed groups. Currently one government governs the country but radical Islamism and terrorist organizations and enormous amounts of illegal weapons and explosives cause further complications. These factors cannot be solved without international assistance.

Since this paper is just an overview of the situation, it cannot provide a solution for all problems of how to rebuild a new democratic country. It is a long-term project to unite all the different interests to create a single functioning body. It is certainly not possible without discussions with, the will and the permission of the legitimate Libyan Government.

The lack of political consensus in the European Union, the geopolitical interests of other powers and the Libyans' own interests block any international mission in Libya, but without an international mission, there is no hope for a stable country close to the southern border of Europe.

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<sup>49</sup> "Libya". International Organization for Migration. <https://www.iom.int/countries/libya>, Accessed on 28 January 2017.

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