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THE FUTURE OF WAR, THE WARS OF THE FUTURE

**ABSTRACT:** War is an organic part of human history, and we can say it is part of life, or in some regions of our World it is life itself. It would be very naive to think that we can ever get rid of war; it is part of human nature. For this reason we face another problem, if we cannot get rid of war, we have to prepare for it, but how can we predict what kind of it will come to us. This problem has caused much headache for politicians and soldiers, strategists and theoreticians, who have had the task: prepare troops for the next war. Many times they have failed and their countries have fallen or suffered more than they had needed to. A common mistake was that they have prepared to win the last fought war, not the next one. The goal of this paper is not to give exact predictions of future wars, but to discover current tendencies. Upon this we can draw possibilities, which may bring us closer to possible future realities. The real goal is to think out of the box and shed light on this very rich topic from other perspectives and trigger others for further thinking, because this paper in itself cannot be perfect or complete therefore it should be only a starting point or a station of a long journey. We are on the edge of something, but it may be too early to determine whether we are on the end of an age or this is already the beginning of a new one.

**KEYWORDS:** counterinsurgency, MOOTW, hybrid warfare, economic or financial warfare, networking, non-linear wars, insurgencies, modern tribal wars, migration

**INTRODUCTION**

Nobody could predict the nature of First World War which cost millions of lives on the battlefield. After the Great War, generals and politicians in the West created a strategy to win the „next First World War” which led to the building of Maginot Line and the Belgian fortress system along the German border. On the other side of the border, the losers learned more from their defeat and created a new kind of warfare, which was later called „Blitzkrieg”. The new mechanised warfare made the remnants of the previous war useless. After the Second World War both NATO and Warsaw Pact prepared for the Third World War, which would have been similar to WW II but with the massive use of weapons of mass destruction; fortunately WW III has been postponed. But Cold War was only cold in Europe and the North Atlantic, meanwhile a lot of proxy wars were fought around the World. American forces, which were built up to stop a Soviet invasion across Germany, had to fight against mass infantry assaults in the snowy hills of Korea and guerrillas in the Vietnamese jungle, while Soviet forces, which were built up to invade Western Europe, had to fight on the Chinese border and in the mountains of Afghanistan. As the Berlin Wall fell down, many felt that World peace broke out, but Saddam Hussein had other plans. With Cold War tactics the US-led coalition defeated the Iraqi army and many thought that similar wars would come, where the advanced Western forces would defeat the aggressors, but history failed them again, because the 90’s brought the age of endless peace operations from Haiti to Timor Leste, where many times the peacekeepers did not know who were the hostile forces. After 9/11 militaries had
slowly reinvented counterinsurgency, however, almost every country had had some kind of experience about the fight against guerrillas.

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) have become a regular term, because war is an ugly word. Politicians do not like saying „boys go to war”, this is a strong rhetoric reason why ‘conflicts and operations’ replaced ‘war’. On the other hand military science needed a term for the situation which is not a real war like WW II was, but is definitely not peace.

So, what is war? Carl von Clausewitz took previous wars and his experience from the Napoleonic wars as a basis to create a definition for war. In his work ‘On War’, he called it as: ‘War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’. In this definition there is much truth but we have to ask ourselves, is it true nowadays too? It must be, but not in that clear form as in the past, since many things have changed and there are a lot of factors in our World, which Clausewitz did not know or could not imagine. For example in the previous wars since the ancient times, the armies lined up against each other and by superior force, tactics and operations or simply by fortune, defeated the other party physically. Now and in the future some financial transactions or a group of hackers can cause so much damage to a country in terms of money like a minor war, without any shot fired. Factories may stand still (in a normal war they would be bombed), but if it is sent to bankruptcy, the effect is the same: production stalls. Hackers can shut down computer networks, which could paralyse a government, a company or a whole country in a *Die Hard 4.0* style. Media can be also a good tool to disrupt the enemy’s credibility with a well built up campaign, diminishing its reputation, creating hostile public and international opinion, which could result in international isolation and, maybe, a change of government. And these methods can be combined with more conventional military operations to achieve the desired end state, as the Gerasimov doctrine uses them.

Therefore we have to ask what war itself is. Do we really need fallen soldiers and smoking ruins to say that we are at war? Maybe armoured columns do not advance across our country, paratroopers do not fall from the sky and bombers do not fly sorties against us, in spite of this we can be under attack. Sometimes it is hard to identify the attacker, so it is hard to counterattack. As opposed to conventional war, it is hard to determine the attack, we just feel the results. Or do we know that we are at war? Maybe we live in a constant war and only a small circle knows about it, only the belligerents change: terrorists, hackers, hostile states, financial groups. We have to examine the cause of the attack; maybe it is not political, despite its political side effects, only acquisition. So can we say that if another country attacked us with armed forces to seize our natural resources or other values is war, but if a financial group was shorting us to seize tremendous money or achieve a government change, is not war? Maybe history has overwritten the above scientific definition. According to current standards, it would be better to say that war is an act of pure force and/or coercive and disrupting tools to achieve our goals against enemy’s will. Therefore in this paper I use a broad sense use of war, defining those situations where some kind of hostilities is in progress as we will see the various possibilities. On the other hand, from a military point of view, when boots are on the ground it really does not matter that we call it MOOTW or war or something else, because troops are going to war. The Battle of Mogadishu was part of a

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peace operation, which is not war, however it had been the most intense fire fight of the US Army since Vietnam (including Grenada, Panama and the Gulf War).³ While in Iraq, during the war period (March–April 2003) 122 US troops were killed (hostile and non-hostile),⁴ by December 2011, the end of active US military presence, this number had grown to 4490,⁵ most of them killed in MOOTW operations. We can say that war in its clear form does not exist now, for this a clear scientific distinction is not possible or simply does not make sense.

**BELLIGERENTS**

To predict the wars of the future, we should first examine the possible belligerent parties. The circle of potential belligerents has significantly increased, we can list countries, various groups and also individuals, meaning everyone who takes part in offensives or defence, regardless of being armed or not. From them numerous opposition scenarios are possible, like state vs state, state vs group, group vs group, state vs individual, group vs individual, and of course the combination of these. The state vs state scenario is the most obvious what we have seen many times in history; naturally these wars can be different depending on size and capabilities of the adversaries. However the number of interstate conflicts has been decreased, it would be a huge mistake to rule out the possibility, even in Europe as many „experts” did in the past years.

Groups are more interesting belligerents since we can list almost endless types of them, based on classification. The first and most obvious is guerrillas, or partisans, or insurgents, or whatever they are actually called. Some kind of armed group which fights against a foreign or domestic government along its own political or social agenda, for example liberation from foreign occupation, autonomy, or independence, etc. We have seen endless examples of guerrilla wars, which have become more and more popular, since their asymmetric tactics were found effective against even the most advanced and strongest militaries. Although defeating them is not impossible, it is much harder than win in a conventional war, hence the weaker side has more chance than in a face-to-face fight. There are domestic and foreign insurgencies, the latter comes up during operations abroad.⁶

Terrorists are more problematic because the question “Who is a terrorist?” is always part of the game. There are numerous definitions for terrorism, maybe the Netanyahu’s is the simplest, he says that terrorism is a use of violence and/or threatening on civilians to terrorize them and trough it achieves political goals.⁷ On the other hand, sometimes it is very difficult to draw a clear line between guerrillas and terrorists, because sometimes it is the same, one day fighting against occupiers (guerrilla), next day committing attacks on civil society (terrorist). In Iraq, Afghanistan and the broader Middle East it is a usual thing, but in other parts of the World the clear classification is easier. Terrorist types can be categorised in many ways, but (in this case) we have to distinguish (just) old and new

⁶ It is a hard question that do the private armies of warlords belong to here or maybe to criminal groups?
type terrorism. The old type has usually achievable goals (autonomy, independence), they commit selective attacks and are willing to negotiate. New type terrorists do not negotiate, they have irreal goals (e.g. global caliphate) and commit indiscriminate attacks, these are the characteristics of modern jihadist movements. One of the most important things about terrorism is to forget a bunch of bad guys with AKs and Semtex. Modern terrorism is more diversified, these organisations not only have militant groups, but own security services, far reaching economic and financial branches, political wings, media and propaganda groups, humanitarian organisations, health and education institutes.

Mercenaries\(^8\) have always been part of warfare, but now it is done at a very very sophisticated level, in specialized firms. Today, individual soldiers of fortune were replaced by companies which provide services from logistics and personal protection to combat operations. Many PMCs served out even the strongest armed forces, for example Halliburton provided global logistics to Pentagon and later to British armed forces, while other companies helped with the operating of highly sophisticated systems like Navy’s AEGIS system. However the employees of PMCs are neither soldiers nor civilians, as they are not current members of any armed forces, but they very often carry or operate weapons, so legally they are not civilians. Furthermore, they are out of the military chain of command, so they have responsibility toward their CEO, not a military commander of operations. Among their criticism are that they work for those who pay them, from democratic governments to multinational companies dictators and warlords.\(^9\) Another strange act was in 2004, when Paul Bremer, the US governor of Iraq, immunized PMC personnel from any prosecution in Iraq before he left the country,\(^10\) further complicating the questionable responsibility issue of them. According to US DoD, in 2010 224 thousand contractors worked for CENTCOM mainly in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, most of them had support and logistics role.\(^11\) Until 2015 April, 7,000 contractors were killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the real number must be higher as many times contractor death (mainly foreign and local) are not reported or counted anywhere.\(^12\) According to estimates, by 2004 the private military industry reached the annual 100 billion USD value.\(^13\) This business is so prosperous that it is possible in the future that more advanced capabilities may be rented. For example, naval or air forces and special capabilities like ballistic missile defence or anti-satellite capabilities, those which are too expensive for smaller countries to maintain, but when they need them, they can hire them.

Fortunately, in the West we do not have to face political parties whose private armies fight on the streets, but in many parts of the World it is reality. But instead of simply speak-

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ing about private armies, we should focus on other possibilities. Political parties have an extremely crucial role, because those who are in the national assembly have an effect on legislation and running of the country. But they can also fight against the standing government as a legal branch of an insurgency (like Sinn Fein and the IRA) or support alien interests, heighten tensions against the government, delay or prevent bills, which can be crucial in a conflict or imminent conflict situation. They can create a shadow government and finally, if enemy attack commenced they can step forward as a „legitimate” government which ask for foreign help. This is not a game of mind. During WW I Lenin could go back to Russia only because Germany helped him to overthrow the provisional government and quit Russia from the war. During WW II both Hitler and Stalin had puppets who were glad to „call in” their troops, like Quisling did in Norway, or local communist parties in the Baltic states or Finland. If we examine the Russian non-linear war in Ukraine, the role of the pro-Russia political parties is essential for success.

NGOs and civil organisations are very widespread today, it is hard to sum their numbers, but there are millions of them worldwide. Many of them do very useful work for society and their actions can be tagged only as positive. On the other hand, many others’ activity is more problematic, many of them support cases which are harmful to society, and we have to note that in democracies they have a lot of tools to fight against their own government or support fight in other countries. As an asymmetric warfare book writes, they only follow their own agenda, do not deal with any other interests, do not respect rules, demand the cooperation of government while they refuse to do so. They are ready to sabotage the measures of national governments, manipulate international public opinion with the belief that they can do anything because their status saves them. Anybody can found an NGO and it will follow his or her and the main funders’ goals, but in democratic sense no one elected them and they also lack political or any other responsibility. NGOs are ideal to organise demonstrations, collect and redistribute funds, provide shelter, develop and organise insurgency, provide supplies, run an intelligence circle or spread propaganda. Hand in hand with media and extremist political parties, these organisations have a leading role to cover up important problems in the name of political correctness and human rights. If their activity is compromised, they can hide behind civil rights, claiming that they are investigated only for political reasons, and they can count on international media support and international organisations. Wikileaks can be an interesting and very good example, it leaked out confidential and secret US papers, which caused tremendous diplomatic troubles to Washington, while it had also some military effects, giving an example how an NGO can fight a superpower with generally simple techniques, which can be considered as a soft disrupting tool. If we consider non-linear war and events in Ukraine, it is not difficult to verify that NGOs can be very useful means in preparing the „battlefield” for an imminent coup and take over or a covert or overt armed attack against the country. However not only Russia, but Western powers also extensively used the NGOs in Ukraine before the revolution to oust the pro-Russia Yanukovych government.

Regarding media, the first thing to do is forgetting independent media or journalist ethic. The greatest newspapers, news channels and sites are part of the greatest firms in

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15 This paragraph is not about those journalists who are loyal to their profession, work hard to create the clearest picture possible and try to inform their audience according to their best knowledge without bias or preconceptions.
the World, which have many economic and political interests and the means to support their
goals. We can say that media does not only report about events, but it also develops them.
Media cannot be a real belligerent like combat forces, if we want to use military term, it has a
combat service support role. What soldiers call PSYOPS, media does every day. Therefore,
media can work for governments, political parties, lobby groups, national or multinational
companies, NGOs or along any ideology the given journalists believe in or paid for. Media
has been always a very useful tool to propagate own opinion, nowadays it is as important to
oppress as any other. In our World where there are so much ways we can get information,
it is hard to present only one deliberate picture and a decisive coverage cannot be reached,
in spite of this superiority can be developed. This is possible through „news chain reac-
tion”, but what is it? It is enough to place some „good” articles at high-value press players,
because most of the news companies do not have the resources to be present everywhere,
therefore they take over news from the bigger ones, so only some well-placed article can
trigger a news flood and this will reach most of the people. Biased reports, misinterpretation,
half-truth, fake news and recorded put-up situations are good means to disrupt a reputation
and credibility of countries or groups. In dictatorships it is easy to gain that opinion ter-
ror, but it would be a mistake to think that only they use it. Past years proved that there is
no such lie, which even the greatest and most respected Western newspapers or channels
cannot present as an only undisputable truth. They have a leading role in supressing those
who have different opinion, keeping up opinion terror. The force of the media is that they
develop opinions. Armies can win battles, if people see defeat on the TV, on the sum it will
be a defeat. Therefore, underestimating the role of the media in war is one of the greatest
mistakes the commanders and politicians can make.

Companies are among the belligerents, but not only PMCs, though they are crucial for
these business wars nowadays. But this is not a new phenomenon, here come two examples.
The British East Indian Company was the top multinational firm of its age. To protect its
trade compounds it needed security personnels with a modern word, which included some
companies of local riflemen with artillery led by European officers, but by the early 19th
century it had nearly 150 thousand soldiers (both European and native units) which was
more than most Europeans states had, and also a small navy in India. In 1746 EIC fought
a war with the help of regular British Army units against the French firm, Compagnie des
Indes and its private army in India. Companies have always been some kind of belligerents,
we should think about that wars often break out because of economic interests, so business
and war always walk hand-in-hand. Modern multinational companies have also interests,
maybe more than ever, and use any tool to protect them, however, such a colonization that
EIC did is not possible today. Nevertheless, modern firms can also wage a war with more
indirect means, and mainly in territories where media attention is less focused, like Africa,
with more direct ones. A more modern example happened in Sierra Leone, where the RUF
rebels (more like drug addicted mass murderers than freedom fighters) threatened diamond
and other mineral mines, where the South African DeBeers, the British Branch Energy and
other companies had mining concessions. The national government proved to be impotent
and RUF was close to seize the capital city. In 1995 the South African Executive Outcomes
PMC was hired to secure the mines. 150-200 mercenaries (mainly ex-recon and special

16 PSYchological OPerations
forces) trained and led the local Kamajor militia and went on an offensive, driving out RUF which got on the edge of defeat.\textsuperscript{18} It is also a good example that these actions are not only negative, because EO’s operation meant the life for the local civilians, however, they fought for business interests. Companies use PMCs in many parts of the World, mainly as security force for their installations or personal protection for their employees, but the above example showed that PMCs can be used by firms in a more traditional military role. However, it questions the state’s monopoly of force, or what happens if a country fights a war with a company, or a company fights with a group in its territory. Many multinational companies’ revenue is higher than that of most of the countries’ GDP,\textsuperscript{19} so raising or renting an army is a possibility in the future, and it can be more elite with more advanced weapons, and may be bigger than most of the countries will have in the future.

Illegal occupiers are those who migrate to another place (country) to settle down there, however they refuse any compliance with native population, they want the goods and all the benefits without giving anything in return. If they are prevented somehow, they act aggressively. Although they disguise themselves many times as refugees and use real refugees to infiltrate or mask themselves, there are many differences in their behaviour. Refugees ask, occupiers demand; refugees are grateful for any aid, occupiers take what they need; refugees cooperate with host nation, occupiers try to drive out host nation by bare violence or creating parallel society; refugees appreciate their new home, occupiers want to exploit it; refugees run for life, occupiers go for higher benefit. Occupiers also refuse to accept the rule of law referring to harsh conditions and they think acting out of law is legal for them, because media, extremist and radical parties and NGOs are on their side.

Although fight against criminal organisations is the task of law enforcement forces, sometimes military is also needed. Organised crime usually keeps a low profile, because the greater the publicity the greater the burden from the police. On the other hand, in some parts of the World local authorities lost control over some of its territory, where criminal organisations take over. This is a reality in Latin America where drug cartels are so powerful that police itself is not enough to defeat them, many times even military is insufficient for victory. The favellas of Rio, jungles of Columbia, or the streets of Mexico became battlefields in the past decades, when government forces and criminal organisations clashed. The Mexican drug war started as an inter-gang fight over the rule of drug routes from Columbia to the USA, but the scale of violence overwhelmed Mexican police, which was also on the cartels’ paylists, therefore Mexican armed forces had to intervene to restore order. Also local militias have been formed to save civilians, although many times they fight against each other. According to estimates, at least 60 thousand people died in the drug war between 2006 and 2012.\textsuperscript{20} Sometimes these groups are hybrids with drug traffickers who become guerrillas to protect their territories, sometimes guerrillas turn to be drug traffickers to raise easy money for their cause and to continue fight.

Individuals can be also belligerents. If we take hackers, we can see that one single person can also cause tremendous trouble as we depend more and more on information networks. Individual hacker attacks happen every day with the intent of gaining money, make trouble for fun, or for political reasons as, for example, Anonymous hacker group have done it many times, shutting down websites. Governments and violent groups have recognised the value of hackers and today hacker groups or units are developed, some for offensive, others for defensive roles. Offensive groups can be used to acquire information or disrupt enemy networks. For example China uses them extensively for military and economic espionage, North Korea used them to revenge and cracked the sites of Sony, stole and uploaded movies to file sharing sites, which caused more than 100 million-USD-losses for the company.  
21 Russia expedited successful cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008, although its direct involvement could not be confirmed. In both cases government sites were shut down using automated methods, but Moscow took no responsibility for these attacks because of the lack of any direct evidence.

Financial speculants and businessmen can be considered as belligerents. However they mostly want to acquire money, sometimes they have political goals too, for example changing government (for a more compliant one). The modern international financial system makes it possible to devastate a country without a shot fired. Shorting is not far from robbery, it is just more sophisticated. I am not an economist, so I do not go deep in technical details. But only from a military point of view, it can be considered as an attack against the country to seize values of it not by force, but a trick. Can we see economic coercion as an act of war? Is it an attack when country does it, and if so, what is it if a financial group does the same? From this aspect, can leaders of financial groups be legitimate targets? How should we estimate a situation when a businessman attacks a politically and militarily allied country? Historically these people can do their tricks without any political responsibility or ever be taken to criminal court for their actions; however, the attacked party suffers all the consequences for years or decades.

We have to take the question what if we do not know the enemy, if the fog of war is so thick that we only feel their strikes, but we have no information about the attackers’ identity? What should we do if we are under attack, but we cannot track down who is behind the scenes? Modern technology and our modern World have empowered too many players, including individuals, to be able to wage war. If someone has enough money, he/she can hire a professional army (PMC), can establish supportive political parties and NGOs to represent interests, pay journalists to degrade the reputation of adversary, purchase cyber intelligence and attacks and launch economic actions. I think this will be one of the greatest questions of future wars: to identify the real attacker. Also this is a real counter-democratic move, that more and more people can launch devastating attacks only on their own or a small group’s decision. The conclusion should be that anyone who is willing to wage war must be seen as a belligerent regardless of wearing military uniform or an expensive suit.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF WARS

Conventional wars are on the decline, but that does not mean that we can forget it as it probably remains the main form of armed clash between states. It can be very similar to what we have known since the Second World War, with mechanised warfare and the massive use of artillery, air and naval forces. Therefore conventional forces play the leading role. In case of highly advanced countries, warring sides can use cyber, anti-satellite, electronic warfare to deplete adversaries’ command and control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation and communication capabilities before the conventional operations are launched. Anti-access and area denial weapons can play a leading role in defending own territories or setting up a perimeter in the theatre of operations where enemy forces are not able to intervene without suffering heavy casualties. The main difference between former and future battlefields can be the more effective kill chain which makes the most advanced main battle tanks, fighter bombers (maybe except stealth ones) or warships less survivable. Situational awareness is also in jeopardy as against lower tech adversaries high-tech countries can reach the highest level ever, but against other high-techs with the above mentioned capabilities it will be able to fall on a WWII level. Only one thing is sure, future conventional wars will be faster and more destructive.

Hybrid warfare or war has become a very fashionable term, however it is generally used in a wrong sense and the war in Ukraine is tagged with „hybrid”. In reality William Nemeth used this term for the Chechen way of war. He argued that Chechen society was between modern and pre-state level, and in warfare they used also the combination of modern regular and irregular methods, and they could easily, flexibly switch to guerrilla or conventional warfare.23 Frank G. Hoffman supplemented this theory with terrorist and criminal activity and he used another term, compound warfare for when both regular and irregular guerrilla forces are used to attrite opposing force. Because of the lot of and many times misused terms, I use only the hybrid for mixed conventional and irregular warfare. He lists many examples in the history, including Hezbollah’s successful defensive fight against Israel in the 2006 war.24 It is interesting that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps worked out the „mosaic defence”, which Hezbollah used in Lebanon. Iran’s mosaic defence was based on the 2003 Iraq war, as they concluded that they could not resist an attack from a modern armed force like American, therefore they turned to a hybrid conventional and guerrilla defence.25 In this strategy they avoid clash with heavy enemy forces and exploit the geography of their country (strategic depth and mountainous terrain) to attack the supply routes of their enemies, which resulted in high level of self-control and self-reliance of the Iranian forces.26 Iran also developed an asymmetric naval warfare, which roots in the Tanker War in the 80’s, and for that Tehran have developed a massive sea denial capability by today. As Taiwan recognised its declining force comparing to ever stronger China, Taipei is also working on asymmetric

25 Ward 322–324.
War theory capabilities\(^{27}\) to execute a sea and air denial campaign in case of war, or as they call: guerrilla air and naval warfare.\(^{28}\) Also the countries’ terrain (mountains and dense cities) can be ideal for hybrid warfare and it is possible to inflict heavy losses to invading forces. Another use of this warfare can be found in a Cold War era ‘Total Resistance - Swiss Army Guide to Guerrilla Warfare and Underground Operations’ handbook which describes guerrilla and underground methods both for cutting off regular soldiers and civilians, what can be used in case of enemy (Soviet) invasion. Also North Vietnam and the Viet Cong fought a hybrid war against the US. If someone faces enemy invasion what they are unable to resist, the mixed use of conventional and irregular forces is a possible way, since the use of guerrilla methods can turn even a successful enemy invasion into a bloody war of attrition, as Soviet Red Army and partisans did it after the 1941 German invasion. Or delaying enemy advance can give time to allied forces to deploy, or preparing the battlefield and supporting the retake of their country. Because this warfare needs highly independent and self-reliant forces, this kind of warfare can be executed only as an all-out war and with ‘do or die’ mentality, so only very patriotic armed forces can fight a classic hybrid war, which also civil society accepts with all its burden and losses. Also enemy should mean a grave danger to the defender like Nazi Germany was to the Soviet Union or Imperial Japan to China.

What is labelled hybrid war in Ukraine is the non-linear war, as I presented which is real hybrid. Non-linear war is especially connected to Russian Chief of Staff General Gerasimov and named after him: Gerasimov doctrine. The General wrote his observations about the conflicts of near past, according to him we can no more draw a clear line between war and peace in every case, and a country can be disrupted within months or even days. He says: “The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown,... The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures – applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population. All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special-operations forces.”\(^{29}\) This doctrine was used in Ukraine by Russia, and we can say that the seizure of Crimea was a military masterpiece, because without firefights or any serious losses, Russia seized the peninsula and captured the local Ukrainian forces. On the other hand in Eastern Ukraine, things have not gone on in a so smooth way. András Rácz gave us an exceptional description of the Gerasimov doctrine which states that the doctrine has 3 phases with 3 sub-phases each. First is the preparatory phase (strategic, political, and operational preparations), when the aggressor reconnoitres the target country and identifies its weaknesses, then establishes organisations (political parties, NGOs) which are loyal to Moscow, gains economic influence, builds media positions and heightens tensions, develops a network of pro-Russia agents and corrupt officials, while applies soft diplomatic pressure. In the next, attack phase (exploding the tensions, ousting the central power from the targeted region, establishing alternative political power), they commence the real attack, when the attacker organizes mass demonstrations and covert forces (special forces)
disguised as local civilians capture key buildings (government, media), supplemented by an intensive information operations and the disruption of the defender’s command and control capabilities. Meanwhile the regular forces of the aggressor are ready to intervene on the other side of the border. The third phase is stabilisation (political stabilization, separation of the captured territory from the attacked country, lasting limitation of the strategic freedom of movement of the attacked country), when a referendum about independence is held, the new „state” requests help from the agressor, which later annexes it and establishes constant military presence. Due to the loss of territory, the attacked country suffers serious political, economic and prestige losses. But Rácz describes that this kind of doctrine cannot be used in every case, it needs some conditions to work, which are military superiority over the victim, weak central power and security structure, lasting dissatisfaction with the government, and the presence of aggressor nation’s minority as a source of legitimacy.30

MOOTW is a term which describes and involves a very wide range of activity and according to present tendencies this probably remains the main form of military operations in the future. While interstate conflicts are on the decline, intrastates are on the rise, when many problems need domestic or foreign military assistance. These are ranging from peace operations and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief to counterinsurgency. If we take a look at current and near past conflicts, we can develop a picture of the MOOTW of the future. MOOTW operations will be able to be a part of homeland military operations in the future, even in Europe.

According to RAND Corporation: ‘Cyber warfare involves the actions by a nation-state or international organization to attack and attempt to damage another nation's computers or information networks through, for example, computer viruses or denial-of-service attacks.’31 The extensive use of information networks and the dependence on them have made it possible to expedite devastating strikes from great geographic distances with a single laptop. Attackers can range from bored teenagers to nation states’ cyber units, as the goal can be simple theft of data or shutting down of whole systems and networks. Cyber warfare must have a central role in almost every type of conflicts in the future; therefore it is not really an independent category, but a part of every other. We must note too that the practicing of cyber warfare does not need visible acts of hostilities; instead, it can be done as a silent war also in peace time.

Economic or financial warfare has become a very often used and widespread form of warfare, an alternative warfare against deploying troops. However this warfare has its limits, as only rich and powerful countries can use it against poorer and weaker states, between 2000 and 2012 sanctions32 were used against 20 countries. The leading states of this kind of war are the United States and the EU countries, however, Russia and the international organisations also take part, while on the other side we can find countries which are not famous for their wealth, like North Korea, Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic. These techniques were used to sabotage nuclear or other weapon programs or to achieve a government change, but Cuba and North Korea are good examples where these sanctions have had no real effect. One of the latest examples was the US-EU sanctions against Russia in retaliation for its ac-

32 Restrictions on trade, investments and financial transactions, and freezing assets.
tions in Ukraine. Because it is not only soft, but silent warfare it can be also used against allied countries to press them, as the US did against the United Kingdom during the Suez crisis, depressing the value of the British Pound. Financial groups can also fight this war in coordination with nation states or on their own. In the latter case the main goal is usually business, but it can have political goals as well, for example change of government for a more business friendly one, lacking any democratic consideration.

CULTURES OF WARFARE

We have to differentiate types of warfare, one is depending on the symmetry of forces. First is symmetric, when the parties are in similar strength, have a similar organisations and technology level, for example US and China, NATO and Warsaw Pact. Second, asymmetric warfare is when one party has tremendous superiority over the other in terms of strength, technology, training, like NATO and Taliban. But maybe it is an oversimplified approach because, for example, one of the tasks of the special forces is irregular (asymmetric) warfare, however they are among the best trained soldiers. So, it is better to say that asymmetric warfare is a use of minor forces against major in a way other than conventional. Asymmetric warfare became a very often used term, but many times in a wrong sense. Two totally equal enemies will never meet, there will be always some difference, so every fight is asymmetric in this sense, but here asymmetry means a very huge difference like regular army against guerrillas. Therefore we make a third term between the two, non-symmetric, when parties have similar organisations and technology level, however there is a huge difference in strength, like Russia and Ukraine, China and Taiwan. Wars happen along these types of warfare, but it almost never happens in a clear form, these can exist in a following order or in a same time. On the other hand these terms refer more like to a kind of use of force.

We can also differentiate the way that warring parties use to achieve their goals, it can be direct or indirect. Direct warfare is more straightforward, with the destruction of enemy forces, cracking the defence capability physically and achieving victory on the battlefield while indirect warfare is fighting the enemy with wearing it down, for example depleting enemy defence capabilities with the denial of access to important materials (eg. blockade) or with the destruction of war infrastructure (factories, railway). It can be psychological wear down as in the case of guerrillas, who may not defeat the enemy on the battlefield, but achieve that their enemy loses the will to fight further on.

Waging a war does not have a uniform way, different countries or groups have their own traditions, personal opportunities, resources, geographic considerations and also culture, which form their own way of war. This can be called culture of warfare, and we can differentiate them upon being direct or indirect. It is not really an operational plan or strategy, but a vision, an approach how to achieve goals, secure interests, defend the country and fight conflicts. Jenő Kovács determined the culture of warfare as “the sum of military, intellectual and material values regarding to warfare, which marks out the baseline of disintegration of enemy forces and protection of own troops. Culture of warfare can be named as an orienta-
tion of military science, a character of the armed forces, or other.”35 He distinguished three types of them; maneuver centric, material centric and guerrilla warfares.

**Maneuver centric** culture is connected to the German and Soviet/Russian culture of warfare. German maneuver centric culture is based on offensives and strikes at enemy centres of gravity. It depends on superior maneuver skills of forces and following punches, when defence is only a temporary status. On the other hand the Soviet/Russian culture shows different characteristics, as they had more forces and resources, it is more like a steamroller than a precision strike force, which counts with a lasting war and great casualties.36

**Material centric** is the way of war of Anglo-Saxon powers, and according to Kovács it uses defence as its central core, while keeping paramount territories and using great firepower to prevent enemy offensives and attrite hostile forces. This culture of war needs tremendous resources, good planning, pre-war preparations and long time to work. He also argued that it lacks creativity and it is too rigid system.37

At the guerrilla culture, he pointed out the central role of a political leader of the movement, who can be also the military one, but anyway he/she has the charisma and ability to mobilize and control the movement. The main goals of guerrilla war are to get people's sympathy, to gain international acknowledgement of their fight, to get moral-material support of great powers. Guerillas also need safe bases where they can prepare their forces and they achieve their goals through constant harassment and attrition of enemy forces, at first mentally, not really physically.38

In my opinion this theory is a little bit simplified and at least partly not true. For example between the German and Soviet 20th century way of war, there is too much difference to group them in one category. Also I argue that Anglo-Saxon powers followed a strictly defensive strategy, although they used indirect methods during WWII like strategic bombing, they had been on the offensive since late 1942, just switching right and left punches to outbalance their enemies, while their maneuver warfare was performed by air and naval forces, which made it possible to move troops around the periphery and strike at the least resistance. On the other hand, this theory is a very interesting thought experiment, that different kinds of states or groups fight their wars according to some kind of culture.

These cultures of warfare may have worked for the WWII and maybe later decades, but nowadays we cannot distinguish them as clearly, and also World has changed and maybe it is time to create a new classification. For example the elements of maneuver centric culture of warfare were adopted by almost all regular armies after WWII. However it is a type of warfare against states, for this in future low intensity conflicts, maybe there will be no one to outmaneuver (eg. urban guerrillas). Material centric is more like in jeopardy than maneuver centric as lacking state belligerents, there is no one to attrite because current enemies might not be attrited by matter, but they are also playing the same game, only they play for mental exhaustion. Wars like Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq proved that it is easier to exhaust a superpower mentally and psychologically than attrite a guerrilla force physically. This foreshadows that future wars may be decided by greater will and stronger determination, not material or technical superiority. Spoiling the new classification, it is not a perfect formula in its current form, I know that separation is not clear and there are many overlappings among

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these categories. However, it may be worth to examine what kinds of cultures develop and influence the warfares of our age.

Let’s start with the guerrilla which, according to current tendencies, will continue its hundreds years’ long victory march as the most obvious way of war for those who face a much superior enemy. Therefore it does not need any further explanation to the above written.

The next category is the conventional, which is the mix of maneuver and material centric warfares, shifted toward the former. This is and will be the primary culture for regular armies, which can be classified as mid-tech forces, thus owning (more or less) modern weaponry but maybe not cutting edge technology or if they had them, they cannot exploit the full range of opportunities of these systems. They may also lack the resources or the will to step on a next level, however, they can fight a conventional mechanised conflict with the hope of success anytime. They operate mainly with the classic fire and maneuver to defeat the enemy on the battlefield, while they are able to fight both low and high intensity conflicts. Most of the countries can be categorized in this culture of warfare; examples are Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Chile.

The next category is networking, this is the club of tier one players who have the resources, technology and other non-military means to fight wars against anyone from low intensity to World War III. They show many similarities to conventional culture, they have the modern weaponry, good training and cutting edge technology, like stealth planes, nuclear submarines, ASAT and BMD, long range strikes, some have nuclear weapons, while they gain superiority in information and situational awareness with their information systems, satellite and UAV-based ISR, and own the non-military coercive tools to secure their interests. They can use a broader spectrum of national resources and toolbox to achieve their goals from indirect sanctions to very direct military operations. These countries’ aim is to defeat the enemy in a fast, intensive war like it happened in the Gulf War or the invasion of Iraq, however, they are able to win via indirect methods. If they face an enemy with close equal capabilities, they would try to avoid direct confrontation or force the other to negotiate instead of an all-out war, in which national infrastructure would suffer considerable damage. These countries are the United States, China, Russia, United Kingdom, France, maybe Japan or future India.

Denying is maybe not a totally separate form, but a subcategory. It means strategic defence and deterrence, where goal is to prevent enemy forces to access and to operate in a territory. This is closely connected to anti-access/area-denial weapons, where advanced weaponry is used with asymmetric tactics against an advanced and mighty foe. For example, the use of anti-ship missiles and mines against enemy naval task forces. These weapons are acquired and used en masse to overwhelm enemy defence, while dispersal and great number of them assures their survival. Denying does not mean no offensive, in this case setting up a perimeter within own forces can operate with little chance of foreign intervention. Iran and China are the two primary players in denying, having the yet most sophisticated and potent anti-access/area-denial systems. On the other hand some parts of these capabilities can be found in many countries, mainly in the As-Pac region.

Hybrid warfare can be considered as a fusion of conventional and guerrilla warfare, when regular forces also have some asymmetric capabilities, or better to say they got irregular warfare training. These armed forces prepare to strategic self defence against a much stronger

\[39\text{ Meaning they have the best available real time picture about the situation, meanwhile adversaries lack or lost these capabilities, for this they are fighting almost blind.} \]

\[40\text{ Long range surface-to-surface/surface-to-air missile systems, naval mines, submarines, advanced fighter jets.} \]
adversary, with little hope for a successful conventional war. This means that enemy forces are too powerful to arrest them and/or the defender country lacks strategic depth to believe in a success of delaying and retrograde operations to a newly built up or better defensive line. However, it cannot be the war of gentlemen, as it would be a do or die situation, which requires very well determined officers and soldiers. Also these countries need a vast reservist force, which can provide large numbers of fighters in case of war, who may act as local militiamen who wage war (maybe without command) after the frontline passes through. Hybrid can mean that regular forces provide delaying mobile defence, while cut off forces with the local reservist militia fight an all-out guerrilla war. Iran and Hezbollah are good examples with their mosaic defence, and maybe Taiwan is turning that way. Nevertheless, hybrid warfare can be a weapon of choice for those small countries that face an invasion of a more powerful enemy.

*Modern tribal* warfare is not necessarily just the mix of cultures of warfare, but mix of ages. This culture closely resembles guerrilla warfare in terms of used weaponry, like small arms, RPG-s, technicals41 and maybe obsolete armours, it is typical in the most undeveloped regions of the World. In this warfare smaller, lightly armed and untrained forces fight mobile warfare, while using a strange mix of modern and pre-historic weapons and tactics. Decentralized leadership and lack of any rules of war are also the characteristics of modern tribal warfare. African civil wars give us good examples what these conflicts look like, for example Somali civil war, Afghan civil war can be also considered as a modern tribal war, as Taliban and other factions (later Northern Alliance) used similar tactics, or Islamic State does something similar in Iraq and Syria nowadays. In case of a foreign intervention this can quickly turn into insurgency as these forces cannot stand the strikes of a modern armed force, as it happened in Mali after the French intervention, therefore they reverted to guerrilla warfare. It should also be mentioned that this type of warfare has a very strong cultural and psychological element, this is one of the causes of exceptional cruelty and ritual acts like raping and mutilation in order to defeat the enemy also in psychological manner.

**WARS OF THE FUTURE**

**Conventional wars**

We cannot rule out large conventional wars in the future, but their probability declines because they are too overt, costly and destructive, and also there are many other ways to achieve goals. So, large wars are not impossible, but less probable, mainly among superpowers, like the US, China or Russia. The high end of these wars is an all-out nuclear war, which has the least probability because it means effectively the end of human race, so we do not have too much to do with it. Conventional wars are more possible, therefore more of interest. A war between hi-tech and mid-tech (or low-tech) adversaries will be mainly one sided, as it happened in the 1991 Gulf War or the 2003 invasion. In a conventional war, better training, equipment and technology will be the decisive factor, even an outnumbered force can achieve victory with superior weaponry, training and situational awareness against a much larger force with weaker training, obsolete weapons and lack of modern C4ISR42 systems.

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41 Technical: A pick up or jeep equipped with a mounted machine gun, recoiless gun or auto cannon.
42 Command, Control, Computer, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
In case of smaller countries there are many variables, so we can be fed from the past and these wars have shown a great diversity, for example beyond naval warfare Iran-Iraq and Falkland Wars have not too much common points, Arab-Israeli wars were other cases. This kind of war might be less probable than the big vs. smaller countries, because today trends show that most of the countries fight internal threats, and a war without the intervention of great powers is not probable. But if it happens, better training and discipline, and also more modern technology and superior doctrines will be the decisive factors.

However, a war between great powers and their allies is currently not so probable, but how we can say that there won’t be any such situation in the future which will lead to a major war or a new World War. Anyway, a war between superpowers will start with massive cyber-attacks against enemy military and civilian information systems and the destruction of satellites to cripple enemy C4ISR and navigation capabilities. So it is possible that the early days of a new great war would be spent in a virtual blackout. But wars will differ based on theater of operations, if it is fought in the As-Pac region, it would be mainly air and naval war in the vast oceans or archipelagos, anti-access/area-denial doctrines and joint naval-air operations would be tested against each other. In this, warring parties would rarely see the enemy visually, while warfare would be dominated by long range precision strikes, missile salvos against enemy fleets and bases, large scale air and naval battles, submarine and anti-submarine actions, amphibious and convoy operations, with the mass use of unmanned platforms (air, sea, underwater) in strike and ISR roles. On the other hand, in continental territories (like Northeast and North Central Asia, or even Europe) land and air warfare would dominate, where mechanized formations would maneuver against each other, while air forces would fly sorties against the other or enemy ground forces (close air support, air interdiction) and infrastructure (strategic strikes) to weaken enemy war machine. This war can be similar to what was expected in the 80’s in a NATO and Warsaw Pact clash, so similar doctrines like AirLand Battle or Soviet type deep operations can emerge again in an updated version. One thing is certain, this type of war would see the use of almost the whole arsenal of great powers (maybe except for weapons of mass destruction), including the use of non-military means like diplomacy, economy and media.

Hybrid wars

In a 2014 National Geographic documentary Maj. Gen. McMaster said that: “There are two ways to fight the US military: asymmetrically or stupidly.” Hybrid war can be a weapon of choice for those smaller countries that face a much more powerful, mighty enemy, which cannot be defeated in conventional war. While historic examples have shown that when opposing forces use the same strategic approach, almost always the stronger wins, on the other part in asymmetric conflicts between 1950 and 1998, the weaker side won 55 percent of conflicts. Therefore creating a professional (full time soldiers) irregular force can be the most viable defence strategy for small countries, with the creation of proper education, training, preparation and political will with citizens’ support. Of course rough terrain or urban environment is needed to expedite a successful irregular defence as Hezbollah did in Lebanon in 2006. Pentagon does not expect conventional wars in the near future, because

of the US power. Therefore those who want to defeat US forces will have to neutralize American superiority by dispersal, concealment and disruption of high end capabilities like GPS. This is why the US Army does not want to rely on only technology in the future, but also superb training, leadership and infoops.\textsuperscript{45} This is the cause why conventional wars of the future will probably turn into hybrid wars rapidly as weaker countries can hardly stand great powers’ strikes, however, even great powers have hard times when they face irregular warfare. Therefore it is a logical step that even nation states turn to irregular warfare at least partly to assure their survival. Iran, the Hezbollah, and North Korea has developed their own hybrid systems, while for countries like Taiwan, and in the case of deteriorating East European security situation, a hybrid warfare system can be a viable alternative for Eastern NATO members, like the Baltic states, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania, or the non-NATO Finland, or for Vietnam in the As-Pac.

Non-linear wars

Conventional wars are very costly ways to achieve goals, therefore new methods have emerged which use military forces and other non-military coercion in very close coordination to achieve the desired result. This is what we have seen in Ukraine in two cases, the first was Crimea with inevitable success, while the second one in East Ukraine was not sustainable without a half-covert Russian military intervention even with regular forces. But non-linear warfare is considered too successful and cost-effective comparing to conventional wars that it must have a future, however its use is restricted by the conditions which have been listed above. A probable target can be the Baltic countries (mainly Estonia and Latvia), Taiwan, Southeast Asia or even Russia’s Far Eastern and Siberian territories. This kind of warfare has the advantage of less responsibility, because if things went well like in Crimea, everything would be fine. But if things went wrong, like in Eastern Ukraine, the attacker can simply deny everything and continue its restricted secret war until things turn good or other end state comes. A non-linear war can work on its own, but in the future it can be an initial phase of a large conventional invasion, with the aim of depletion of enemy defence capabilities, or by creating the casus belli for the aggressor, claiming its responsibility to protect. On the other hand it can be a primary form of (low intensity) conflicts between great powers or alliances, as they can get rid of the destruction, heavy casualties and political consequences of a large conventional war; meanwhile they can penetrate the borders of the others.

Peace operations

Peace operations will change in nature as the number of interstate conflicts decline, so the classic peacekeeping is more and more seldom. Modern peace operations show a very mixed picture like it was in Iraq and Afghanistan, where peacekeeping, nation building and counterinsurgency happened in the same time. For this, while the main characteristics of current peace operations will remain, they may shift toward more like a combat centric activity, because losing sides can start a guerilla war against peacekeepers in the hope of achieving victory. Therefore future peacekeeping forces should prepare for combat operations also, where they will have to perform classic infantry tactics with the support of armour, engineer,

\textsuperscript{45} Wasserbly, D. "ConOps conundrum". \textit{Jane's Defence Weekly}, 30 September 2015. 25.
artillery and air forces, meanwhile they will act as a police force, humanitarian organisation (e.g. healthcare, construction) or local administration.

Insurgencies

On operations in remote foreign countries, intervening forces must face insurgencies in the future, as wars of the near past proved that the most advanced armies can be fought effectively this way. This does not mean that insurgencies cannot be defeated, but regular armed forces may have a hard time to do that, because it usually gains much more time and a more complicated approach than conventional operations. Even the most advanced armed forces, like those of the US, NATO, or Israel, have had difficulties to fight insurgencies, and while they could reach military success at a local level, countering the whole movements has been failed. Because of this, insurgencies will be the main form of defiance, since guerillas can fight a war of attrition. They have almost endless number of replacements as war produces their recruits while most of Western societies cannot stand killed and wounded soldiers, or civil casualties for a long time. Therefore intervening armed forces and their political leadership need a very strong determination and a lot of time to execute a successful counterinsurgency. Hence insurgency and counterinsurgency will appear in most of the foreign operations of the future, probably becoming the dominant form of warfare.

Domestic insurgencies are the other form, which is an everyday thing in many parts of the World from Columbia to the Philippines, but in Europe it is a long forgotten phenomenon. In spite of this Europe will have to face it and not only in foreign missions. The main cause of this should be searched in the mistaken immigration policy of the Western European countries, shortsighted political considerations, and their over-tolerant behaviour toward the incomers. This made it possible to live in Europe without learning the host nations’ language, creating parallel societies within their own districts or slums where their own rules and laws are working and not the host nation’s ones.46 „No go zones”47 are developed as enclaves, where government presence (administration, police, health, education) is failing or effectively ceased to exist, therefore host nations simply gave up part of their territories. The host nations failed to integrate immigrants, while mainly Muslim communities have shown total refusal toward their host nation societies, laws, values and way of life.48 Poverty, no perspectives, searching for identity, closed different societies with a well-developed way of life and hatred towards host society are ideal soil to radicalize people, as we have seen that thousands of second and third generation immigrants (mainly youngsters) joined the Islamic State49 to fight for radical Islam. Apart from those who have gone to Syria and Iraq,

46 Resperger, Kiss and Somkuti. Aszimetrikus hadviselés a modern korban. 263.
49 According to estimates at least 3500-3900 muslim from Europe have gone to the Middle East to join the Islamic State. Rebala, P. and Wilson, Ch. "Growth of Muslim Populations in Europe Map". http://time.com/3670892/muslims-europe-map/, Accessed on 10 October 2015.
it is hard to tell how many stayed here, and how many of them come these days, who are to be recruited as well. The newcomers will probably want to live within their people, they also export their home problems, while they will face with broken promises, unemployment and lower living standards than host society has. Europe is importing masses which tend to be radicalized (or at least their offsprings) and some parts of them will be willing to join jihadist organisations like the Islamic State, or wage a war at home. Urban slums are ideal battlegrounds to fight a guerilla war. With good planning and leadership these social problems can turn into a homeland security nightmare. Western Europe will have to face large scale urban uprisings in the future, but more serious than those we have seen in Paris, London or Stockholm, which can be supported by other non-Muslim, but marginalized extremist groups. According to IS statements they infiltrated thousands of covert jihadist fighters into Europe. They can cause serious casualties and damage if these terrorists execute their attacks, similar to Mumbai or Paris. But if they are not used as fighters, instead recruit, organise, train and lead cells, they can multiply their destructive force and this is their more probable will in this case. Breaking out an uprising is the real price that would multiply the force of these well organised groups, it just needs an event what triggers the outbreak, like it happened in Paris. If it does not happen, terrorists can trigger it by false flag operations, their task is to take events further and lead the insurgency. Secret services face serious problems, because their resources remain the same, while their target group increases and effective work can be prevented by political considerations or in the name of civil rights. Radicals are using democracy to cripple host governments to a level, where they can no longer defend the democracy. These factors make Europe a probable battleground for domestic insurgencies; Paris, Marseille, Hamburg, Birmingham and Malmö can be on the list with Fallujah, Najaf, Baghdad, Gaza or Grozny in the coming decades.

Another type of domestic insurgencies can come from non-linear wars, where security forces (military and police) have to face both trained guerillas (own and foreign citizens) and foreign special operations forces, which may be supported by a great power’s regular troops, beyond the whole political, economic and diplomatic toolkit of a nation state. Another similar situation is when armed gangs and other organised crime groups fight for territories against each other and law enforcement. This is the case in the jungles of Columbia, the slums of Brazil or in northern Mexico. Where government control is on the decline, the power vacuum is filled by criminal or other militant groups, which won’t give up their seized territories easily.

Modern tribal wars

Civil wars and inter-group conflicts of regions like Africa, Middle East and Central Asia will see modern tribal wars as a main form of warfighting. This is the war of warlords, terrorist

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50 This must not been the whole number, there must be a considerable number of people who are willing to fight, just stay here, also a much wider circle has to be here, who are not fighters, but they are ready to support them directly. While a huge base does not fight or support the fighters directly, but agree with the case and they are willing to provide financial or other support, however they stay away from operations, they are the sympathizers. This is the classic build up of the terrorist organisations and sympathizers.

War theory

and insurgent groups, or any local militia. However, it shows many elements of pre-historic conflicts, which caused fewer casualties than modern conventional wars; these can be the most savage wars with genocides, mass rapes and mutilations. These horroristic events have happened in the past in Ruanda, Sierra Leone, Darfur and Afghanistan. Therefore we have to consider them in the future and these conflicts can be the cause of international peace enforcement operations and further peace building. However, it can be halted by deploying superior force, like it happened in Somalia in 1992, when the US deployed a massive force to restore peace, it can turn into insurgency quickly, so from our point of view these conflicts should be seen as a starting point of peace operations and counterinsurgencies.

Migration wars

Because this is a relatively new phenomenon in Europe (in scale and nature), it earns more discussion. Nowadays Europe faces an annual hundreds of thousands of immigrants, which soon can grow to millions. The roots of this problem are very far-reaching from the Middle Eastern destabilization by irresponsible wars and by the Arab Spring to Europe’s behaviour, since it is acting as a migrant magnet with its generous social systems, welcoming and over tolerant behaviour toward anyone, and historical and cultural maladjustment. These factors make Europe a top tier migrant target. Letting unlimited immigration will only cause the disruption of the continent, therefore major EU nations’ leaders should think about it, because soon millions are going to knock on the door or simply kick it in, which will lead to conflicts, if it had not started yet.

Now we can distinguish three main types of possible migration wars, but they cannot be divided clearly, instead they come one from the other. The first one is what IS does, committing genocides and other mass violence against civilians to force them to flee and by generating a migration crisis, they harm their enemies. Lots of migrants cause heavy burden to host nations which have to receive, accommodate, settle, and integrate them. This can cause serious financial problem with overwhelming of host social systems, but far not as serious as social troubles. As the ethnic mixture of a country changes fast, it can cause a losing balance because large numbers of people arrive with totally different culture, religion, customs and languages. This in itself can heighten social tensions, mainly if a host nation fails to integrate them or immigrants refuse the integration. Therefore it brings a long term problems for the target countries and now we can see this type of warfare against Europe. Furthermore it gives a never returning opportunity to infiltrate terrorists and other Islamist agents into Europe as usual identity check has been suspended. These Islamist agents will be able to train, recruit, organise and lead terrorist networks across the continent to cause confusion, to carry out devastating strikes, or launch the aforementioned large scale uprisings in the future. In September 2015, the IS claimed that they have already smuggled 4,000 covert jihadists into Europe amongst migrants. This spoils the third category and the above domestic insurgency.

The second type is a counter move by target countries, which means military interventions in the departure points to counter the causes which led to migration, or intervention in the transit countries which fail to contain migrants. If we see the current situation, most

of the countries in the Balkans let the migrants flow through their territories, so they effectively gave up part of their sovereignty, because they are incompetent or by nasty reason to pass the problem to their neighbours (or both cases like in Croatia). The problem is that these countries were encouraged to do so, while Hungary which tried to keep the situation under control was under heavy pressure, from international media, through UN secretary, to major and some very minor EU leaders gave further lessons about hypocrisy and took every occasion to stab Hungary in the back. If current trends continue, we will face such heavy immigration that would be able to crack Europe from every point of view, but hopefully EU leaders wake up and start acting like nations’ leaders and not teenage human rights activists. Holding up the masses at Schengen borders is not an efficient way; therefore the problem must be solved on the route to Europe. This could lead to military interventions in transit countries to help restore order or to do themselves and then maintain it. This is not a war against migrants, because refugees have to be treated under human conditions, and of course they must respect laws too, but Europe must avoid letting such masses in. Uncontrolled immigration causes so much dilemma from social welfare to security that Europe must not let its free flow. Within the EU this problem cannot be solved as it failed to integrate those who were already born in the EU, the current trends will only worsen the situation which will lead to the above mentioned homeland security problems.

The third form is when migrants decide to use any means, including armed violence, to reach their destination. Western media created a false picture about migrants who were depicted only in positive manners, recording mainly families with little children. On the other hand, they do not like or simply fail to report atrocities that migrants commit (also against their own women, or media and politics tried to cover up the mass sexual assaults throughout Europe in new year’s eve 2016) or anything which does not support the positive image. Only a very little portion of the current migrants are real refugees who came from Syria, also relatively very few families, women and children come. Most of the migrants are young adult males in their military age, many times in very good condition, with smart phones and a lot of money. Because most of them destroy any identity papers and refuse to register anywhere, we do not know anything about them (except that they lie about their}

56 According to recent EU estimates only 20% of the migrants are from Syria. "1 in 3 'Syrian' refugees have fake IDs, German authorities admit". RT. 26 September 2015. https://www.rt.com/news/316570-eu-false-syrian-refugees/, Accessed on 4 October 2015.
names, nationalities, dates of birth, etc.\textsuperscript{59}). Those who now demand our welcome maybe fought for years against NATO and US troops in Iraq, Afghanistan or some other part of the World. These people showed to be very well organised, they come with migrant handbooks/guides,\textsuperscript{60} we could see that some kind of leaders give them orders through loudspeaker, threatening people, giving ultimatums to host nations, and then attack with improvised weapons against the police. If Europe closes its gates and other transit states do so, what will they do? We have seen that many countries’ law enforcements cannot keep back large (yet) unarmed crowd, instead they allowed them to go through their country without any control. For this reason if migrants act aggressively under generally normal conditions, what will they do under stricter ones? So it is not far from reality that we will have to face armed groups who want to simply break through every obstacle to reach their destination. Although it is not a difficult task for most of the armies to defeat a relatively large, but lightly armed force,\textsuperscript{61} these attackers have many advantages. First, most of the media and radical political parties turn a blind eye toward their atrocities. They have also a human shield from women and children,\textsuperscript{62} which prevent the police and military to fight effectively. And third, they do not need supply routes, because they could acquire most of the supplies on route. Large swarming groups can overwhelm smaller police or military units or seize smaller settlements, but their success can be based on media attention and positive coverage, which can cripple government forces from effective countermeasures. But we must see that Europe is already under a soft invasion, which will only worsen, and we cannot believe in some miracle which will solve every problem instead of us.

We have to take another possibility, when migration war can break out. A major or a global pandemic could trigger a mass immigration to any previously not infested territory, which could result in further problems over the above mentioned ones. Namely, the faster spread of a virus, which could bring out the worst of human nature both from refugees and defenders, this could lead to the most savage and desperate situations, which would be worsened by domestic panic.

**CONCLUSION**

With all these factors in view, what will future wars be like? The simple answer is they will be very-very diversified. As we have seen in the 20\textsuperscript{th} and in the one and half decades of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, wars have come in many forms and it is very hard to find two very similar wars,

\textsuperscript{59} Fake Syrian ID papers can be bought from less than 1000 EUR, because Syrian refugees get asylum easier, therefore everybody (over 90%) claim to be Syrian. "1 in 3 'Syrian' refugees have fake IDs, German authorities admit".


\textsuperscript{61} Weaponry can extend from hooligan weapons like bats, knives, broken bottles or spears and swords to infantry small arms like pistols, assault rifles or simply hunting rifles.

the two World Wars were very different, even the guerilla/counterinsurgency conflicts have had few common points. So we must avoid thinking that we can prepare for one, uniform way of war. Furthermore, the coming threats heavily depend on the country in question. For example, while future great powers like the US or China have a difficult task because of internal unrests or high-end all out wars, they have to prepare for anything, at the same time for example, according to current tendencies Latin American countries have very little possibility for interstate conflicts, on the other hand internal security threat is considerably higher.

After all, some game changing phenomenon should be mentioned or outlined again, which will have a considerable effect on future warfare. Looking at the new phenomenon of current conflicts we must highlight the increasing role of non-state actors and traditionally non-military tools. These actors cause much problem, because so far it was evident that those who carry weapons are legitimate targets, though now many elements of them are legally civilians and may never hold weapons, while actively and directly support military type operations. And not only PMCs, mercenaries or guerillas belong here, but many NGOs, newspapers and TV channels, hackers, financial groups and multinational companies, which can actively support foreign powers’ or individual political and business interests. These latter organisations can work under the concealment of humanitarian and human rights activity, which complicates the defence of the target country, while provide intensive international support and sympathy for the covert attack force. This does not always mean a direct military activity, maybe just soft coercion, which means not kinetic, however today it is a sufficient way to achieve such goals, which could be achieved by mainly military tools in the past.

The other phenomenon is the unprecedented technology level and the power it means. Military technology has had always a decisive effect on conflicts, but until the latest times it wasn’t possible to spy or disrupt from thousands of kilometers distance without a single intelligence officer or soldier in the target area. Cyber warfare brought along an age when there is no need for very complicated and expensive equipment to cause a lot of troubles. What the most frightening in this is that single individuals can do that as well as on their own.

Technology has also allowed the development of long range, highly sophisticated precision weapon systems. Hence anti-access/area-denial weapons make it possible to keep out enemy forces, while long range strike capability prevents the defender to access to enemy’s carrier platforms. In past wars the difference between capabilities was much tighter, so weaker and less developed side could fight effectively in a conventional war even against stronger enemies. Therefore in the future, there will be a great need for stealth platforms, which might be the only carriers having a survival capability to operate in denied environment. Because of their high price, there is little chance that every military can equip themselves with such a technology. Also there will be a greater need for stand-off weapons which can be launched from relatively safe distance, also by conventional platforms. Lacking any effective electronic countermeasures, the targeted side can be endangered by hostile electronic warfare, which could result in the collapse of operational capabilities, like keeping up communications, targeting or operating combat network systems.

The fast evolution and spread of unmanned platforms must be also announced, the unmanned air systems (UAS) have seen the most spectacular development, however, sea and undersea systems are also coming into operational status. Ground systems have achieved less success and their widespread use is an issue of the future, but if it happens, soldiers’ burden can drastically decrease, because “pack-animal” systems will be able to carry soldiers’ load, another use of them can be reconnaissance and fighting platforms, but partly they can
also take over tasks like convoy escort. These systems can revolutionize future warfare and decrease the number of friendly casualties. The big question is what will happen, if current unmanned systems become really unmanned and make decisions on their own?

We must make another mention. In the latter decades technologies which used to be the privilege of militaries became commercially available. Today it is an everyday thing, that anyone has a cell- or smart phone, anyone can buy a satellite phone, also anyone who has internet access, has some kind of, but not up to date satellite reconnaissance. Also, smaller drones can be bought in most of the supermarkets, which carry a small digital camera, but they could also deliver a small amount of explosives. Social networks became a very rich information source, in the past secret services would have been happy for such a database which contains relations, habits, hobbies and details of private life or political opinion and sympathies, and the best is that people voluntarily provide information about themselves. These sites became also the organizing place of demonstrations and flash mobs, which intensively contributed to the, for example, North Africa revolutions and uprisings of 2011.

So, what can we say in Central Europe, what kind of force would be sufficient for the conflicts of the coming decades? What are the coming threats for us? In my opinion the most probable upcoming military challenges are expeditionary operations derived from NATO membership or other EU or UN missions (probably mainly peacekeeping, low intensity conflicts or humanitarian aid in the third World), and the internal security problems (terrorism, uprisings, insurgencies, uncontrolled mass illegal immigration) especially in Western Europe, so low intensity conflicts will dominate the future warfare, while non-linear wars (in the territory of NATO and EU states) and conventional wars have very little possibility now, but they cannot be ruled out at a 100-percent certainty.

Because we cannot rule out conventional wars, we must be prepared for them. Before the Ukraine crisis, I had heard many times that “in Europe, there will be no wars, and current borders are everlasting”, and this too optimistic and shortsighted view always bothered me, because what if there would be? And that is what happened, when Europe suddenly faced a massive Russian intervention and revealed that most of the NATO countries’ expeditionary oriented light forces either lacked or had only limited territorial defence capabilities.

I think that every country’s ground forces need infantry, armour and artillery. Infantry should be the core; it is the most flexible, which can execute many types of combat tasks. Because of the limited nature of resources and funds in most of the countries, not every type of infantry units can be sustained; therefore cross training is essential as it is practiced in the French Army. For example, mechanized infantry can be trained for also light infantry and air assault roles (and vice versa), as light infantry is more effective in the usual tasks of low intensity conflicts, while mechanized infantry is better suited for conventional operations. Tanks and AIFVs provide the maneuver capability, firepower, and protection at the same time, for this, effective offensive, defence, or counterstrikes cannot be executed without them. Also, while the twilight of heavy armour has been announced many times since its appearance, Iraq and Afghanistan proved again their indispensable support to infantry, and until today there is no such innovation which can totally replace heavy armoured tracked vehicles. While artillery is still the most effective in the delivery of large amounts of explosive munitions to long distances and cheaply, in other words it is the tool of the remote destruction of

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63 It means that there is no crew aboard actually, but there is at least one human being, who controls them from a remote location.
enemy. Therefore these three branches are the core for any powerful ground forces, however, they also need massive support from other branches to be able to do and sustain fighting.

Special forces are indispensable for future conflicts as their value has drastically increased in the past decades, because they can be employed in any type of conflict with very various tasks. If we consider current counterinsurgencies, non-linear wars, foreign military assistance missions, or more conventional wars, special forces have always had crucial roles. Because of their exceptional skills and capabilities, these soldiers can be deployed and operate covertly also in official peacetime. No considerable armed force can let itself lack special operation forces, and due to the operational requirements of Afghanistan, many smaller NATO countries established their own units of special operations forces. However, it should be highlighted that not even the best trained special operations forces can operate successfully without an intensive and efficient intelligence and reconnaissance background (this is true for every other military operation too). Therefore these branches should be strengthened, including all types of their activity (for example the many times underestimated human intelligence or the use of recon soldiers on the ground). Beside them acquiring UAS for proper reconnaissance and surveillance is a must, however, most of the current UAS cannot operate in an environment with adequate air defence.

Air force and navy are much harder questions, because their structure depends on financial opportunities, while the latter also on geographic characteristics and long-term foreign policy considerations. At least future air forces will need stand-off and other precision weapons, particularly if they do not have stealth fighters, because considerable adversaries will have integrated air defence systems. Helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft of army aviation or air force will be also very valued assets, because of their flexibility and maneuver capability. Also, if NATO considers future counterinsurgencies, a less expensive common counterinsurgency air wing would be desired, because turboprop attack planes can be more effective and cost efficient in this role than high-tech fighter jets.

Proper reserve forces are also important, because they can multiply the actual force of the military without serious defence budget increase, what would be needed for full-time soldiers. On the other hand, requirements toward the reservists, their training and equipment must not be inferior to those of professional soldiers’; it must be close to identical. Training and education of any soldier should be as effective and realistic as possible and if there is only one thing for which we cannot spare money is the training. It can mean the difference between life and death, or victory and defeat.

Because of the increasing terror threat in Europe, the internal security role of the armed forces will definitely increase. However, this role is usually heavily restricted legally, in case of emergency, law enforcement forces cannot provide enough human force to fulfill their usual public security roles and send policemen to the streets as a preventive force in anti-terrorist operations. In this case the military is a potential source of trained armed personnel, who can supplement police, though it hasn’t been a usual mission for them so far. For this reason, there is a need for a gendarmerie type paramilitary force, which is better armed and tactically more military than regular police, but less heavy and destructive than military, it should be basically a light infantry force. It would be able to execute high end police and low level military operations as the clear borderline between police and military activities is often blurred, so it would be better tailored for higher intensity internal security. Such a force could fight against urban and rural guerillas, terrorists or foreign special operation forces. Anyway, the military and police will need more cooperation in the future.
So finally, how can we predict future conflicts and how can we prepare the troops for them? First, always remember the hard lessons of past conflicts and integrate them into training. Second, follow current tendencies which may show a way of future conflicts or may not, anyway it can be useful. Third, be openminded, examine every opportunity and never reject any possibility which has some chance, only because it is not liked or seems less probable now. Fourth, if the above written is done, find out what force structure can be the most adequate against the expected threats and spend the funds smart to build up the most effective and powerful armed force available. Fifth, never miss re-examine your past work and belief and if it is needed, make corrections. There will never be a perfect preparation, but we should try it, and finally we can never forget that it is always only the last but one war ended.

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