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WHITE PAPER 2016, ON GERMAN SECURITY POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF THE BUNDESWEHR: AN INTRODUCTION ON THE NEW GERMAN SECURITY POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUNDESWEHR

ABSTRACT: The new German "White Paper 2016" is a development process within the German security policy and gives a trend for the future development of the Bundeswehr. After a lot of public discussions about this paper, the German Federal Minister of Defence Mrs. Ursula von der Leyen, presented on the 13th of July the new "White Paper 2016" as the key policy document of the German Government on security policy. This policy paper is the essential guide for the security policy decisions and actions of Germany. It creates a conceptual and contentual framework and provides links for further national and community-specific strategies. THE White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr answers questions about the motives, interests and priorities that guide Germany's international activities. It creates baselines for all authorities of the Federal Government so that they can further develop their instruments and strategies based on their specific needs. It also describes the participation of the Bundeswehr in providing the security for Germany and its allies as well as to a stable international community.

KEYWORDS: German security policy, Future of the Bundeswehr, whole-of-government development, Comprehensive Approach, Embedded Security Policy

INTRODUCTION

White Paper 2016 was published by the German Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. This paper describes the security policy situation of the Federal Republic of Germany and its allies for the coming years. It takes on the future task of the Bundeswehr, its personnel, equipment and training.

Since its first publication on February 11, 1969¹, it has been published at irregular intervals under different titles. In public, it is called a Defence White Paper or Bundeswehr White Paper.

In the meantime, White Papers have appeared in the following years: 1969, 1970, 1971/72, 1972, 1973/74, 1975/76, 1979, 1983, 1985, 1994, 2006 and 2016. In terms of its content the expenditure reflects the changing domestic and foreign political, constitutional, military and economic situation and their discussion at the respective time.

¹ *Weißbuch 1969 zur Verteidigungspolitik der Bundesregierung* (White Paper 1969 for Defence policy of the Federal Government). Bonn, 1969.

With the new White Paper 2016 it is the first time that a White Paper was prepared in an inclusive development process. White Paper 2016 on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr is the current key policy document of the German Government on security policy.

It is thus the principal guideline for the security policy decisions and measures of German authorities. Now that the new White Paper has been adopted, it replaces its predecessor from the year 2006. White Paper 2016 on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr is a document of the entire Federal Government. On account of its whole-of-government character and its contents and scope, which encompass the entire breadth of Germany's security policy, it was adopted by the federal cabinet².

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS OF THE NEW "WHITE PAPER 2016"

The German Federal Ministry of Defence was responsible for its preparation. White Paper 2016 Project Group was part of the Directorate-General for Security and Defence Policy and prepared this document in close cooperation with all other ministries, especially with the Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Aside from these contributions from other ministries, the participation phase, which lasted from February³ to October 2015, included numerous events of various formats and with different types of participants.

The heart of the participation phase consisted of ten expert workshops⁴ on current security issues. In addition, there was an in-depth exchange with the German allies and partners, who were able to directly contribute their ideas and suggestions. Besides an abundance of expert talks, a great number of third-party events took place as well. These were used for debates with representatives from politics, science, industry and society – and above all from the interested general public.

This highlights the broad range of activities and the great interest they attracted. In total, the various events of the German Federal Ministry of Defence reached more than 6,500 participants.

These Workshops were generally conducted in close cooperation with partner institutions from various fields. These included think tanks such as the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), associations such as the Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie), Federal Ministries and international partners such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which is based in London.

A broad range of current and emerging topics and issues were debated with all partners, the invited experts, and – during the accompanying debates – the interested general public. These debates yielded many ideas and suggestions that have found their way into the new White Paper 2016.

² At its 111th meeting on 13 July 2016, the Federal Cabinet approved, inter alia, the draft White Paper 2016.

³ Kick-off event for the preparation of the "White Paper 2016 On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr" at the Grand Hotel Esplanade on 17 February 2015.

⁴ "Weißbuch 2016: Wege zum Weißbuch" (White Paper 2016: Ways to White Paper). Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Berlin, July 2016. 20–28. https://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/UIRvcjZYSW1R cEVHaUd-4cklzQU4yNW FvejhLbjVYnR1OCt3ZIU1N09FVvk5FaGxPNGVrQkd4TWVoamlGOXVJNkZUY3JTM09PLzBkUTQxNDJkUX VoQmJXM24xSngzQlBydE0wRURtc kRRL1E9/RZ_Begleitprodukt_Weissbuch_Ansicht.pdf, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

The participation phase has stimulated the security debate in Germany, broadened its scope by involving new actors, and enlarged its reach through the many events all over Germany. Germany has to use this momentum to continue the debate on the future of German security policy and the Bundeswehr and need to take White Paper 2016 as a new point of reference.

THE STRUCTURE OF WHITE PAPER 2016

The new White Paper is structured in two parts. The first part contains guidelines for security policy in the coming years. It describes Germany's approach to security, its interests, strategic priorities, and its key national and international areas of engagement.

The second part concerns the future of the Bundeswehr. Based on the papers first part, it shows the properties and abilities the Bundeswehr must have to perform as an instrument of German security policy nowadays and for the future.




Illustration 1 *Structure and Narrative Flow – Part I Security Policy*

Source: *White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*.

The first part of White Paper 2016 on Security Policy provides all other ministries with starting points for their own ministerial strategies. White Paper 2016 also provides an opportunity to continue the security debate in Germany.

After all, White Paper 2016 helps to promote the public debate on security policy and also to document Germany's ambition and scope of action for its international partners.

Ten White Papers have been published in Germany so far. Back then the title was “White Paper on the Defence Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany”. Later White Papers extended their scope to encompass security policy.

The public understanding in Germany of security changed significantly, especially after the end of the Cold War. Today’s way of thinking is in terms of extended security. Security is no longer defined as just the absence of a military threat. Instead, other developments of non-military nature can and are considered relevant to security. The new White Paper 2016 thus adopts a whole-of-government approach and in some cases even a whole-of-society approach, for example when it comes to building up and ensure resilience. In this way, it breaks new ground.

The new White Paper 2016 has been published full ten years after the last one in 2006. The 2006 White Paper was the first key security policy document to call for a comprehensive approach⁵, that is, a closely coordinated action by civilian and military actors to sustainably resolve crises and conflicts.

The structure of White Paper 2016 follows the guiding principle of a willingness to take on responsibility and a leading role. It combines the interests, priorities and key areas of engagement of German security policy into a strategic approach.

It begins with an ambitious clarification of Germany's position and its security interests. This serves as a starting point for an analysis of the security environment. The results of the analysis determine strategic priorities and the resulting key national and international areas of engagement.

The chapter "Key National Areas of Engagement" represents a substantial innovation and provides starting points for other ministries, as does the chapter "Key International Areas of Engagement". Key national and international areas of engagement are taken up again in Part II on the future of the Bundeswehr. The guiding principle of this White Paper 2016 is not only to illustrate and describe but, above all, to draw forward-looking perspectives about Germany's security policy.

Part II is based on Part I. It takes the demands and requirements from Part I and applies them to the Bundeswehr.

This is true especially of the guiding principles developed in White Paper 2016 and the further development of capability domains⁶. Together with the mission and tasks of the




Illustration 2 *Structure and Narrative Flow – Part II Future of the Bundeswehr*

Source: *White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*.

⁵ "The Comprehensive Approach provides an overall concept for policy and action in international crisis and conflict management. Its purpose is to:

- Coordinate, bundle and optimally employ,
- Resources of diplomacy, development cooperation, the civilian peace corps, military and police,
- Within and between organizations and institutions
- At the local, national, and international levels
- With the goal of effectively resolving international (violent) conflicts, thereby contributing international, European, and German peace and security." "Comprehensive Approach". Center for International Peace Operations. <http://www.zif-berlin.org/en/focus-areas/comprehensive-approach.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

⁶ The Department of Planning within the German Ministry of Defence is responsible for the development of the Strategic Guidelines and the Capability Management of the Bundeswehr.

Bundeswehr, these are used to answer the question of how the Bundeswehr of the future can meet the demands made on it.

Like Part I, Part II is also designed to finish with a clear-cut guideline for future action. The mission and tasks are formulated against the backdrop of the changed security environment and are incorporated into guiding principles and guidelines for the capability development of the Bundeswehr. Areas where further development of the Bundeswehr is necessary are also indicated. These areas spell out how Germany intends to make the Bundeswehr fit for the future, and help them protect Germany's interests and pursue their strategic priorities.

GERMANY'S VIEW ON SECURITY POLICY

The first chapter of Part I – Security Policy is entitled “Key Elements of German Security Policy” and consists of sections on “Germany's role in the world and approach to security” and “Germany's values and interests”.

The first section is the central prerequisite for the analysis of the security environment and the identification of strategic priorities.

The key questions are: How does Germany see itself? What does Germany depend on and where is Germany vulnerable? What is Germany's current and – above all – future role in international security policy?

Since the 2014 Munich Security Conference and the opening speech of the German Federal President⁷, the security debate in Germany has intensified. The idea proposed there, that Germany should assume greater responsibility, has already become reality and must be taken even further. White Paper 2016 encourages this very much.

All of these factors influenced the way Germany sees itself. At the same time, none of the




Illustration 3 *Germany's Security Interests*

Source: *White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*.

factors can be seen isolated. Instead, it is the combined effect of individual factors which is key, which forms Germany's identity, explains the role it should play in international security policy, and determines the expectations of the international community.

After identifying Germany's place in the international community, White Paper 2016 sets out the country's security interests. These are based on Germany's identity and values: German security policy is tied to values and guided by interests.

⁷ Gauck, J. "Germany's role in the world: Reflections on responsibility, norms and alliances". Der Bundespräsident. Munich, 31 January 2014. <http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/EN/JoachimGauck/Reden/2014/140131-Munich-Security-Conference.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

The national interests guide the actions Germany takes on matters of security policy. Germany's interests reflect what is required of national security policy in a globalised world.

Germany's focus, then, is not just on traditional interests like protecting and defending (if necessary) the country and its citizens. Instead, Germany asks what conditions should be maintained, protected, and developed in order to guarantee Germany's security and prosperity, and that of its allies, both now and in the future.

Milestones of Germany's national interests are their multilateral approach and a security policy based on international norms (preservation of the rules-based international order).

Germany has to first determine the requirements for security in Germany and for its interests and only then attention can be drawn to the security environment. Because only then it can be realistically assessed what current and probable developments will affect Germany's interests and thus require action on its part.

A look at the security environment shows that the challenges Germany must respond to are increasing both in number and type. In other words, greater demands are challenging Germany's security policy.

First of all Germany has to look at the causes of current developments, the most important ones are the following. The international order is under pressure. The global distribution of power is changing – power is shifting within the international community but also between countries and non-state actors.

The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation⁸ and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine both represent a challenge to the rules-based Euro-Atlantic order of peace and stability. But even the European Union (EU) project itself is under pressure.

Most recently, the outcome of the British referendum⁹ has highlighted the pressure which the EU currently faces from within. Prior to that, the EU and its various member states had already had to deal with the consequences of the economic and financial crisis, the refugee crisis, and instability at Europe's external borders. With member states now placing stronger emphasis on national affairs, the EU is now facing both internal and external challenges. This brings Germany to the specific challenges affecting their present and future security.

All in all, Germany's security environment – and the range of security risks – has become even more complex, volatile and dynamic, and thus increasingly unpredictable.

More than ever before, a broader approach to security is required, as recent events have shown. Refugee crises, pandemics, and radicalisation in societies without prospects are just a few examples of situations that have immediate security repercussions.

In this security environment, Germany must show maximum flexibility and respond to challenges in an effective and timely manner. Terrorist attacks are the most immediate challenge to Germany's security. Germany's free, open and tolerant society is both an enemy and a target of such terrorism¹⁰.

The threat from cyberspace¹¹ and information domain has also palpably increased both in number and type; it thus counts among the challenges directly affecting our security at the present time.

⁸ Crimea Crisis from February–March 2014 and Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Crimea on 11th March 2014.

⁹ Referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union from 23 June 2016.

¹⁰ Berlin Terror Attack on 19 December 2016.

¹¹ Cyber Attack on German Parliament in May 2015 and German Telekom Cyber Attack on 29 November 2016.

Hybrid threats have increased over the past few years. Through their targeted application of military and non-military measures, hybrid methods are an attempt to blur the boundary between war and peace. Often carried out in the grey area between the domestic and foreign security domains, hybrid attacks aim to reduce, as far as possible, the options available to target countries and their ability to respond. Hybrid threats call for a hybrid analytical capability¹², as well as defence readiness and other relevant capabilities.

The return of traditional power politics and the associated risk of interstate conflict are also worrying developments. Apart from affecting distant regions, such as Southeast Asia, now they also have their impact on the European neighbourhood and the south-eastern periphery of Europe.

Security challenges can arise both as a direct and an indirect consequence of these developments. Fragile states have a major impact on security because they provide safe havens for international terrorist networks and human trafficking groups and can threaten international trade and the global supply chain of energy and resources. Instability, then, is both a security challenge in and of itself and also a cause of and precondition for further risks to local security structures.

Germany can only define its strategic priorities if it has previously produced a hazard analysis. In setting out these strategic priorities – for the first time in White Paper 2016 – Germany has, in a sense, “operationalising” its interests with due consideration for the security environment.

Germany’s strategic priorities specify what Germany is willing to do to safeguard its interests in the security environment; but they also identify areas in which Germany is prepared to assume responsibility and lead.

And whenever Germany contributes to international security and stability, it contributes to German security as well.

The next chapter, “Key Areas of Engagement in German Security Policy”, is a core part of White Paper 2016.

National and international areas of engagement reflect Germany’s ambition to play a substantial role in security policy. The section on “Key National Areas of Engagement” – another innovation in White Paper 2016 – is specifically designed to encourage the involvement of all other Federal Government ministries. However, their ambition for self-improvement should not stop at national level. On the contrary, in our globalised world, which is more interdependent than ever before, Germany must constantly be prepared to assume responsibility at an international level. Germany’s national and international areas of engagement are therefore complementary and reflect the country’s overall security ambition together. White Paper 2016 is thus a national document with international aspirations.

At national level, the Federal Government is determined to increase its strategic capability. Its ability to analyse, assess, and take decisions is essential if it is to act effectively. A forward-looking and well-equipped inventory of security instruments is required. Permanently safeguarding security interests is a cross-generational responsibility that demands forward-looking and sustainable engagement. The comprehensive approach¹³ will continue to guide

¹² "In Optionen denken: Interview mit Nigel Inkster, IISS London". Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. 3 August 2015. <https://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/start/weissbuch/fragen/>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

¹³ Explained in "Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation". NATO, 2010. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

Germany's actions. But it must be even better coordinated and practiced. The boundaries of ministerial responsibility must be made flexible, because the challenges Germany face are not contained by such boundaries; sometimes the boundaries themselves are the target.

National security is not just a task of the state, but increasingly a joint task of the state, industry, academic community, and society itself. Particularly, when it comes to hybrid threats, Germany needs an approach to security that ensures resilience, which must be seen as a whole-of-society task.

If Germany is to assume its share of responsibility for international stability and security, its instruments must be further developed – especially with a view to provide an effective early prevention. Important elements of this include early crisis recognition and enabling and enhancing their partners.

The overriding goal in setting out Germany's international areas of engagement was to maintain the international order as well as to strengthen and develop it even further if possible. In working towards this goal, Germany remains true to its traditional approach¹⁴ of acting only as part of a multilateral framework. Established organisations like the UN, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE will continue to be Germany's main forums for multilateral engagement.

NATO is a guarantor of Germany's security and the main framework for action in matters of security policy. Its future viability and capacity to act must be ensured across all three of its core tasks. Collective defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security are crucially important aspects of this¹⁵. Germany will resolutely continue to play an active role in NATO's future development.

The European project and the EU itself face considerable challenges. However, these challenges also present opportunities to make the EU fit for the future and to increase its capacity to act. Germany must strengthen the EU, especially when it comes to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)¹⁶.

Germany will continue to act responsibly in pursuit of this goal. The development of an effective European security and defence industry is important in achieving this, as is the more distant goal of a European security and defence union.

Close, reliable and long-term cooperation as part of a broad network of allies, partners, and regional organisations will remain at the heart of German security policy.

But beyond that Germany must consider the increasing importance of ad hoc cooperation as an instrument of international crisis management. With a look at the implications of the first part of White Paper 2016 for the future of the Bundeswehr, the German Ministry of Defence has to develop their strategies that can be derived from Part I of the new White Paper 2016.

¹⁴ „Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany). 23 May 1949. Art. 24.

¹⁵ "Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation".

¹⁶ "Implementation Plan on Security and Defence". Council of the European Union, Brussels. 14 November 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUNDESWEHR

As an instrument of the comprehensive approach, the Bundeswehr makes a vital contribution to the security, peace and freedom of Germany, its allies and its partners as well as to international stability. The transformation process of the Bundeswehr is still ongoing also with a changed German identity and a permanently changing security environment.

The first focus is on the requirements, mission and tasks of the Bundeswehr in the changing security environment.

As we all know it is not only the number of operations but also the demands made on the Bundeswehr that have changed fundamentally. The demands made on the Bundeswehr are increasing in number and changing in type as a result of the complex, dynamic and volatile security environment, Germany's national interests and priorities, as well as its aspiration to play both a substantial and a leading role. The character and intensity of the challenges have changed. The expectations of Germany's allies and partners have continued to increase¹⁷.

This development is also reflected in the task of national and collective defence, the significance of which has increased again recently. However, the character of this task has changed considerably: shorter warning times, spatially focused threats posed by military forces, and hybrid warfare are important factors in this respect.

At the same time, the demands facing the Bundeswehr in international crisis management missions are continuing to increase. This part of the mission seems to have remained unchanged. However, it has become significantly more multifaceted, ranging from training and humanitarian aid for people in need to the use of military force, as a last resort for peace enforcement.

In addition, this also includes a clear commitment to countering security threats together with Germany's partners and allies.

One new task is contributing to the resilience of state and society against external threats. This is not only due to new threats in areas such as cyberspace.

As a result of the increased requirements and the more multifaceted mission, the task spectrum has become wider. These tasks must be given the same level of priority. The Bundeswehr must focus on the most challenging task, namely national and collective defence, and must also provide the forces and assets required for international crisis management and crisis management for German nationals abroad.

At the same time, the number of theatres of operations around the world is continuously growing. As a consequence, the Bundeswehr faces a wide range of challenges seldom experienced on such scale. It must be able and prepared to perform tasks simultaneously.

The necessary flexibility and agility can only be delivered by a multifunctional and adaptable Bundeswehr with a broad spectrum of capabilities. This is easily said, but how does Germany achieve this goal? What steps must be taken towards this end?

¹⁷ "In the alliance, the fears of the victory Trumps are enormous. A secret report from the staff of General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg describes the scenario of a Trump presidency. According to the NATO strategists, the new president could withdraw the pledge for the rotating US troops in Eastern Europe. Another scenario generally provides for the reduction of the American quota in Europe. In the most favorable scenario, it is assumed that Trump will strictly insist that Europeans spend more money on their security...". Hoffmann, Ch. "Nato verschiebt Gipfeltreffen wegen Trump". Spiegel Online. 12 November 2016. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/donald-trump-und-die-nato-buendnis-verschiebt-gipfeltreffen-a-1120873.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.



- **Broad spectrum of capabilities** in an integrated network of command and control, reconnaissance, effects and support
- **Ability to accomplish tasks depends on**
 - adaptability of personnel, equipment and structures
 - high-value capabilities that contribute to the accomplishment of different tasks
 - high levels of readiness and appropriate sustainability
- **Important factors**
 - ensuring survivability and protection
 - strengthening reconnaissance and command and control capabilities
 - defining effects in all their dimensions
 - being able to lead as a framework nation

Illustration 4 Guidelines for Capabilities of the Bundeswehr

Source: *White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr.*

In order to achieve these aspirations, a balance must be maintained between the Bundeswehr's task spectrum and its resources. As a result of the trend reversal in the areas of personnel, equipment and financing, the appropriate framework conditions have already been established¹⁸.

In order to continuously modernise the Bundeswehr, guiding principles were derived from the first part of White Paper 2016, which provide guidance for joint action in various areas of the Bundeswehr. These guiding principles are:

- Multinationality and integration with NATO-wide capability development as well as leadership and responsibility as a framework nation¹⁹;
- A comprehensive approach in a national and international framework and
- Flexibility and agility with a single set of forces.

These guiding principles must be applied to the areas of personnel, material, equipment and training in equal measure. The capabilities required for the Bundeswehr's tasks can only be provided through targeted and guided cooperation in these areas. It is particularly important, however, that the equipment of the Bundeswehr is suitable for different tasks in different operational theatres.

The ability of the Bundeswehr to accomplish its tasks depends above all on

- the adaptability of its personnel, equipment and structures;
- high-quality and modern capabilities including the availability of critical capabilities (such as strategic air transport) in order to assume multinational responsibility as well as to carry out national tasks independently; and

¹⁸ "In the future, personnel planning is to be coordinated with requirements every year. At present, the Bundeswehr assumes that by 2023 another 14,300 military and some 4,400 civilian service posts are to be filled. For example, there will be 7,000 new appointments and extended service time for soldiers from 2017 onwards. The further staffing requirements should be ensured by internal measures and restructuring. A total of 96 individual measures are intended to increase the efficiency of the Bundeswehr. These include, for example, the construction of the new cyberspace and information space, as well as the strengthening of the special forces of the army and navy. In addition, health care provision in Germany and abroad is being expanded. Further steps need to be taken to cushion the impact of the EU working time directive." "Mehr Personal für die Bundeswehr". German Federal Government. 10 May 2016. <https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2016/05/2016-05-10-mehr-personal-fuer-die-bundeswehr.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

¹⁹ Germany introduced in 2013 a Framework Nation Concept (FNC) to NATO, this was then adapted by NATO in 2014 on the Summit in Wales.

- the rapid availability, high levels of readiness, appropriate sustainability, and strategic deployability of capabilities.²⁰

Other important requirements in terms of capability development include

- ensuring survivability and protection as well as strengthened reconnaissance and command and control capabilities;
- covering the range of direct and indirect effects at the same time (from humanitarian aid and enabling and enhancing partners by providing advice, training and equipment to the use of military force, including kinetic and non-kinetic effects);
- being able to lead as a framework nation and provide critical capabilities that are needed for other nations to participate in operations.

These guidelines for the capabilities of the Bundeswehr are also reflected in the final chapter of White Paper 2016 "*Making the Bundeswehr Fit for the Future*".

In a similar manner to the key areas of engagement for German security policy in the first part of White Paper 2016, the considerations in this chapter are based on an active approach.

Certain areas of the Bundeswehr must undergo continuous modernisation²¹ so that it can remain a viable instrument of German security policy.

The first area that has to be examined is that of personnel. The Bundeswehr requires a modern, sustainable and demographically sound personnel policy. The initiated reversal in personnel trends²² and the Attractiveness Agenda²³ are significant contributions in this respect. Germany needs a high degree of flexibility in the area of personnel, without fixed upper limits, and in compliance with constitutional law. This is the only way Germany can actively shape the Bundeswehr and create new capabilities, for instance in the cyber domain.

With the many and varied challenges it faces, the Bundeswehr needs the best possible equipment in order to fulfil its mission successfully and to protect the lives of its servicemen and women. The Armaments Agenda²⁴ has already been launched for this purpose. It is in keeping with the conclusions drawn in White Paper 2016 and builds on the guiding principles of transparency and efficiency.

²⁰ White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. Berlin: The Federal Government of Germany, 2016. 102.

²¹ Also already stated in Milestones for the reorientation of the Bundeswehr by Defence Minister Thomas de Maizière on 15th May 2011. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. <https://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/start/sicherheitspolitik/bundeswehr/neuausrichtung/chronologie/>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

²² Leyen, U. von der. "Tagesbefehl" (Day Order). Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Berlin, 10 May 2016. https://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMm_UzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzIzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY5NmYzMTYyMzIzNzMwNmEyMDIwMjAyMDIw/Tagesbefehl_Personal.pdf, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

²³ German Minister of Defence, Mrs. von der Leyen presented the attractiveness campaign of her house with the title "Aktiv. Attractive. Different. - Bundeswehr in Leadership" at the beginning of June 2014. Essentially, it is an 8-point plan, underlined by 29 "subordinate" measures. The eight core projects are as follows: the introduction of new leadership management (1) and new recruitment and training opportunities (2), the reconciliation of family and work life (3), more flexible working conditions (4) with improved planning and better promotion conditions (5), the development of health management (6), the modern setting up of the barracks (7), and the deepening of the Bundeswehr in the society (8). "Die Agenda Attraktivität". (Attractiveness Agenda). Bundeswehr. 2 June 2014. https://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/start/karriere/bundeswehr_in_fuehrung/ueberblick/, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

²⁴ German Minister of Defence, Mrs. Von der Leyen introduced the Armaments Agenda with a total of 1.500 measures by 2030 in a Press Conference at the German MoD on 27th Januar 2016.

Constitutional guidelines²⁵ are an important factor when it comes to deploying the Bundeswehr inside and outside of Germany. With regard to missions abroad of the Bundeswehr, Germany can see that the number of deployments and missions necessitating immediate and resolute action has grown in recent times. A rapid response is frequently requested when it comes to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, tackling human and drug trafficking on the high seas, and supporting partners at short notice in stabilisation operations. This increasingly leads to ad hoc cooperation between states.

In view of this development, Germany must also be in a position to meet these challenges too at short notice, if necessary by deploying armed German forces. Nevertheless, all deployments abroad require the consent of the German Bundestag²⁶. This practice of parliamentary consent has stood the test of time.

With respect to the deployment of the Bundeswehr in Germany, White Paper 2016 states: *"In the context of present-day threat situations, the deployment of the armed forces in effective disaster response plays an important role within the narrow limits of unusual emergency situations and in accordance with current constitutional law. It is important to foster good cooperation between the federal and state authorities that work together in the event of a disaster and to conduct exercises for them. We must be able to rely on them as part of a common and responsible approach to ensuring security in our country."*²⁷

The dynamic changes happening around Germany and Germany's increased responsibility in the world mean that the Bundeswehr must be even more rigorously organised in accordance with the principles of agility and adaptability. This is the only way it can respond to rapid changes. The objective is to continuously modernise the Bundeswehr in a way that takes into account the continuously changing framework conditions.

However, the modernisation of our Bundeswehr can only be successful with an appropriately sized defence budget. Tasks, structures, personnel and equipment must be harmonised so that future requirements and challenges can receive the necessary consideration. The capability of the Bundeswehr is not only determined by the areas of personnel and equipment. White Paper 2016 also indicates a need for further development in the areas Bundeswehr and society, *Innere Führung* and tradition.

²⁵ „Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland“ (Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany). 23 May 1949. Art. 87a and "Defence Policy Guidelines". German Federal Ministry of Defence. 27 May 2011. <https://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/UIRvcjZYSW1RcEVHaUd4ckIzQU4yNWFvejhlBjVYyYnR1OCt3ZIU1N09FW EwrL0NqN21rVmRmMU01U3B2VFhLVzcxhbHF4TU1Sa1NSUkFnQzhzT1h6MThxZmlaMzR2Y1ZHblVmRDRSdnkvREU9/110527%20VPR%20engl.pdf>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

²⁶ 1. for defense - in Germany the defense of the country as well as abroad the NATO defense, peace and humanitarian interventions of the UN and the EU as well as the protection and the evacuation of threatened Germans abroad („Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland“. Art 87a para 1 and Para. 2.); 2. to protect civilian objects (so-called critical infrastructure) and to regulate traffic in cases of tension or defenses („Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland“. Article 87a para 3). In the two cases referred to above, the Bundestag (with the approval of the Bundesrat) shall, as a rule, fix the defendant's case of a defendant's decision or declare a foreign benefit pursuant to the Parliament's participation law, 18. 05. 2005.

²⁷ White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. 110.

The Bundeswehr is absolutely integrated into the state. It has strong links with society and is broadly appreciated²⁸. It is important to cultivate and encourage the further growth of this relationship between the Bundeswehr and society. In addition, White Paper 2016 again emphasises the significance of *Innere Führung*²⁹, or leadership development and civic education, as a core element of the Bundeswehr's identity. It is and will remain an indispensable foundation for individual and collective action in the armed forces, as it recognises the conscience of each and every individual as a moral authority.

This also includes seeing *Innere Führung* as a Leadership framework for developing a common identity for and with all members of the Bundeswehr. All members of the Bundeswehr, whether in uniform or civilian clothes, comprise a single entity, today more than ever before. *Innere Führung* is a unique feature that must also be successful in an international environment.

With respect to the traditions practiced in the Bundeswehr³⁰, they must have relevance to the present day and to everyday life. In addition to its established traditions, the Bundeswehr will place an increased emphasis on its own successful, over sixty-year's history. It is a history of armed forces in a strong democracy which proved themselves not only in the Cold War but also after 1990, when they embodied the reunification of Germany from the first day onward. It is also the history of a force on operations, in which servicemen and women have shown what they can do in combat and have proven their readiness and skills. A great deal remains to be done to further modernise the Bundeswehr and to make it fit for the future in a way that reflects Germany's identity. Doing nothing should not be an option.

CURRENT COMMON AND SOCIAL DEBATE ABOUT „WHITE PAPER 2016“

Within the framework of the presentation of White Paper 2016, the political parties represented in the German Bundestag, as well as other public institutions such as the churches, expressed their position.

The CDU / CSU³¹ sees in White Paper 2016 the new security policy compass and speak of a successful work for the national security system. Similarly, internal and external security could no longer be separated from each other, and a modern Bundeswehr has to be the basis for a stable security system.

²⁸ The majority of the citizens (85 percent) represent a positive attitude to the Bundeswehr. The positive opinion is predominant in all strata. Bulmahn, Th., Fiebig, R. and Hilpert, C. "Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsklima in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsbefragung 2010 des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Bundeswehr". (Security and Defense Policy Climate in the Federal Republic of Germany 2010). Strausberg, May 2011. <http://www.mgfa.de/html/einsatzunterstuetzung/downloads/forschungsbericht94.pdf>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

²⁹ "A-2600/1: Innere Führung: Selbstverständnis und Führungskultur: Zentrale Dienstvorschrift" (A-2600/1: Inner Leadership: Self-understanding and Leadership Culture: Central Service Specification). 28 January 2008. <http://www.kommando.streitkraeftebasis.de/resource/resource/U1RvcjZYSW1RcEVHaUd4cklzQU4yNWFvejhlbjVyYnRIOct3ZIU1N09FV3UxVU11bi9WbnVZWk1INEVJQ1p2MzFrQlhXTW9wUlpaeTk2M1VvaXZZeGJRZ2pBZzRXSEfKbDd2d1pOWnJQdlU9/Zentrale%20Dienstvorschrift%20Innere%20F%C3%BChrung%20Selbstverst%C3%A4ndnis%20u nd%20F%C3%BChrungskultu r.pdf>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

³⁰ "Richtlinien zum Traditionsverständnis und zur Traditionspflege in der Bundeswehr" (Guidelines on tradition and tradition in the German Armed Forces). Bonn, 20 September 1982. <https://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/start/streitkraefte/grundlagen/geschichte/tradition/traditionserlass/>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

³¹ Otte, H. "Sprung in die sicherheitspolitische Zukunft Deutschlands" (Leap into the security policy of Germany). CDU/CSU. Presse Portal. 13 July 2016. <http://www.presseportal.de/pm/7846/3377739>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

The SPD³², on the other hand, welcomes the clarification of the limited scope for the use of the Bundeswehr in the interior and sees here the need for a well-equipped police as an improved protection. Even if the SPD-led ministries have signed it, White Paper 2016 is not be evaluated sufficiently within the SPD. The SPD left the CDU / CSU the interpretation of White Paper 2016. For this reason, the SPD Berlin is planning an argument paper with its Working Group on Security Policy.

The Left Party³³, on the other hand, sees in White Paper 2016 a written legitimating for more money, more soldiers, more military operations and more war equipment.

The alleged externally imposed responsibility of Germany to shape the global order is only the approach of the great and middle powers in the fight for the raw materials of the world. Likewise, the The Left Party is missing an evaluation or summary of the foreign operations as well as an assessment of the worldwide nuclear armament contest.

In the publication of White Paper, the Alliance 90 / The Greens³⁴ see the manifestation of the conservative right-wing of German defence policy and the return to the Cold War. From their point of view, White Paper 2016 deals with backward-looking ideologies and does not search for causes and then uses them as a grounding approach for security and peace strategies. Everything is directed only at military symptom control, instead of diplomacy or the support of international institutions and trust building. Overall, White Paper 2016 is only the orientation of the German foreign and security policy with more military commitment.

The Evangelical Church of Germany³⁵, on the other hand, praises the inclusion of the churches in the preparation of White Paper 2016 and sees it as a stimulus for a further, broad discussion of questions of peace and security. However, the support of the non-military instruments of German peace policy should be improved.

The Catholic Military Bishop of Germany³⁶ supports this approach as well and emphasizes that Christian peace ethics is peace and not violence. The causes of conflicts should be sought in ecological hazards or cultural disparities. In addition to "Responsibility to prevent" and "Responsibility to protect", "Responsibility to rebuilt" is also an International Protection Responsibility.

In addition to the displeasing tones of the opposition parties in the Bundestag, one must acknowledge that with White Paper 2016 the inclusion of many groups and organizations was realized for the first time.

³² Socialist Party Germany, Berlin, Working Group Security Policy. "Resümee der Diskussionsveranstaltung 'Weissbuch 2016 zur Sicherheitspolitik und Zukunft der Bundeswehr'" (Conclusions of the discussion 'White Paper 2016 on the security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr'). Berlin, 5 September 2016. www.spd-berlin.w/files/spd-arbeitskreise/resuemee-weissbuch.pdf, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

³³ Buchholz, K., Kunert, K. and Neu, A. "Ein Weißbuch für Aufrüstung und Krieg" (A White Paper for rearmament and war). Die Linke. 13 July 2016. <https://www.die-linke.de/themen/nachrichten/detail/ein-weissbuch-fuer-aufruestung-und-krieg/>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

³⁴ Hofreiter, A. and Brugger, A. "Weißbuch: Ideologie aus der Mottenkiste statt Zukunftsstrategie für Frieden und Sicherheit" (White Paper - Ideology from the "Mottenkiste" instead of the future strategy for peace and security). Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90 / The Greens). 13 July 2016. <https://www.gruene-bundestag.de/presse/pressemittelungen/2016/juli/weissbuch-ideologie-aus-der-mottenkiste-statt-zukunftsstrategie-fuer-frieden-und-sicherheit-13-07-2016.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

³⁵ Brahm, R. and Rink, S. "Zu viel Sicherheit, zu wenig Frieden" (Too much Safety, too little Peace). Evangelical Church of Germany. 8 September 2016. http://www.kirchengeld.de/download/2016_09_08_Stellungnahme_Weissbuch.pdf, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

³⁶ Overbeck, F.-J. "Friedensethischer Rahmen und das Weißbuch 2016" (A Peaceful ethical framework and White Paper 2016). Kompass Special Edition White Paper. 2016. 4–6.

CONCLUSION

With the new White Paper 2016, Germany has made it clear for the first time that it is ready to take on *more responsibility* as Europe's strongest economic power. The core points of the German security policy are the *continued close ties to NATO and the EU*, that the *security of Germany is a national task* and that the *basis for a comprehensive security policy is a modern powerful Bundeswehr*.

The reorientation of the German security and defence policy must now also be appropriately financed, as planned by the increase in the defence budget³⁷.

The Community approach and the Multilateralism leading to the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union are also Milestones which are still to be formulated. At any rate, White Paper 2016 made it clear that Germany's existing security policy had to be adapted to the changing threats, and this is a common acceptance in German society. The paperwork has been done and it is now the responsibility of the politicians to implement it.

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³⁷ *The defense budget will be raised by EUR 1.7 billion to around EUR 36.6 billion in 2017 through the face of diverse and changing tasks in the field of defense and international defense, and will be reduced by a total of around 10, 2 billion Euros.* "Draft 2017 budget and financial plan to 2020: the right priorities, no new debt". German Federal Ministry of Finance. 6 July 2016. <http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Topics/Public-Finances/Articles/2016-07-07-Draft-2017-budget-and-financial-plan-2020.html>, Accessed on 12 June 2017.

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