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NATO RESERVISTS IN THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The World's Largest Organization of Reservists Held a Security Forum and a Winter Meeting

ABSTRACT: The article reports on the Bonn Seminar followed by the Brussels Winter Meeting, organized in February 2016, by the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers. The article evaluates the two events and also provides an insight into the broader activity of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers at a time when the role of the reserve forces is changing and becoming increasingly important all over the world. In addition, recommendations are formulated to make a more efficient use of the potential collaboration opportunities.

KEYWORDS: CIOR, CIOMR, NATO, international cooperation, reserves

THE INTERALLIED CONFEDERATION OF RESERVE OFFICERS AND ITS MAJOR EVENTS OF THE YEAR

Between 31 January and 3 February 2016, the NATO-affiliated Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR)¹ held its traditional Winter Seminar in Bonn, followed by its annual Winter Meeting between 4 February and 6 February 2016, with the participation of its sister organization, the Interallied Confederation of Medical Reserve Officers (CIOMR).² The Winter Meeting was organized at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels.³

In NATO, the significance and prestige of reservists and reserve officers, along with the organizations founded by reservists, are best illustrated by the fact that among a great number of non-governmental organizations, dedicated to advance the cause of defence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization maintains a special relationship with only four parliamentary and non-governmental organizations.⁴ One of them is CIOR, the other is CIOMR,⁵ which gives both these associations and their national member organizations special legitimacy.⁶

¹ Confédération Interalliée des Officiers de Réserve. For more information, see: Ujházy, L. 2013, 167–184.

² Confédération Interalliée des Officiers Médicaux de Réserve. For more information, see: Ujházy, L. "A NATO Tartalékos Egészségügyi Tisztek Szövetsége". *Honvédtörvény*, 2010/1–2. 66–72.

³ The authors attended the Winter Meeting on behalf of the MoD Public Relations Office and the Association of Hungarian Reservists.

⁴ Tóth P. (ed.). *NATO Kézikönyv*. Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem, Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóintézet, Budapest, 2001. 375–385. See also: Military Decision on MC 248/1, 1988.

⁵ The other two organizations are: NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA) and Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA). CIOR and ATA work in close cooperation.

⁶ For more information on international reservist organizations, see: Ujházy, L. "A nemzetközi tartalékos szövetségekről". *Hadtudomány*, 2010/4, 89–101.

The idea of CIOR was first conceived by Belgian, French and Dutch reserve officers⁷ and CIOR was eventually founded in 1948.⁸ Now an organization working alongside other associations of reserve officers affiliated to NATO, CIOR represents a total of around 1 million reserve officers and has become the largest organization of its kind worldwide. CIOMR is the sister organization of CIOR. The two associations work closely together.

CIOR and CIOMR are both non-profit, non-governmental organizations unrelated to party politics. Their activities are based on a constitution. Both CIOR's and CIOMR's objectives are to strengthen cooperation between the national reserve associations of member states and also to enhance solidarity with NATO. The highest priority on CIOR's list of commitments is to advocate NATO's policy. Apart from all its other objectives, CIOR serves as a connecting link between regular forces and the military reserve forces of NATO member states. The activities of CIOR and CIOMR were officially recognized by NATO's Military Committee in MC 248/1 of 27 March 1988. The permanent representation of the organization at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels is the responsibility of a staff consisting of one individual.⁹ Similarly to NATO, English and French are the working languages. Simultaneous translation into English and French is a service provided at major CIOR events. All important documents are also available in those languages.

Only NATO member states can obtain full membership. Every member state can be represented by one reserve officer association alone.¹⁰ States outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can participate in the activity of CIOR as associate members, members in observer status or members in visitor status.¹¹ Information regarding the activity of CIOR first reached Hungary in the mid-1990s. Having first joined NATO and after a long period of preparation, Hungary eventually obtained full membership on 10 February 2000.¹² Today Hungary is represented in CIOR by the Association of Hungarian Reservists.¹³

CIOR's two main annual events are the Winter Meeting and the Summer Congress. Traditionally, the former event is held at the NATO Headquarters in the early days of February, while the latter is usually organized in one of the NATO member states and is attended by approximately one thousand participants. A high-level Military Competition¹⁴ and the so-called Young Reserve Officers' Workshop¹⁵ are organized simultaneously with the Summer Congress. These events specifically target the most important category of reservists: young

⁷ As early as 1935, close cooperation existed between Belgian, Dutch and French associations of reserve officers: *CIOR, Its Contribution to Vigilance towards Peace, Freedom and Human Rights*. Venezia, 1998. 129.

⁸ Tálás P. (ed.). *NATO Kézikönyv*. Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem, Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóintézet, Budapest, 2001. 383.

⁹ Permanent Representative CIOR at NATO. This task is generally assigned to a Belgian reserve officer who can speak good English and French and lives in or near Brussels.

¹⁰ Any national reserve officer association should be authorized by the Ministry of Defence of its home country. In addition, during the approval process of an application for full membership, CIOR will scrutinize the operational constitution of the association applying for membership to see whether its operational rules conform to CIOR specifications (they are democratic, they are open to all branches etc.) During the process, a CIOR delegation comprised of a few members makes an official visit to the country applying for membership, as was the case with Hungary.

¹¹ Currently Austria, the Republic of South Africa, Finland, Macedonia (officially: the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Moldova, Slovakia, Switzerland and Sweden are associate members of CIOR.

¹² Devèze, J. and Lataste, P. "La session d'hiver 2000 Bruxelles de la C.I.O.R." *Armée et Défense*. 2000/2, 26–27.

¹³ Magyar Tartalékosok Szövetsége – MATASZ

¹⁴ Military Competition – MILCOMP

¹⁵ Young Reserve Officers' Workshop – YROW

and active reserve officers capable of exploiting in various theatres of operations knowledge and skills acquired during these events along with experience gained via international cooperation. Delegate at Large¹⁶ is another programme alternative geared to the needs of older reserve officers. A symposium, which is part of the congress itself, is an event open to all participants and external specialists. All other congress-related activities are pursued within the framework of plenary sessions or committees.

Another event held during the spring and autumn seasons is the so-called In-Between Meeting, which is organized with the participation of a limited number of attendants at a venue provided by the member state currently in presidency. Participants of this event are the presidency, vice presidents of national reserve associations and committee chairs. In-Between Meetings last for 2 or 3 days.

The association has a presidency, a council and various committees. Every two years one of the member states takes over the presidency composed of a President and a Secretary General. The Secretary General also performs the task of the treasurer, thereby assuming responsibility for the finances within CIOR.¹⁷

The work of the Council is helped by committees and working groups supervised by the President. These committees and working groups are responsible to the Council via the President. Today a total of ten committees or working groups participate in the work of the association¹⁸ (Public Affairs Committee, Language Academy Committee, Civil Military Co-operation Committee,¹⁹ Defence Attitudes and Security Issues Committee, Legal Committee, Military Competitions Committee, Partnership for Peace and Outreach Committee, Symposium Working Group, Seminar Committee and Young Reserve Officers Committee).

FORUM ON SECURITY ISSUES HELD IN BONN

CIOR's annual Winter Seminar held in Bonn is a forum devoted to security issues with the participation of experts and reserve officers, focusing on current issues. The event is sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the meeting is conducted in accordance with Chatham House rules.²⁰

¹⁶ Delegate at Large (DAL): Self-financed participants having no specific function, participating with the approval of national reservist associations. They are allowed to take part in general programmes. Their presence at the Congress will help familiarize their home country with the messages coming from NATO and CIOR and will also help make the Congress profitable. See: *CIOR at a Glance*. Coordinated by the CIOR Strategic Planning Working Group, 2008. 14.

¹⁷ The financial resources of the association are comprised of membership fees paid by national reserve officer associations, subsidies, donations and the sale of memorabilia. Annual membership fees are determined by the Council.

¹⁸ The structure of CIOR committees has undergone substantial changes in recent years. See Dikács Csaba. "A NATO országok tartalékos tisztjeinek szövetsége, a CIOR". *Új Honvédségi Szemle*. 2004/6. 91–94.

¹⁹ Civil-Military Co-operation: an activity supporting a military operation with the aim of ensuring co-operation between the operations headquarters, local authorities and international, national governmental and non-governmental organizations and agencies and the local population. NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine AJP-9 2013.

²⁰ Chatham House Rule. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/Chatham-house-rule> (Accessed: 2 March 2016)

THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE SO-CALLED ISLAMIC STATE

This year the forum focused on the threat posed by the terrorist organization called Islamic State (hereinafter: IS) and the various ramifications of that threat. For the first time, the venue of the annual seminar on security policy issues was Bonn.²¹

On the first day, slightly out of character with the nature of these events, a round-table meeting was organized with the participation of those scheduled to give a speech during the seminar. These experts were all trying to throw light on IS as a phenomenon, viewing the whole issue from various angles. The complexity of the problem was absolutely clear, given the fact that on the one hand there is a fairly strong urge for us to adopt an interpretation which describes the events cloaked in a cultural or religious narrative, whereas vested interests are unequivocally reflected in the way international relations are perceived in the context of the phenomena accompanying the activity of IS. Special emphasis was laid on the economic and financial environment in which IS pursues its activities. In the course of the discussion it became clear that several speakers regarded that particular environment as a wide window of opportunity for the terrorist organization to be weakened and eventually defeated. Naturally, the discussion did not stop short of looking at the larger picture as there are countries to be reckoned with both at a regional level (Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia) and at a global level (Russia, United States, Europe).

On the second day, a recap on past events associated with IS was followed by common reflection with the participation of those attending the seminar. The emergence of IS is by no means a surprise event. Its origins can be traced back to the Iraqi terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, formed after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, the genesis of that organization stems from its roots in Afghanistan. A group made up mostly of foreign mercenaries and jihadists had embarked on a process of "Iraqisation" towards the late 2000s under the name Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen. This group was later transformed, mostly as a response to the excesses of the Shiite-led government encountered by Sunnis, into an organization called the Islamic State of Iraq which, from 2012 onwards extended its influence into the eastern parts of Syria. Meanwhile, tension between Al-Qaeda and this new formation was building up, particularly because the methods used by those organizations were different. The attitude of the Islamic State was characterized by a considerable lack of respect for the lives of other Muslims during its terrorist activities, which Al-Qaeda found inappropriate. This led to a split between the two organizations as early as 2006 or thereabouts. IS announced the establishment of a caliphate in 2014, which meant that the animosity between the two groups was by now irreversible. At the same time, the relationship between IS and other Islamist organizations was undergoing change as well. In the words of one of the speakers, just like "Kremlinology" – a well-known term and a field of political research in the Cold War period – "brotherology" (who considers who as their brother at a particular moment) could be a new branch of study aimed at monitoring the fast-changing relationships between these organizations.

²¹ This event goes back a long way. From the late 1980s, items on its agenda have, almost every year, been current issues related to security policy matters discussed in front of an audience of reserve officers. The timing of the forum makes it possible for participants to attend the CIOR Winter Seminar starting on the day following the date upon which the forum ends. In this way, the location of that event would still be North Rhine-Westphalia. The venue of the event in 2015 was Königswinter, while in 2016 it was Bonn, the former seat of government in the Federal Republic of Germany.

This was followed by several speeches on the religious and cultural aspects of IS, all of which emphasized the eclecticism of IS ideology in the sense that it resorts to cherry-picking by using only those thoughts and ideas in Islam from which it can benefit or which it finds suitable to describe current issues. IS, therefore, can be described neither through Salafism nor through Wahhabism, despite the fact that it appears to have borrowed various elements of both. A key element of their teachings roots in Wahhabism, the core idea being the Ten Nullifiers of Islam, which places Muslims outside the Ummah (the community of believers), thereby paving the way for Muslims to be considered Takfir and thus becoming legitimate targets.

When examining the broader context of cultural issues, it becomes clear that globalisation is not necessarily conducive to convergence when it comes to the values rooted in the social norms of a particular society. This is true even of the European Union, where 2 or 3 groups of countries with markedly different social values can be distinguished. (In his lecture, the speaker examined existing social values according to five different paradigms: distribution of power in a society, individual and group loyalty, reaction to the unknown, motivation to achieve success, notion of time.) Although the participants seemed to disagree on whether culture or religion are of greater significance here, most participants were of the view that the activity of IS is a phenomenon determined by a cultural rather than religious subtext.

According to some, IS is a trend that seamlessly blends in with the context of Islam, representing a long tradition going back 300 years, the foundations of which can be traced back through the early history of Islam.

Possible ramifications for Europe

Inevitably, this topic brings us to the issue of migration into Europe and the problem of immigrants. Several participants underlined that, given the fact that even Western Europe appears to be increasingly short on universally accepted values, immigrants might find it difficult to conform to any set of values believed to be appropriate for the purpose of assimilation. Moreover, people who come to Europe from a Middle Eastern culture expect to be told by some authority, as it were, what to do, which Europe is neither willing to do nor capable of doing. This will lead to a kind of voluntary isolation and the emergence of enclaves similar to those in Berlin's Kreuzberg district, which in turn will reproduce the original problem.

Alarming as it is, data available suggests that IS might have dormant agents in the immigrant communities of around 60 countries worldwide, while at least 30 regional "franchise" organizations have been identified. (As a matter of fact, IS has already assumed the role of Al-Qaeda in this respect.) In 2014 and 2015, acts of terror were prevented on 32 occasions by law enforcement agencies in Western Europe alone, with 58 individuals having been taken into custody in the process in a total of 10 countries. Those arrested were the citizens of 14 countries. Worse still, 29 percent of those involved were not born Muslim, they were young people from Europe who later converted to Islam. While the reason behind these high percentage figures has generated various theories, there seems to be general consensus that in today's rootless European societies, emotions stemming from a perception

driven by an attitude of protest among young people translate into religion-driven ideas similar to Islamism rather than secular ideologies (e.g. Marxism).²²

Finally, an interesting comment made on the subject of the rule of law highlighted the fact that although there is no terminological difference in that area, the actual interpretation given to the notion of human rights in the western world is markedly different from the way the Islam world interprets that notion. The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, adopted in 1990, clearly shows how differences regarding certain subjects (gender, church and political power etc.) lead to incompatibility between the western perception of those issues and the traditions and the interpretation of law in Islam.²³

Bearing in mind the semantic diversity of certain words when it comes to the legal system of various countries, let alone different cultures, one cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that the term “terrorism” is interpreted quite differently in NATO and in EU member states, which sometimes makes cooperation (e.g. in the procedural aspects of extradition cases) rather difficult. Fortunately, the international legal environment provides us with the facility of applicable common rules which offer guidelines as to the legal framework available when dealing with IS. Apart from the general rules and criteria of ‘*ius ad bellum*’ and ‘*ius in bello*’, mention must be made of United Nations Security Council resolution 1368²⁴ along with articles 42.7 and 222 of the Treaty of the European Union, which France invoked after the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. At the same time, the coalition against IS was formed neither under the auspices of NATO nor those of the European Union. It was formed in an *ad hoc* manner, although both the EU and NATO have provided the coalition with certain capabilities which coalition members are entitled to exploit.

The involvement of NATO would, among other things, contain an element of risk as Turkey itself is a NATO member with active involvement in the region, whereas its objectives and interests are not entirely identical with those of other member states. Among the topics discussed during the seminar, Turkey and Russia’s activity in the region were the most contentious issues. For Turkey the highest priority among all the problems to be dealt with is to prevent a Kurdish state from being formed along its borders, one that would be capable of providing effective support to the Kurdish minority in Turkey in its separatist fight. Some participants expressed the view that because of this, some form of economic cooperation with IS or at least some degree of tolerance towards IS cannot be ruled out on the part of Turkey, given the fact that in the present situation this seems to be the most efficient way for Turkey to counterbalance the Kurds. However, Turkey’s attachment to the EU manifests in its various interests as – unrealistic as it may appear – Turkey has long considered itself a candidate for EU membership. Besides, terrorism is a growing problem for Turkey as well. In the last year alone, there were arrests with a number of people having been taken into custody on grounds of terrorist activity. Despite all these efforts terrorist acts did occur. They were usually committed by returning IS fighters. The reason behind this is that both Turkey and Russia are involved in fairly complex activities in which the Middle East is only one factor. Also, the military forces used by these two countries comprise not only their own armed

²² Solomon, H. "Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa, Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram". London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013. 78.

²³ Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 5 Aug 1990, U.N. GAOR, World Conf. on Hum. Rts., 4th Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (1993)

²⁴ "Security Council resolution 1386 (2001) on the situation in Afghanistan". <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/708/55/PDF/N0170855.pdf?OpenElement> (Accessed: 16 March 2016)

forces but armies known as client forces. Rather than using their own regular forces, there is a tendency for these countries to back an increasing number of non-government armed units and this is how they achieve their political objectives.²⁵

This kind of warfare has its advantages. First, it is cheaper (both financially and politically) than regular forces. Second, any relationship between the government and these non-government armed forces can be denied in case of a botched operation. Another interesting aspect of this proxy warfare is that – broadly speaking – such military units do not necessarily have to carry out their acts voluntarily; often, what one state does is profit from the activity of another state (or that of non-government fighters), as was the case with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which Iran managed to take advantage of. Another way to benefit from client organizations is to have them engage in activities that a regular army would refuse to be involved in, not least because media interest in their activity is usually less intense. When we apply the above client warfare theory to the situation in Syria, we can see that the conditions there are of a multifaceted and fast-changing nature, while in various areas of cooperation even contradictions might emerge. The Assad regime, for example, is at war with the Islamic State, but continues to buy oil from IS. The payment by the Iraqi central government of public servants working in regions controlled by IS seems to have continued until recently, while the salary of those employees has also been taxed by IS, whose revenue from that tax is a significant source of cash etc. At the same time, warfare via clients has its risks. An armed unit of fighters having previously been provided with arms by their patron might become hostile over a longer period of time and turn against that same patron. Another disadvantage of this type of warfare is that it is less effective than one in which regular forces are involved. Also, it generally results in a protracted conflict and violence. In many cases this does serve the interests of a client as both the significance of that client and the support provided by the patron will only last as long as the armed conflict lasts. The escalation of a conflict might often lead to an unexpected (unintended) chain of events as was the case in Libya. Finally, a client sometimes becomes self-employed. Moreover, roles might change and a client becomes patron. This is what we have seen in the context of the Assad regime and Hezbollah.

What does the future hold?

Finally, on the third day, a fair amount of attention was paid to IS finances. There are some encouraging new developments in this area: as opposed to its revenues of around 2 billion dollars in 2015, IS can expect less than half of that amount for this year, although IS is in no need of creativity when it comes to generating sizeable sums of money (“oil refinery” through small-scale production methods, sale of works of art, collection of protection money, various sharia-related taxes, fees charged for the escort of foreign media staffs, collection of donations from European shops in Muslim ownership etc.) As for IS expenditure, most financial resources available in 2016 will only cover costs incurred by the operation of the “State” armed forces, as opposed to the period of 2014 and 2015 (when the “welfare state” was in a position to pay relatively high army salaries to its fighters and offered free-of-charge public services). First, due to a more efficient control system along the Turkish border, a

²⁵ Mumford, A. *Proxy Warfare*. London: Polity, 2013. 45.; Jobbágy Zoltán. "Clausewitz és a felkelők: a háború csodálatos háromsága és a felfegyverzett nép ereje". *Honvédségi Szemle*, 2013/3. 28.

number of smuggling routes have become useless. Second, the infrastructure of smuggling has been seriously damaged (bombardment of trucks transporting oil). Third, certain items on the list of revenues from previous years are no longer an option to use (robbery, selling of objects of arts). Infrastructure on occupied territories is deteriorating for the lack of maintenance, while a growing number of people are fleeing these regions, causing, for example, the number of professional health workers to drop to critical levels.²⁶ When looking for feasible alternatives to defeat IS, finances appear to be the answer: currently no one at a global or even regional level is likely to embark on a large-scale military operation against the Islamic State, while by cutting off the resources crucial for the operation of the “terror state”, a slower process of annihilation seems a viable option and the signs are that sooner or later, it will eventually fall apart.

Some aspects of the ideology associated with IS are expected to survive its demise, partly in regional “franchise” organizations, partly in the form of “lone-wolf” terrorism.

To eliminate the indirect effects of terrorism, the following recommendations have been formulated by speakers:

- the influx into Europe of migrants whose intention is to make trouble should be prevented or at least reduced,
- the integration of European Muslims should be facilitated, thereby preventing the emergence of parallel societies which can easily become the hotbed of radicalization and a hiding place for terrorists. This, at the same time, entails unequivocal self-definition for Europe, resulting in a set of values providing a benchmark for integration,
- extremism should be confronted even if it is not (yet) manifested in violence,
- all this can only be achieved by working together, given the fact that because of the openness of our societies the strength of the West is to be measured through that of its weakest link.

This is where the role of reservists becomes a key factor. They play a part in the solution of this conflict not only as soldiers. Their contribution in tackling the social problems referred to should also be defined by their role as active, responsible citizens.

The seminar itself was meant to help achieve this objective partly by providing detailed information on the security policy aspects of the challenges currently posed by IS, thereby giving assistance during the preparatory work of reservist based in that region and often entrusted with various, culturally sensitive assignments (CIMIC, legal or cultural problems.) Ideas were also exchanged on how civilians in their home countries can help eliminate the threat posed by IS.

Another oft-repeated objective of the seminar was that knowledge acquired by reservists should be passed on to their own armed forces and reserve organizations, thereby enhancing the culture of security policy perceptions both in their home countries and in the armed forces.

CIOR WINTER SEMINAR – RESERVISTS’ CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECURITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC REGION

February 4th was the opening day of CIOR’s Winter Seminar. The morning programme was organized jointly with the closing event of the NATO National Reserve Forces Committee,

²⁶ Isellée, R. "How to estimate the Islamic State’s annual budget?" <https://ciorseminar.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/isselc3a9e-isis-financial-aspects.pdf> (Accessed: 26 April 2016)

held in the building of NATO Headquarters.²⁷ Following the opening ceremony of the session, the most significant event during the plenary meeting was an update on NATO current issues by General Petr Pavel, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. The speaker underlined the role of reservists in dealing with new challenges²⁸. At the initiative of the Permanent Representative CIOR at NATO, a working lunch has, since 2011, been yet another opportunity for the members of national CIOR delegations to meet national NRFC representatives. Work then continued in the CIOR Executive Council and the committees. Hungary was represented in the Council as well as the CIOR Legal Committee. The Council is the highest-level decision-making body in CIOR. Apart from a debate focusing on CIOR internal affairs (new CIOR strategy, financial situation, upcoming events, member states to take over presidency in the future etc.), both the NRFC Chairman and the representative of the International Military Staff gave an update on key developments affecting their organizations.

The Legal Committee is CIOR's most important legal workshop as well as the legal advisory body within the association, providing assistance for the activity of the Presidency, the Council, the committees and working groups, CIOR and CIOMR. The Committee also deals with issues related to the employer support system and is involved in the organization of the military competitions. The Committee's work efforts were directed partly towards the technical aspects of certain resolutions made in Sofia in the summer of 2015 aimed at specific modifications, partly towards the finalisation of lectures on the law of armed conflict and of tests, to be implemented during events accompanying the 2016 Summer Conference in Madrid such as the Military Competition and the Young Reserve Officers Workshop.

A POTENTIAL ROLE FOR RESERVES

Reservists can play a crucial role in several aspects when dealing with the consequences of the actions of the Islamic State: First, in the more traditional role, they can fill gaps in the capabilities of NATO member nations' armed forces in areas where a specific set of civilian expertise is needed. For example, in countering the media presence of IS, professional communicators are needed in Western armed forces and other government agencies. Another key area could be finances, one of the weak spots of IS. These experts are more easily found in the reserves than in the regular forces of NATO.

Another aspect of utilizing reserves is the maintenance of border security within Europe. As it was demonstrated, IS uses the waves of migrants to smuggle its operatives into Europe. Standing police are hardly capable of managing increased border security operations for an extended period of time, therefore it is of utmost importance to properly control borders and this can only be done with the support of reserves.

Regarding migration, the special skills of reserves also play a role, for example, in CIMIC activities or using linguists to communicate with incoming people. Finally, reserves are also

²⁷ National Reserve Forces Committee (NRFC). Formerly NATO was not particularly concerned with issues related to the organizational aspects of the reserve forces in member states. However, this attitude changed by the 1980s. A sign of this change was that NRFC, an informal, independent group of senior officers responsible for the national reserve forces of NATO member states, was formed in 1981. In 1987, CIOR and NRFC signed a memorandum of understanding.

²⁸ On more information regarding the potential role of reservists and reserve associations today, see: Ujházy, L. "A tartalékosok és a tartalékos szövetségek szerepe napjainkban". *Honvédségi Szemle*, 2014/1, 41–45.

crucial in dealing with the aftermath of terrorist attacks, as they can provide numbers for quickly enhancing security, then maintaining a high level of it.

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS

The significance and prestige of reservists and reserve officers, along with the importance of organizations which they have set up, are a remarkable contribution to achieve the objectives envisaged by NATO. CIOR is an organization established on the foundations of an appropriate structure and philosophy across the whole spectrum of reserve officers ranging from second lieutenant to general. CIOR provides an excellent international environment for the activity of all reserve officers to be harmonized both at a mental and at a physical level (CIMIC, law of armed conflict, military sports events, Young Reserve Officers Workshop, symposium, Delegate at Large programme). During the readiness period, participation by our Volunteer Operational Reserves in CIOR committees, sports competitions²⁹ and the Language Academy would be an excellent opportunity for improvement in skills related to the professional, physical and linguistic aspects of their activity.

Meanwhile, the values represented by reservists and their associations have excellent opportunities to resonate with those segments of the society which the messages of official politics, diplomacy/military diplomacy can hardly find their way to³⁰ or do it with considerable difficulty.

The CIOR Winter Seminar is a useful security policy forum with current issues on its agenda to be discussed every year. CIOR's Winter Meeting is a less comprehensive event than the Summer Congress. An event with a more visible focus on specific problems, it is possible for issues affecting the Hungarian association to be debated. The permanent presence of the representatives of Hungarian reservists at these events is a vital factor for maintaining international relations. The need to safeguard the interests of reservists and to enhance the capability of armed forces to retain reservists has become something of a priority for CIOR member organizations. The Association of Hungarian Reservists should, perhaps, also consider that option as a direction to take by providing legal assistance aimed to tackle special problems that reservists encounter, and by doing so, earning as much credibility with them as possible. CIOR is an organization with a structure having been refined and fine-tuned during several decades of operational experience, one which helps maintain required standards, both mentally and physically, among reservists during the readiness in an international context. This might serve as an example for any national association of reservists upon which to shape their internal structure. It is through participation in the work of committees that a highly effective representation in CIOR can be achieved. To have reserve officers capable of representing both Hungary and its national association of reservists in various committees (Legal, CIMIC, Public Affairs, Language Academy, Young Reserve Officers' Workshop, Military Competition etc.) is an idea worth putting into practice. We would also benefit from

²⁹ The advantages of participation in CIOR sports competitions, made possible through national competitions held with the aim of selecting competitors, were underlined by András Kladek as early as 1999. Kladek András. "A tartalékos koncepció". *Humán Szemle*, 1999/1. 31.

³⁰ From a video message sent by Admiral James Stavridis, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander of the United States European Command (USEUCOM) to the CIOR Summer Congress in Stavanger in 2010.: <http://www.cior.net/News/2010/SACEUR-encourages-reserve-officers-in-Stavanger.aspx> (Accessed: 21 February 2016.)

having delegates in CIOMR as it offers a variety of high-level professional programmes and forums designed for an exchange of information.

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