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## FORWARD MILITARY PRESENCE: ASSESSING THE NATO WARSAW SUMMIT

*ABSTRACT: The NATO leaders in Warsaw discussed not only the traditional threats of the East but the hybrid threats of the South as well, according to the 360-degree approach of the Alliance to security. The study examines the extent to achieve the pre-set goals, balance and adaptation requirements. The author presents the results of Warsaw Summit, evaluates in detail the decisions taken with regard to the management of the Eastern threat. The article points out that the Alliance decisions about the forward military presence has improved the measures of the Readiness Action Plan approved in the Wales Summit. Although the Warsaw Summit is basically dealt with the traditional military issues, the undertaking fighting tasks against the hybrid threats is taking another turn in the NATO strategy.*

*KEYWORDS: NATO, Warsaw Summit, Reassurance Action Plan, hybrid threats, forward military presence, resilience*

The 28<sup>th</sup> NATO Summit ended in the capital of Poland on 9<sup>th</sup> July, 2016, which event was a milestone in the history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.<sup>1</sup> Warsaw can be significant indeed in NATO history, since the decisions made there mean the settling of the post-Cold War “peace period”. In the Summit a very strong emphasis was put on the military measures to provide the security of the Eastern flank. These measures improve the military aspects of the organization, which is getting back to serve its original collective defence role. Besides deterrence and defence, NATO has undertaken to act against hybrid threats like terrorism, cyber war, migration and instability which aspects mean a kind of new trend in Europe in comparison with issues discussed at the Wales Summit in 2014. However, this article focuses first of all on the military decisions made in the Warsaw Summit. First the outcomes of the Summit are reviewed, then the results of the RAP (Readiness Action Plan) are described in details, and finally the military decisions of the Summit are evaluated.

### THE HISTORICAL SITE

Poland, who hosted this event for the first time,<sup>2</sup> proved to be an excellent site for the Summit. Although the Summit itself was held in the National Stadium, made into a fortress for the event, many significant programs took place outside the football stadium. The NATO member states as well as the international organizations and leaders of partner countries had their working dinner in the ball hall of the Polish Residency on Friday evening, which place was the site for signing the Charter of the Warsaw Treaty, the agreement between the Soviet

<sup>1</sup> "Landmark Summit in Warsaw draws to a close". NATO. 9 July 2016. [http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_133980.htm](http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_133980.htm) (Accessed on 24 Dec 2016)

<sup>2</sup> This was the fourth NATO Summit which took place in the area of the previous Soviet Block countries (2002 – Prague, 2006 – Riga, 2008 – Bucharest)

Union and the communist countries of Eastern Europe in 1955. Almost all reports on the topic emphasized the idea, that the leaders of NATO could literally breathe an air of history while walking in the hall with the gigantic crystal chandelier and huge wall carpets with 185 square metres in size. The National Stadium on the bank of the river Vistula was made into a real fortress for the time of the event, surrounded by high walls, hermetically isolated from the world outside. The safety of thousands of guests from 53 countries, including 18 state presidents and 21 prime ministers, were guarded by 6,000 policemen and soldiers on land, in the air and on the river. Even the mermaid on the logo of the Summit could have not defended the event better than the Polish military force did. The total expense of the Summit was over 0.5 % of the defence budget of the country.<sup>3</sup>

The Summit proceeded according to the plans and to the usual schedule, but with a new form of partnership. NATO has not used the traditional, existing forms of partnerships during the meetings of the transatlantic state leaders for a long time; instead, it tries to find solutions to fit the goals and the schedule of the Summit. The schedule of the Warsaw Summit was not different either. The NAC (North Atlantic Council) had two meetings and made very important decisions.

Montenegro also took part in the work of the Summit, as an invited member state. There were two more partners, Finland and Sweden, which took part in the gala dinner as well as in the meetings of NAC for foreign and defence ministers as Enhanced Opportunity Partners (EOP). The renewed cooperation agreement with the European Union was signed by the Secretary General of NATO, by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and by the President of the European Committee, Jean-Claude Juncker. All the three leaders will have their own tasks for the implementation in their own respective fields. The leaders of the EU also took part in the conference where Afghanistan and her regional security issues were discussed. Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy also attended a meeting of foreign ministers. The Alliance discussed Ukraine's security problems with president Petro Poroshenko within the framework of NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC), where they also made a decision about an extensive supporting package. The NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC), however, had a meeting only at foreign ministers level and no significant step was made towards the future membership of the Caucasian country. The Defence Ministers discussed the security and military-defence issues against the Eastern and Southern strategic threats within the new and flexible forms of cooperation created in the Wales Summit: Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII), and Defence Capacity Building Initiative (DCBI). However, the planned meeting with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was cancelled, yet the Secretary General of NATO had a chance to talk with the minister of defence of the United Arab Emirates on the security situation in the Middle East on the first day. NATO had very productive talks with the leaders of the Afghan government, President Ashraf Ghani and the Chief Executive of Afghanistan, Abdullah Abdullah about the further steps of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), as well as the extension of financial support to the period lasting until 2020.

As usual, there were also many bilateral and multilateral meetings, debates, and agreements in the framework of the Summit, as it is very common in conferences of all major and

<sup>3</sup> "Rendkívüli állapot" Varsóban". *Napi.hu*, 8 Jul 2016. [http://www.napi.hu/nemzetkozi\\_gazdasag/rendkivuli\\_alapot\\_varsoban.617454.html](http://www.napi.hu/nemzetkozi_gazdasag/rendkivuli_alapot_varsoban.617454.html); and "Ötven millió dollárba került Lengyelországnak a NATO-csúcs". *Népszava*, 9 Jul 2016. <https://nepszava.hu/cikk/1099408-otven-millio-dollarba-kerult-lengyelorszagnak-a-nato-csucs>, Accessed on 24 Dec 2016.

significant international organizations. One example of this was the meeting of the American President with the leaders of the EU member states, where they discussed the problems of BREXIT, the counter-terrorism issues, the Euro-Atlantic solidarity and trade agreements.<sup>4</sup> Barack Obama had a bilateral meeting with the Secretary General of NATO as well as with the Polish, British and Turkish leaders. All countries did the same, including Hungary, when the Hungarian Prime Minister had talks with the Turkish president. The Foreign Ministers of the Visegrád Group had discussions with their British counterpart, where they agreed about a meeting next autumn. They will discuss the situation of employees working in the United Kingdom after BREXIT

## BALANCE AND ADAPTATION

About the priorities of the Warsaw Summit, just as about the strategic policy to follow, decisions were made by NAC and the general assembly of NATO together in the middle of February, when NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg talked about the two goals of the consultation: (1) *to create balance* and (2) *to continue the adaptation*<sup>5</sup>

The demand on the balance was progressively growing during the preparations for the Summit as the Alliance was making progress with the agenda. First the balance was focused on the Eastern and Southern threats and their sizes then it was extended to the Baltic countries and Poland and to Southern countries, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, in accordance with the requests of South-Eastern countries. A balance was to be found about the proportions of foreign and security policies of Russia as well, because the member states have different opinions about the Russian threat. Due to these internal debates, *the principle of the dual track was introduced*, which focuses on calming the frightened and worried countries and on sustaining continual political talks and discussions to relieve the tension and conflicts by diplomatic means.<sup>6</sup> After the Summit, we can say now, that if the NATO had not been able to find balance, this problem would have seriously questioned the efficiency of the Summit. Before and during the Summit there were many declarations from the member states which did not support the general political attitude of NATO.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> "Remarks by President Donald Tusk after the EU-US Leaders' Meeting in Warsaw". European Council. 08/07/2016. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/08-tusk-remarks-eu-us-leaders-meeting-warsaw/>, accessed on 28. 7. 2016

<sup>5</sup> "Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Defence Ministers". NATO. 10 February, 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_127824.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_127824.htm?selectedLocale=en), Accessed on 15. 2. 2016.

<sup>6</sup> Many member state leaders support the dual track approach (Frank- Walter Steinmeyer: "Everything or nothing approach might sound good, but it does not work"; Jens Stoltenberg: "We need power and deterrence on one side and on the other one transparency, predictability and discussions are needed.")

<sup>7</sup> The German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier criticized NATO about 2016 military operation Anaconda. According to his opinion, "with instigation and sabre-rattling the Alliance will not achieve its goals". See "Páros lábbal szállt a NATO-ba a német külügyminiszter". *Origo*, 2016. 07. 19. <http://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20160618-kemenyen-kritizalta-a-nato-t-steinmeier-nemet-kulugyminiszter.html> The Italian Minister of Defence, Roberta Pinotta said before the Summit that the deterrence and conflict prevention strategies of NATO makes cooperation in the fight against terrorism impossible between NATO and Russia, instead of a kind of bridge is needed to develop the relations between them. (See: "Olasz védelmi miniszter: a NATO-nak együtt kell működnie Oroszországgal a terrorizmus ellen". *MSZFSZK*, 6. July, 2016. [http://www.mszfszk.hu/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1039:olasz-vedelmi-miniszter-a-nato-nak-egyuettt-kell-mkoednie-oroszorszaggal-a-terrorizmus-ellen](http://www.mszfszk.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1039:olasz-vedelmi-miniszter-a-nato-nak-egyuettt-kell-mkoednie-oroszorszaggal-a-terrorizmus-ellen)). Francois Hollande, the President of France (*see next page*)

During the preparations there was another demand on the balance; there was a need to balance the reinforcing collective defence with the European security threats, especially hybrid warfare, fight against terrorism and dealing with mass migration problems. Some member states (including Hungary) suggested that the Alliance should examine its own opportunities and abilities and contribute to the improvement of the European security, dealing not only with the crisis in Ukraine, but protecting the European borders in the south as well. This mission might seem a new one; however it is not new, if we consider the crucial NATO Summit in London in 1990, when the Alliance decided to adapt itself to the changing world and to improve the security in Europe<sup>8</sup>. „Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation. Working with all the countries of Europe, we are determined to create enduring peace on this continent”<sup>9</sup>

The requirement of adaptation has become very important for the future of NATO. After the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September, 2001 the Alliance realized that it was not enough anymore *to focus only on the security of Europe*, but the defence had to be extended to any parts of the world where it was needed, to fight the enemies where they appear and to deal with any crisis where that occur. Although since 2010 NATO has been focusing very strongly on *the new security threats* emphasized in the strategic concept of 2010, it has become clear since the crisis in Ukraine in 2014 that these threats appear simultaneously, at the same time, in a kind of a hybrid way, both in the East and South. Though the concept of hybrid threats is not new for the Alliance, since first it was defined in 2011,<sup>10</sup> dealing with a new type of strategic threats has not been adapted by the political, doctrinal and planning systems and there is a lot to do about the creation of adequate capabilities. What makes things more difficult is that the strategic threats appear in different forms, including the traditional military form (terrorism, migration, piracy, transnational crime and ethnic conflict etc.) and a variety of military-security tasks, including the participants, the rivals, the intensity of operations and missions is also very different. While collective defence can be used in the traditional way, by applying conventional and nuclear military forces, the actions against hybrid threats need the application of a coordinated and complex system of international cooperation and crisis management. Another problem is that the threats in the Eastern and Southern parts of NATO borders have different effects on the frontline countries and the rest of the member states. *This is the reason why not only NATO as an organization but all countries need to be adjusted to the new security situation.* As a consequence, the Alliance needs to transform not only its own institution system, military force and capabilities, but it should encourage the transformation of all member states, new concepts, new strategic ideas and solutions as well as further resources. It is an outstanding achievement of this Summit

<sup>7</sup> expressed his opinion in the discussion of the Summit, which was published by the Russian media word by word: “NATO can’t decide about European-Russian relationship. Russia does not mean an opponent or a threat for France, but a partner.” (“Russia Threat Takes Center Stage at NATO’s Warsaw Summit”. *The Daily Signal*, July 10, 2016. <http://dailysignal.com/2016/07/10/russian-threat-takes-center-stage-at-natos-warsaw-Summit/> Accessed on 10. 7. 2016.

<sup>8</sup> Moore. R. R. *NATO’s New Mission. Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger Security International, 2007.

<sup>9</sup> “Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance”. 06. July, 1990. 23. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_23693.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23693.htm), Accessed on 10.7. 2016.

<sup>10</sup> „Hybrid threats are those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means in pursuit of their objectives”. See “NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat”. NATO ACT. <http://www.act.nato.int/nato-countering-the-hybrid-threat>, Accessed on 12. 07. 2016.

that the Alliance has begun this transformation: it reconfirmed its cooperation with the EU, it declared the cyber area as a military operation domain, and it is getting involved in dealing with mass migration in the Mediterranean Sea.

## THE DECISIONS OF THE SUMMIT

The *communiqué*<sup>11</sup> of the Warsaw Summit makes it easier to judge the significant issues of the Summit, which publication describes the attitude of the Alliance to the future. This extensive official publication, however, was only one of the *nine* documents, which were published on the website of NATO during the two days of the conference.<sup>12</sup> Whereas the communiqué recorded the standpoint of NAC, the common statements described the details of the cooperation agreements with the EU<sup>13</sup>, Ukraine<sup>14</sup>, Georgia<sup>15</sup> and Afghanistan.<sup>16</sup> Just as the Summit in Wales, the Warsaw Summit also admitted the need to enhance transatlantic security, and in achieving this goal, the European member states strongly rely on the USA but Canada also intends to take part in this task.<sup>17</sup> These publications call the attention to the importance of *political concepts and the adaptation* to fight with hybrid threats. In the cyber area – also known as the fifth dimension of operation domain, after land, air, sea and space – the Alliance intends to take further steps by implementing the *Cyber Defence Pledge*<sup>18</sup> of the member states as well as increasing the defence budget to fight against the new type threats.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>11</sup> "Warsaw Summit Communiqué: Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July, 2016". NATO, 9 Jul 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm), Accessed on 10. 07. 2016.

<sup>12</sup> Tálas, P. "A varsói NATO-csúcs legfontosabb döntéseiről" (About the most important decisions of the Warsaw Summit). SVKK, 11. July, 2016. [http://netk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media\\_items/svkk-elemzesek-2016-10-a-nato-varsoi-csucsstalalkozojanak-don.original.pdf](http://netk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/svkk-elemzesek-2016-10-a-nato-varsoi-csucsstalalkozojanak-don.original.pdf), Accessed on 12. 07. 2016.

<sup>13</sup> "Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization". NATO, 8 July, 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133163.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm); <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/08-tusk-remarks-eu-nato-joint-declaration/>, Accessed on 10. 07. 2016.

<sup>14</sup> "Joint Statement of the NATO - Ukraine Commission at the level of Heads of State and Government". NATO, 9 July, 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133173.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133173.htm?selectedLocale=en), Accessed on 10. 07. 2016

<sup>15</sup> "NATO – Georgia Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers". NATO, 8 July, 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133175.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133175.htm?selectedLocale=en), Accessed on 10. 07. 2016.

<sup>16</sup> "Warsaw Summit Declaration on Afghanistan". NATO, 09 July 2016. [http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133171.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133171.htm?selectedLocale=en), Accessed on 17. 07. 2016.

<sup>17</sup> "The Warsaw Declaration on Transatlantic Security". NATO, 9 July, 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133168.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133168.htm?selectedLocale=en), Accessed on 10. 07. 2016.

<sup>18</sup> "Cyber Defence Pledge". NATO, 8 July, 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133177.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133177.htm?selectedLocale=en), Accessed on 11. 07. 2016.

<sup>19</sup> Although the Alliance has not published summaries about the obligations undertaken by the member states, certain countries have already revealed their intension for contribution. For example the USA offered his support of *200 million \$* in value, including technical devices, know-how, trainings and experts, to NATO, which support will be provided in the framework of bilateral agreements and through the Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (Tallinn) and the Strategic Commands. This support will be used for improving military training and developing the civilian preparations for cyber defence and for defence against *CBRN*. Among the decisions about resilience the Baltic States and Poland get a priority. The fight against the transnational threats includes the support of other countries too, like Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria. Hungary (*see next page*)

### Decisions of the Warsaw Summit

- New partner cooperation with the EU
- Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine
- Ensure stability through partnership
- Declaration of the cyber space as a military operation domain, adaptation of Cyber Defence Pledge
- Improve interoperability and enhance resilience
- Sustain RSM, continue financing ANSF until 2020.
- Military reinforcement of the Eastern and South-Eastern flanks
- Approved IOC of BMD
- Support the ISIS coalition
- Launch a new operation on the Mediterranean sea (Operation Sea Guardian)
- The next Summit: Brussels-2017

Source: Warsaw Summit documents

The two other documents dealing with the *improvement of resilience*<sup>20</sup> and the *defence of citizens*<sup>21</sup> also emphasize the importance of hybrid threat issues. This issue proved to be really important as both announcements were confirmed by prime ministers and presidents. The Summit created a new concept in the terminology of NATO, labelled resilience.<sup>22</sup> Resilience<sup>23</sup> comes from Latin and it means the ability of something to return to its original shape after it has been pulled, stretched, pressed, bent, etc.<sup>24</sup> The word resilience is regarded as an important element of collective defence by the NATO vocabulary and it is outstandingly important to improve this resilience against all different threats, no matter if they are hybrid, cyber, CBRN, terrorist or traditional types of threats.<sup>25</sup>

It is important to examine the decisions of the Summit in an extensive way because this is the only way to separate the achievements of the Warsaw Summit from the decisions of the Wales Summit. Since the tasks are similar, many measures are still

improving the RAP (Readiness Action Plan) and its adaptation like the forward military presence. Other decisions, like the fight against ISIS, ballistic missile defence and migration, serve the defence of the Southern Flank. Certain parts of decisions, however, support crisis management like Resolute Support Mission (RSM/ Afghanistan) and the new partnership cooperation with Sweden, Finland, Georgia, Ukraine, Iraq, Jordan and Tunisia.

<sup>19</sup> can expect further equipment supply for the Special Operation Force. "Fact Sheet: US Contributions to enhancing Allied Resilience". The White House, July 09, 2016. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/09/fact-sheet-us-contributions-enhancing-allied-resilience>, Accessed on 17. 07. 2016.

<sup>20</sup> "Commitment to enhance resilience". NATO, 8 July, 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133180](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180). Accessed on 11. 07. 2016.

<sup>21</sup> "NATO policy for the Protection of Civilians". NATO, 9 July, 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133945.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133945.htm?selectedLocale=en), Accessed on 11. 07. 2016.

<sup>22</sup> It is important to remark that a similar concept and requirement was already introduced in the Warsaw Pact, called viability (жизнеспособность) but that time it was used in relations of defence against nuclear weapons.

<sup>23</sup> The resilience is emphasized in the new EU global security strategy as well, regarding both the state and social elements. "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy". June 2016. 3. [https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs\\_review\\_web.pdf](https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_review_web.pdf), Accessed on 19. 07. 2016.

<sup>24</sup> "Merriam-Webster Dictionary". <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resilience>, Accessed on 17. 07. 2016.

<sup>25</sup> Shea, J. "Resilience: a core element of collective defence". *NATO Review*, 30/03/2016. <http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/nato-defence-cyber-resilience/EN/index.htm>. Accessed on 17. 07. 2016. Resilience is highlighted in the new EU Global Security Strategy as well. See Molnár Anna. "Az EU globális kül- és biztonságpolitikai stratégiája" (A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy). SVKK. <http://netk.uni-nke.hu/kutatas-es-tudomanyos-elet/strategiai-vedelmi-kutatokozpont/publikaciok/elemzesek>, Accessed on 21. 07. 2016.

## THE RESULTS OF READINESS ACTION PLAN

A significant issue of the Wales Summit was the crisis in Ukraine which has not been solved yet, moreover, it has become even more chaotic and complicated. As the Russian issue might divide the member states of the Alliance, during the preparation phase NATO worked out a new concept regarding Russia called *the dual track approach*: it is aimed at avoiding a direct aggression and military intervention but, at the same time, at keeping the door open for negotiations with Moscow. Since 2014 there has been a growing concern about a sudden

attack of Russia against the Baltic countries,<sup>26</sup> which would challenge NATO<sup>27</sup>. The fear of Baltic States is based on the fact that a significant number of Russian people live in these countries, particularly in Estonia and Latvia<sup>28</sup>. Furthermore, there is a tension between the Baltic States and armed Kaliningrad presenting a high-level military threat around the Russian exclave.<sup>29</sup> The claims of Baltic countries and Poland were supported by Romania and Bulgaria too, which began to urge new regulations to ensure security.

During the Summit in Wales NATO introduced significant counter-measures, later labelled as *Readiness Action Plan* (RAP), which is demonstrated in Table N.2. The goal of this new plan is to improve the Alliance's reaction to security challenges and crises in case of a potential attack on a member

### The accomplished measures of RAP

- Enhanced NRF (eNRF)
- Introduction of VJTF
- Establishment of NFIU elements in CEE countries
- Extended location of infrastructure projects and supplies
- Enhancing the headquarters of MNC-NE, MND-SE
- Naval reinforcement
- Intensive military training - 240 exercises in 2016
- Enhancement of defence planning (Graduated Response Plan)

Source: Warsaw Summit Communiqué, p. 37

<sup>26</sup> The American RAND Corporation Research Institute made a model based on the balance of forces and it studied how the Baltic countries could be defended against a frontal Russian attack. The results of the computer game showed that the Russian forces could penetrate into Tallinn and Riga in 60 hours. A quick and successful Russian attack would create a hard situation for NATO which would be left with poor and limited action possibilities. The researchers suggested that seven brigades and an air force support deployed in the region would be helpful to prevent an attack like this.

<sup>27</sup> Schlapak, D. A. and Johnson, M. *Reinforcing deterrence on NATO's eastern flank: wargaming the defense of the Baltics*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2016.

<sup>28</sup> Lucas, E. *The Coming Storm. Baltic Sea Security Report*. Warsaw: Center for European Policy Analysis, 2015. [http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20\(2\).compressed.pdf](http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20(2).compressed.pdf); Kaziukonyte, S. "The Baltics: Security Environment and practical responses to the Security challenging stemming from the crisis in Ukraine". CSDS. [http://nit.uni-nke.hu/oktatasi\\_egysegek/strategiai-vedelmi-kutato-kozpont/publikaciok/nezopontok](http://nit.uni-nke.hu/oktatasi_egysegek/strategiai-vedelmi-kutato-kozpont/publikaciok/nezopontok), Accessed 21. 07. 2016.

<sup>29</sup> For many years Russia has been enhancing systematically the Baltic region, especially regarding the Kaliningrad defence region. According to the sources in the area of Kaliningrad land (79. Mechanized Brigade, 7. Mechanized Regiment), artillery and missile groups (244. Artillery Brigade, 152. Missile Brigade), air forces (7054. Air Force Base with bombers, fighters, helicopters, and air defence missile groups) and navy military forces (Baltic Fleet, 336. Marine Brigade) are located. The command of the fleet is based in the city, but the Yantar warship building factory is also operating there. In order to transform the area into a fortress there are plans for deploying the most modern Russian weapons (Iskander M ballistic missiles, Kalibr missiles, S400 anti-aircraft missile systems) in the area. There is a plan to establish a new, mechanized division there as well. See: Kaarel Kaas. "Russian Armed Forces in the Baltic Sea Region". *Diplomatia*. N.130/131. June/July 2014. <http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/russian-armed-forces-in-the-baltic-sea-region/>; Hawk, J. "Russian Defence Report: Jan. 30, 2016: Fortress Kaliningrad". *South Front*. <https://southfront.org/russia-defense-report-fortress-kaliningrad/>; Accessed on 21. 07. 2016.

state, or of any other unexpected crisis situation. The decisions make the political aims, strategic and management methods of the Alliance clear. The RAP consists of two different types of measures, one for assurance and the other one for adaptation.

Under the *security measures* the North Atlantic Committee (NAC) made efforts first to calm the public down in 2014 with using the existing NATO forces like AWACS aircraft and standing naval forces to act in the Baltic region and in the Black Sea. Among these rapid steps there were also measures to enhance the air policing mission in the Baltic countries. Besides the Alliance organised intensive training events in the Eastern member states to prove reliability, solidarity, and capability to defend its members in case of a potential intervention. In addition, the NATO leadership allowed the member states to show their solidarity towards the Alliance. Particularly the United States was very active and introduced its plan called *European Reassurance Initiative* (ERI) in June 2014. This plan included the transfer of many land and air force units from America to Europe, which conducted efficient exercises and training with the frontline NATO countries. To improve readiness Washington made decisions to transfer military vehicles and equipment to Europe in the framework of the *European Activity Set* (EAS) which can allow – just in case – to set up a Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) in Eastern Europe. In 2015 the USA took further steps to improve the defence of Europe and to increase deterrence. The ERI budget was tripled to 3.4 billion Dollars showing the determination of Washington to express its solidarity.<sup>30</sup>

The importance of the Readiness Action Plan, however, demonstrates not just the worries of certain countries about Russia but rather the improvement of real security and deterrence capabilities and *adaptation decisions* to achieve these capabilities. Even we can make an early conclusion that after a time, when the security of NATO can be as strong as the possible threat, there might be no more steps for enhancing the assurance, as all the taken security measures will have transformation functions to adapt NATO for the tasks of deterrence.

During the past two years NATO has done a lot to implement the decisions made in Wales, targeting the *long term adaptation* in the area of command and control and ready-to fight military forces. The NATO Response Force (NRF) – which was set up in 2002 – has been increased three times bigger, extended to 40,000 troops from land forces, air force, navy and special operations forces, in order to rapidly deploy whenever needed. The mission of the reinforced NRF has been extended by *collective defence tasks*. This has produced a fast change in the concept of ready-to fight military forces, since the previous function of the NRF meant only to serve transformation and preparation for outside operations.<sup>31</sup> Because of this reinforcement, the structure of the NRF was also significantly modified, as the Wales Summit introduced the VJTF (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force) military force of 5,000 troops, which can respond to threats within 2-7 days.<sup>32</sup> The extremely quick and technologically advanced military force, called only the „spearhead force” by the press, includes 5 manoeuvre battalions, which have the necessary air, naval and special operation

<sup>30</sup> Cronk, T. M. "European Reassurance Initiative Shifts to Deterrence". U.S. Department of Defense, July 14, 2016. <http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/839028/european-reassurance-initiative-shifts-to-deterrence>. Accessed on 18. 07. 2016.

<sup>31</sup> The eNRF conception was introduced on 8 October 2015 by the Ministers of Defence. [NATO Defence Ministers]. [http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2015/NATO\\_Defence\\_Ministers\\_8oct2015.pdf](http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2015/NATO_Defence_Ministers_8oct2015.pdf), Accessed on 18. 07. 2016.

<sup>32</sup> Ringsmose, J. and Rynnius S. "Credible deterrence? NATO's new spearhead force". Atlantische Commissie. [http://www.atlcom.nl/ap\\_archive/pdf/AP%202015%20nr.%206/Ringsmose%20and%20Rynning.pdf](http://www.atlcom.nl/ap_archive/pdf/AP%202015%20nr.%206/Ringsmose%20and%20Rynning.pdf). Accessed on 19. 07. 2016.



skills and contain combat support subunits. Thanks to this extension the eNRF today includes four echelons: *advance C2 group, VJTF, initial follow-on-forces (two brigades) and follow-on-forces*.<sup>33</sup>

The triplication of NRF was achieved by using creative ideas. As the VJTF operates in an annual rotation form, the NRF draw in the standing down VJTF brigade as well as the standing up VJTF brigade of the next year. These two brigades together form the so called Initial Follow on Forces Group (IFFG). The Follow on Force (FOF) includes those forces which are needed for the necessary development of the NRF. The evolution of this conception can be clearly seen if we consider that the forward location of the 4 battalions, which the Warsaw Summit made decision about, can also form ready-to-fight military forces. The setting up of VJTF and its preparation goes back to 2015, and now it is ready for operation. This year Spain is in charge of managing the Spearhead brigade made up by shared contribution of 25 NATO member states. The great powers of Europe have undertaken the job to lead the VJTF until 2022.

The preparation of the VJTF was really intensive in the past two years and it became operational in November 2015. However, its power, command and control system, mobility among member states and its long-term force generation are still disputed. There is a shared opinion about the Spearhead brigade's role as a kind of „mobile tripwire”, and that it can bear a significant holding power, but decisions about quick actions have not been made yet.<sup>34</sup> The crisis simulation exercises have revealed that a potential traverse of the member states would cause difficulties, as parliamentary approval is needed for getting permission to move troops across borders. This problem generated the idea of the „military Schengen area”, which concept needs to be implemented by new national regulations and cooperative agreements of the member states.<sup>35</sup> The rapid reaction force capacity also needs to be improved because at the moment each major military operation requests American support. It is important to create the necessary infrastructural, logistic and national support conditions needed for collective defence, similarly to the decision about Cyber defence. Although VJTF looks like a solved problem in mid-term, however, the annual rotation, the three-year serving time in NRF may cause big difficulties for the member states in the future.<sup>36</sup> The mid-term consolidation of high readiness forces can only be maintained if the capability development of national military forces will be effective and stable in long term. If this does not happen, the VJTF and eNRF concepts might fail, which was experienced with the first version of NRF in 2010 years. The operational control of NATO Reaction Forces is exercised by two regional operational commands, Joint Forces Command (JFC) Brunssum and Naples alternately. In 2016 the Brunssum Command is the responsible operational headquarters (HQ) in

<sup>33</sup> "NATO Response Force Fact Sheet". NATO, SHAPE. <http://www.shape.nato.int/page349011837>, Accessed on 17. 07. 2016.

<sup>34</sup> Glatz, R. L. and Zapfe, M. "NATO Defence Planning between Wales and Warsaw. German Institute for International and Security Affairs". SWP. 5. January 2016. 8. [https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2016C05\\_glt\\_Zapfe.pdf](https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2016C05_glt_Zapfe.pdf), Accessed on 17. 07. 2016.

<sup>35</sup> Zaborowski, M. "«We need a military Schengen Zone«– General Ben HODGES". Center for European Policy Analysis, 26 November, 2015. <http://cepa.org/index/?id=54cb487d58110b0869e7e435175ebad8>, Accessed on 16. 02. 2016.

<sup>36</sup> In 2016 the NRF land force is commanded by the Spanish, the air force by the Italian, the maritime force by the British, the special operations force by the American HQs, the logistics by JFCBS, while the defence against weapons of mass destruction by the Polish command, who are also responsible for the training and management of the forces offered.

Holland. The NRF are established on the basis of force generation process in which national decisions and dedications ensure the commands and units in the requested size and structure to deploy wherever needed. The commander of NRF is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), but the NAC is responsible to decide about deployment. Although there were many political debates about the SACEUR to get permission to use VJTF within its own scopes so that he can make quick decisions or at least to order unexpected tests about the readiness and abilities of VJTF, these efforts have not been adapted yet due to the lack of the necessary political intention. The Alliance has not been able to create the quick decision making culture needed for deterrence, or to provide political guaranty and technical solutions in case of a crisis. It seems the NAC does not want to lose its political control over the employment of the NRF / VJTF.

The reinforcement of collective defence and the new military tasks in the Eastern front-line countries generated a new demand on the modification of the NATO command system. After the reform Summit in Lisbon (2010) the Alliance leadership decided to decrease the size and structure of NATO Command Structure (NCS). As a result, *only one component command was left* from the land, air and navy HQs which do not provide enough C2 capacity in the new security environment for multipurpose and simultaneous tasks. To improve the situation, the Wales Summit already decided to include into the NCS the Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC-NE), which was settled in Szczecin (Poland) in 1999 to control the Polish-German-Dutch corps. Due to its geographic features the HQ MNC-NE is directly ordered in charge of Joint Forces Command Brunssum (JFCBS).<sup>37</sup> The number of MNC-NE staff was doubled last year – currently 405 soldiers are serving in the Polish city on the German border – and the military barracks was modernized and modified to serve the new C2 mission controlling preparations of the subordinated forces for collective defence tasks in the Baltic Region. Today the soldiers of 25 different nations are serving in this command, including Swedish and Finnish military as well.<sup>38</sup> The duty of the HQ MNC-NE is to control VJTF / NRF forces in the region, to monitor the security situation and to organize the multinational military cooperation. The Szczecin Command is also in charge of operational control of 6 NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) set up in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary,<sup>39</sup> and in Slovakia. The primary responsibility of these units is to facilitate the rapid deployment of the VJTF and other NRF units held at high readiness level in order to enhance Alliance responsiveness.

The NFIU units formed in the South-Eastern countries like Romania and Bulgaria are ordered under the charge of the Multinational Division Southeast (MND-SE) – formed in December 2015 in Bucharest – to serve similar tasks to the ones of Szczecin command in the South Eastern European region.<sup>40</sup> The new, high readiness HQ has been established as part

<sup>37</sup> Kirschbaum, E. "Rising Russian Tensions put lonely NATO base in Poland on map". *Reuters*, Sept 12, 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-nato-outpost-idUSKBN0H711W20140912>, Accessed on 8. 07. 2016.

<sup>38</sup> "The NATO Custodian of Regional Security". HQ MNC NE, 9 July, 2016. [http://mncne.pl/leaflet/mncne\\_civ.pdf](http://mncne.pl/leaflet/mncne_civ.pdf), Accessed on 18. 07. 2016.

<sup>39</sup> The Hungarian NFIU achieved initial operation readiness on 15 January, 2016 in Székesfehérvár. The full operational capability including infrastructural developments will be achieved by July 2017. "Befogadók: NATO-parancsnokság Székesfehérváron". *Háború Művészete*, 19 Apr 2016. <http://www.haborumuveszete.hu/egyeb-hirek/befogadok-nato-parancsnoksag-szekesfehervaron>, Accessed on 15. April, 2016.

<sup>40</sup> "NATO activates new Multinational Division Southeast headquarters in Bucharest". NATO. 01. Dec. 2015. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_125356.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_125356.htm?selectedLocale=en), Accessed on 08. 07. 2016.

of balancing efforts in the Eastern Wing, following the Romanian suggestions. Because of the threats from the south and east Romania and Bulgaria are eager to improve their security, especially the security of the Black Sea region. The MND-SE is under the supervision of the Joint Forces Command Naples (JFCNP) which commands and controls the preparations of the new division-level body. According to plans the command needs to achieve complete readiness with 280 soldiers by 2018, and its personnel will also contain 75 NATO soldiers.<sup>41</sup>

## NATO MILITARY FORCES IN EASTERN COUNTRIES

The reinforcement of the NATO command system is also necessary to cope with the *increased number of rapid reaction force* adopted by the Warsaw Summit decisions (Table N. 3). The most effective measure was the reinforcement of land forces including four NATO multinational battalions in the Baltic States and Poland, and one NATO multinational brigade in Romania. The battalion size task group of 1,000 troops will not be permanent forces, but will operate as a persistent forward military force in constant rotation as long as it is needed. The rotational character of the multinational forces is very important because it does not go against the 1997 NATO-Russia

agreement. This decision, however, has a crucial importance, since the original effort of Baltic countries was to have a NATO brigade in their territory, whereas Poland wanted to have two NATO brigades in the country. The USA had an important role in achieving the solutions in Warsaw, which was not only making the promise true, but Washington was also able to convince its German, French and Canadian partners to take the lead in forming the multinational battalions in 2017. According to *forward presence concept*, each NATO unit will be led by the framework nation which is to provide half of the military force, whereas the other half will be covered by another six member states. According to the communiqué, the USA will take the lead in Poland, Great Britain in Estonia, Germany in Lithuania, and Canada in Latvia. In Southern Europe Romania and Bulgaria will take the lead to form the multinational “Black Sea” brigade.<sup>42</sup> The Romanian government has already started the diplomatic negotiations with the countries which might offer forces to them. Although the exact location of NATO forces is not decided yet, they are subject of further negotiations with the host nation support countries. There is not too much time for defence diplomacy because the NATO multinational units need to achieve their full operational readiness by mid-2017. The framework nations have already started recruiting contributing nations in order to solve the NATO unit formation „puzzle”. According to the media, the Visegrád Group countries

### Military decisions in Warsaw

- Extended location of 4 multinational brigades to the Baltic region and Poland
- The settlement of a NATO multinational brigade in Romania
- Improvement of MND-SE Bucharest (readiness 2018)
- Reinforcement of SNMG navy forces
- Training support projects (TACET, CJET)
- The end of operation planning
- Enhancement of cyber defence and resistance

<sup>41</sup> "New NATO division becomes functional in Bucharest". *Xinhua*, 2016. 05. 12. [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/12/c\\_135351824.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/12/c_135351824.htm), Accessed on 19. July, 2016.

<sup>42</sup> "Romania to host NATO multinational brigade". *Balkan Defence*, 7 July, 2016. <http://www.balkandefense.com/romania-host-nato-multinational-brigade/>, Accessed on 20. July, 2016.

will provide a company on V4 rotational basis in the Baltic Region every three months.<sup>43</sup> The preparation of the multinational units will be supported by special capability-building and training support projects.<sup>44</sup>

The Warsaw Summit, however, made decisions not only about the improvement of rapid reaction land forces, but also the *increase of the naval force capacity* in order to improve the security of the Baltic Sea, Norwegian Sea, Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea facing from hybrid threats. Though the documents published in Warsaw do not reveal details about this idea, the military literature can help in the interpretation of Brussels ideas. The Alliance intends to leave the continental-focused attitude behind, rather it is planning to work out new naval strategies and it supports researches called "Maritime League"<sup>45</sup> The Warsaw decision, however, has only a more modest goal, it only wants to increase the number of ships in the Standing Navy Maritime Groups (SNMGs), which efforts, however, need remarkable national pledge. According to the latest news, the USA, Great Britain, and Canada have already offered new ships for the Maritime Command (MARCOM) and the other member states have also committed themselves to give several ships for sea operations. Nonetheless, *the Alliance is still not ready to undertake a major naval project*. The NATO Black Sea Fleet conception, suggested by Romania, has not been encouraged and Bulgaria discouraged the proposal.

In short, the capability enhancing measurements introduced in Warsaw are to serve the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan and the further development of high readiness NATO forces. There is only one point where the Warsaw decisions are more advanced than the ones of the Wales Summit: the forward rotational presence of multinational units in the Eastern Flank countries, near the Eastern NATO border can indicate a new operational *concept of forward defence*. It seems that the NATO leadership looks at the VJTF and NRF as a not sufficient solution because the "distant deterrence" by the enhanced rapid reaction force is far from the prospective of the threat-worrying countries. This conclusion is re-confirmed by the American decision too, which intends to deploy an armoured brigade on rotationally basis in Eastern Europe from February 2017.<sup>46</sup> If we also add to this the improved

<sup>43</sup> "Magyar század is segít a Baltikumban" (A Hungarian military company will also operate in the Baltic region). *Origo*, 2016. 06. 14. <http://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20160614-nato-v4-baltikum-magyar-szazad.html>, Accessed on 15. 06. 2016.

<sup>44</sup> The Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training Initiative (TACET) is in charge of the preparation of the future NATO forces based in the Baltic region. The Combined Joint Enhanced Training Initiative, (CJET) is completely to assist in the preparation of the new NATO forces in the Black Sea region. "Romania to host NATO multinational brigade". *Balkan Defence*, 7 July, 2016. <http://www.balkandefense.com/romania-host-nato-multinational-brigade/>, Accessed on 20. July, 2016

<sup>45</sup> According to suggestions a new maritime strategy must be based on the following priorities: (1) Enhance maritime domain awareness; 2. Reenergize the European Amphibious Initiative; 3. Give Smart Defence concept a naval dimension; 4. Focus on high-end naval capabilities; 5. Share technologies and operation concepts; 6. Resource the standing maritime groups; 6. Provide secure access to the enabling domain (cyber, space, communication). See: Magnus NORDENMAN. "The Naval Alliance: Preparing NATO for a Maritime Century". Atlantic Council of the United States, July 24, 2015. [http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/20151217\\_Naval\\_Alliance\\_web.pdf](http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/20151217_Naval_Alliance_web.pdf), Accessed on 19. 07. 2016.

<sup>46</sup> Poór, Cs. "Az elrettentést szolgálják a Kelet-Európába szánt amerikai páncélosok" (The American armoured troops for Eastern Europe are representing deterrence). *Népszabadság Online*, 2016. 04. 01. <http://nol.hu/kulfold/az-elrettentest-szolgajlak-kelet-europaba-szant-amerikai-pancelosok-1608909>, accessed on 2016. 04. 03.

military capabilities of the other member states,<sup>47</sup> not only the threatened member states, we can see an increasingly strong military defence and deterrence posture in the Eastern Europe.<sup>48</sup>

## CYBER DEFENCE AND RESILIENCE

Besides the traditional military threats, cyber defence also got a major role in the Warsaw Summit discussions, both separately by NATO and in cooperation with the EU. If we add to this, that the OSCE also introduced new information security regulations in March 2016 as confidence and security building measures (CSBM), a coordinated international effort can be seen against cyber threats.<sup>49</sup> The phenomenon of cyber warfare is not kinetic, rather extremely changeable, unpredictable, hardly interpretable and dissolvable.<sup>50</sup> NATO experiences 200 million incidents on its computer network system every day and around 200 more serious intrusion attempts every month. This level of hostile activity looks like “new normal” in the cyber domain.<sup>51</sup> During the Wales Summit the Alliance made decisions about a potential cyber war and the adaptation of Article 5, and it accepted the enhanced cyber defence policy and action plan.

Many NATO decisions had been made about the defence of information technology since 2014, but the *Warsaw Summit introduced further actions* in this field. It regarded especially important to reconsider the lessons learned from cyber war in Ukraine and Crimea, review the opportunity of using military and civilian means in a combined way, and share information with members and partners.<sup>52</sup> Brussels is now planning to establish an *integrated intelligence and information processing centre* in the HQ. NATO signed a cooperation agreement with the 28 member states, and also signed a technical cyber defence agreement with the EU in February 2016. The NAC in Warsaw declared the cyberspace *as a military operation space*, which might have effects on cyber defence planning, organization of operations and

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<sup>47</sup> Angela Merkel German chancellor announced the increase of the defence budget until 2020 following the Summit. David Cameron British Prime Minister announced the modernization of the British Nuclear Submarine Fleet (Trident).

<sup>48</sup> According to NATO accounts the military budget of the European member states have already increased by 3% in 2016. Although now only 6 countries spend more than 2% of their GDP on defence, the increase of expenses can be seen in 16 countries. 9 countries spend more than 20% of defence budget is on the supply of new equipment, military technology, research and development. "Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2009-2016)". NATO. 04 July, 2016. [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2016\\_01/20160129\\_160128-pr-2016-11-eng.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160129_160128-pr-2016-11-eng.pdf) Accessed on 15. 08. 2016.

<sup>49</sup> Minárik, T. "OSCE Expands its List on Confidence Building Measures for Cyber Space: Common Ground on Critical Infrastructure Protection". 04 April 2016. <https://ccdcoc.org/osce-expands-its-list-confidence-building-measures-cyberspace-common-ground-critical-infrastructure.html>. Accessed: 30. 07. 2016.

<sup>50</sup> Berzsenyi, D. CyCON "2016 – NATO cyber defence before the Warsaw Summit". 12 Jun 2016. <http://bizton-sagpolitika.hu/cikkek/cycon-2016-nato-kibervedelem-varso-elott>, Accessed on 15. 06. 2016.

<sup>51</sup> Shea, J. "Resilience: a core element of collective defence". *NATO Review*, 30/03/2016. 3. <http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/nato-defence-cyber-resilience/EN/index.htm>. Accessed on 17. 07. 2016.

<sup>52</sup> NATO and partner countries experts were practised the cyber defence methods and cooperation according to many different scenario with 600 participants in „Cyber Coalition 2015” training (November 16-20), Tartu (EST). Georgia, Japan and Jordan took part for the first time in the simulation training. "NATO Cyber Defence: fact sheet". NATO, July 2016. [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2016\\_07/20160627\\_1607-factsheet-cyber-defence-eng.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-cyber-defence-eng.pdf). Accessed on 10. 07. 2016.

missions, as well as on preparations and training<sup>53</sup>. This decision, however, does not change the defence character of NATO's cyber policy in spite of the opinion of certain experts, who are suggesting some modification in the policy. According to the experts of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence it is not enough to focus only on defence, but offensive capabilities and skills are also needed, which allow NATO to respond properly to a potential threat from cyber space too. *A new kind of approach and mentality is needed to implement this idea, which accepts cyber-attack in a way like attack from the air.*<sup>54</sup>

The Warsaw Summit called the member states to make pledge to improve the cyber defence capabilities and the joint innovations, which will all be reviewed at the Brussels Summit in 2017. The promises about cyber defence include seven areas:<sup>55</sup> 1. develop the fullest range of capabilities to defend national infrastructure and network; 2. allocate the adequate resources nationally to strengthen cyber defence capabilities; 3. deepen coordination and the exchange of best practises; 4. improve understanding of cyber threats, 5. enhance skills and awareness of „cyber hygiene“; 6. foster cyber education, training and exercises; 7. expedite implementation of agreed cyber defence commitments.<sup>54</sup> It is obvious that for success international cooperation is necessary – especially cooperation with the EU and Five Eyes countries,<sup>56</sup> as well as governmental, industrial, and scientific cooperation, which is to be achieved by implementing of *NATO Industry Cyber Partnership* projects.

At the Summit the problem of resilience was discussed in association with cyber security, although it is well-known that proper resilience is much more crucial than to discuss only in cyber-space. The commitment to enhance resilience approved by the heads of state and government underlines that “resilience is an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfilment of the Alliance's core tasks.”<sup>57</sup> As NATO faces the new security challenges and threats it is important to maintain and protect critical civilian capabilities, alongside and in support of military capabilities, and to work across the whole government and with the private sector. It also requires the Alliance to continue to engage,

<sup>53</sup> "NATO's largest annual cyber defence exercise underway in Estonia". Balkan Defense. 18 nov 2015. <http://www.balkandefense.com/natos-largest-annual-cyber-defence-exercise-underway-in-estonia/>, Accessed on 28. July, 2016.

<sup>54</sup> Veenendaal, M., Kaska K. and Brayetto P. "Is NATO Ready to Cross the Rubicon on Cyber Defence?" NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence, Cyber Policy Brief, Tallin, June 2016. <https://ccdcoe.org/multimedia/nato-ready-cross-rubicon-cyber-defence.html>, Accessed on 29. 07. 2016.

<sup>55</sup> Cyber Defence Pledge. NATO, 08. July 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133177.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133177.htm?selectedLocale=en), Accessed on 10. July, 2016.

<sup>56</sup> The USA, Great Britain, Australia, Canada and New-Zealand agreed about a joint secret technical military intelligence and share of information 70 years ago. The Alliance had been operating in secret until 1999, but its global feature had not been revealed until the Snowden scandal in 2013. The joint activity today – which is mainly carried out by technical intelligence agencies and units – includes not only the global technical intelligence, but the monitoring and controlling of cyber space as well. The cooperation of the five countries is constantly expanding, and nowadays the Alliance is called as „9 Eyes“ (+ Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Norway) and „14 Eyes“ (+ Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Sweden) because of the involvement of these countries. Within the framework of the so-called „focused cooperation“ 20 more NATO member states and partner countries take part in the collaboration. During the ISAF operation in Afghanistan the „41 Eyes“ collaboration proved to be really successful and now it is regarded as a „pilot program“ by the Alliance. The reinforcement of the secret intelligence organizations is crucial now, mainly because of the Russian hybrid war and international terrorism (ISIS). "The Five Eyes". Privacy International. <https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/51>, Accessed on 17. July, 2016.

<sup>57</sup> "Commitment to enhance resilience". NATO, 8 July, 2016. 1., 3. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133180](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180)., Accessed on 11. 07. 2016.

as appropriate, with international bodies, particularly the EU, and with partners. As the civil preparedness is a national responsibility above all, NATO will strive to achieve the agreed requirements for national resilience. As the Alliance is to enhance resilience against the full spectrum of threats, the Warsaw Summit introduced the *NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians*,<sup>58</sup> which focuses on the increased protection of civilians during NATO operations, missions and other activities. This document emphasizes that the tasks – just as in the case of resilience – can only be fulfilled in the framework of international cooperation and with the adaptation of a comprehensive approach. The improvement of resilience takes a major part in the long-term NATO adaptations, and the Alliance intends to achieve this in cooperation with the EU. An important part of resilience is cyber defence, but the resilience also includes the defence against weapons of mass destruction and the decrease of dependence of the Eastern European member states on Russia. The improvement of resilience is first of all a national challenge, especially in concern with civilian issues.

The resilience is an important consequence of the defence and deterrence measures because the system of conditions for the adaptation of NATO military forces to their future operations must be guaranteed. During the Cold War resilience was a part of the „*preparation of war theatre*” both in the West and East, mainly within national borders, in accordance with the nuclear threats. The civilian infrastructure building, economic production, development of war industry, and the accumulation of war reserves were all carried out according to military requirements. The network of transportation (railway network, motorways, ports, airports), the healthcare system (hospitals, hygienic capacities, patient accommodation capacities), the energy network, the material capacities, the military technology repairing plants, the organization of transportation were all parts of warfare preparations of the countries.

Today, by contrast, a significant part of supplies of NATO forces depends on the private sector: 90% of the logistic supply comes from private companies, whereas 75% comes from host nation support of the receiver countries. Air transport, telecommunication, and information technology services and different IT systems depend almost exclusively on the private sphere. It is evident that because of privatization, globalization and economic profitability *the vulnerability of social-economic systems has increased*, while the resilience capacity has decreased. The forward military presence in the East needs to reorganize all these tasks and all the conditions needed for the operation of NATO forces and have to be provided and guaranteed, especially in endangered countries. This challenge can only be solved by NATO with the assistance of member states. First, to ensure that it can speedily move all forces and equipment required to any part of the Alliance facing an imminent threat or attack, ensuring full and unimpeded access to all the infrastructure and supply it needs for this purpose. The new NFIUs in Eastern countries will have a major role in these tasks, because these units are going to organize the reception, the staging and onward movement (RSOM) of the new NATO ready-to-fight and rapid reaction forces. Second, NATO

#### Resilience Requirements

- assured continuity of government and government services
- resilient energy supplies
- ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people
- resilient food and water resources
- ability to deal with mass casualties
- resilient communications systems
- resilient transportation systems

Source: Jamie Shea: *Ibid.* 3.

<sup>58</sup> NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians. 09 July, 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133945.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133945.htm?selectedLocale=en) (Accessed: 10. 07. 2016)

members must be able to anticipate, identify, mitigate and recover from hybrid attacks with minimum disruptive impact on the Alliance's political, economic, social and military cohesion. Although resilience is a national responsibility, NATO must ensure adequate cyber defence for their critical infrastructure (Table N.4). This said, Allies' security relies on individual nations upholding this commitment; and NATO has an interest in obtaining as much transparency as possible. Avoiding unpleasant surprises in crisis situations when the Alliance needs swift and reliable information and the capability to analyse, decide and respond quickly has to be the goal. Therefore NATO should practise these issues in the annual crisis management exercises focusing on assessing and accurately measuring potential vulnerabilities and civil preparedness. It will be an important challenge for the countries to create an appropriate legal environment for NATO operations in their own territories, so that the national and Alliance forces can take actions without breaking the rules of Article 5, against any forms of hybrid threats, and let them do even sovereignty-offending covered military actions. The creation of resilience means a long-term challenge, and its realization requested to develop NATO civil crisis management institutes as well.

## CONCLUSIONS

The Warsaw Summit – just as almost all major NATO conferences – had had great expectations. The decisions about the assurance of deterrence and defence in the Eastern Flank countries have proved very popular, as they continue to intensify the military features of the Alliance returning to its initial collective defence mission. The forward military presence, however, can threaten the ideas saying that NATO needs – sooner or later – to replace the Readiness Action Plan with *forward defence doctrine*. Nevertheless, the persistent forward presence cannot be labelled as permanent military deployment as it used to be in the Central-European region during the Cold War, when major efforts were concentrated on border defence.<sup>59</sup> Today, NATO is making efforts to create a balance between the expected effects of deterrence and a minor escalation of forces. Although the operation planning process will have been completed by the end of 2017, further forward presence decisions in Brussels will rather depend on the political-military situation, than on the military operation plans prepared on the worst-case security scenarios.

Besides deterrence and defence NATO is planning to cope with the hybrid threats like terrorism, cyber warfare, migration and regional instability too, which represents *a new trend* compared to the decisions made in the Wales Summit. The implementation of *a dual track political approach* to the Russian challenges has also proved a correct decision because the different and controversial statements of the member states' leaders could only be managed with this attitude. Only in this way was possible to avoid qualifications like „division”, „cracks”, „faults”, which labelling have lately been so popular in international media. NATO has also recognised the need to enhance cooperation with the EU against hybrid dangers and threats, just as to collaborate with the reliable Arabic partner countries. This new strategy also includes the *projecting stability concept*, which makes efforts to improve the security of the challenged countries beyond the NATO borders – like Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Syria, Iraq and Libya – by implementing non-kinetic means and forces.

<sup>59</sup> Mearsheimer, J. "Maneuver, Mobile Defence, and the NATO Central Front". *International Security*, Winter 1981/82. Vol. 6. N. 3. <http://johnmearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0005.pdf>. Accessed on 19. 07. 2016.



While at the Wales Summit NATO made a “half-turning”<sup>60</sup> – like the return to the direction of a new Cold War – the Warsaw Summit produced a complete turn. New NATO now is not only about the reinforcement of the Eastern border, but about the return to the traditional defence of the European borders. Many decisions made by the Alliance in Warsaw try to work out new solutions for internal European utilization of NATO military forces for security tasks. The modern security approach is about the fusion of external and internal security representing the need to fight against hybrid threats. In a new security environment the tasks of the military forces need to be clarified in connection with nationwide and international community defence efforts. It is unquestionable that NATO will take further steps this way at the Brussels Summit in 2017.

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<sup>60</sup> Szenes, Z. "Back to the past? The NATO Summit in Wales". *Külgügyi Szemle* (Foreign Affairs Journal), autumn 2014. <http://kki.gov.hu/download/9/1a/c0000/Szenes.pdf>

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