“Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.”


**ABSTRACT:** In the Hungarian Army during the country’s Warsaw Pact-membership it became clear that there was no space for independent Hungarian military thinking. According to the Soviet doctrinal approach the satellite countries’ security was not a primary issue. The whole structure, the preparation, and the training of the Pact’s armies intended purely to support the Soviet Red Army in the invasion of Europe. The Hungarian People’s Army was not an exception and as a consequence now there is no tradition of independent concept and doctrine development in the Hungarian Defense Forces. The Author draws attention to a couple of misunderstandings about doctrines, still prevailing in the Hungarian Defense Forces.

**KEYWORDS:** Doctrine, Strategy, Policy, National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy

The Hungarian People’s Republic had no independent security strategy, consequently the Hungarian People’s Army had no independent military doctrines either. As a matter of fact neither the Hungarian Army nor the Warsaw Pact had any coherent military documents bearing the name “doctrine”¹,² The Hungarian Defense Forces made huge progress since the dissolving of the Warsaw Pact.

In the early 90s, the changed security situation demanded the creation of a new Hungarian national security and military strategy. I use the terms “national security strategy,” “military strategy,” “doctrine,” etc., but these clear concepts were not clear at all that time. The terminology was in total turmoil. Many politicians and military thinkers were confused by these concepts and sequenced them in reverse order: they thought that “military doctrine” was the “master plan” for the Army and the military strategy was subordinated to that. This approach reflected pretty much the prevailing soviet (later Russian) approach.³

After Hungary’s accession to NATO, doctrine development accelerated. The expectation was very high, but the role of the doctrine was absolute misunderstood. Many military leaders believed that doctrine was a single, uniform system of thoughts in which both political

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and military-technical elements could be found, and – like a “supreme field manual” – it explained every strategic and operational\(^4\) and even tactical\(^5\) aspect in detail.

This was not the only misconception. Military doctrines had different misinterpretations: they were deemed an attempt to produce a higher form of catechism or a codex of general rules from which strategic and operational conclusions could be gained. Both tenets were so ridiculous and absurd that many military thinkers turned away from doctrines altogether, and rejected the need for them. Both opinions fail to consider that doctrines are not a silver bullet, they are not able to answer every question, and there is no ultimate truth, especially not for wars and battles.

**WHAT IS MILITARY DOCTRINE?**

Both NATO and Hungarian terminology sources\(^6\) define doctrine as a “*Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.*”\(^7\) In order to fulfill its function a doctrine should be based on operational and strategic experience. Experience can be gained from military history, training experience, and the latest lessons learned from campaigns (operations). Doctrines should be intellectually coherent, relevant, and reflect the views of the top leader of the Armed Forces. The doctrines are however not written for eternity, and to make sure that they remain relevant they must be revised from time to time. So the doctrines intend to reflect the latest development of the security environment, the resources allocated to the Armed Forces, the technological advancement, and last but not least the experience from operations.

The doctrines accumulate the common wisdom of the army; they demonstrate the proper attitude and the philosophy of warfare for future military leaders. The doctrines’ aim is to standardize the joint approach for commanders and their staffs, they establish a common basis and provide reference points for military education and training. The common doctrines enhance the interoperability with allied forces, they standardize terminology, symbology, training, and processes.

There is always a potential that the nature of the next armed conflict will be fundamentally different from the previous one. To change the doctrine from operation to operation would undermine their authority, therefore a doctrine describes just generic contexts or principles of long standing. For the same reason, doctrines are not strict rules; they are rather guidelines which tell the Commander how to think and not what to think. Thus doctrines aid the analytical thinking necessary to command various operations and are versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of situations.\(^8\)

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\(^5\) To illustrate: the “*Light infantry section and platoon doctrine*” (!) (No 68/24/2005.HTF) was issued in 2005.

\(^6\) *AAP-06 (U)* was translated in 1996, the relevant (STANAG 3680) was ratified and implemented in 1998.

\(^7\) *Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06* (2014) NATO Glossary of Terms and definitions, 2014. 2-D-9.

WHO ARE THE AUDIENCES OF MILITARY DOCTRINE?

At this point we have to clarify to whom the doctrines are supposed to be written. The short answer is: for military personnel, but this answer is not so simple. It is clear that in certain situations a „guidance” provided by doctrines is effective enough to achieve a coordinated action. A military doctrine gives guidance to officers, educates them and explains the approach to operations and the nature of warfare. It helps to understand the character of warfare and forms the basis of military training. At the same time, the doctrine helps civilians (politicians, government departments, public administrations, law enforcement agencies, academics, journalists, etc.) to understand the military point of view and approach.

But at a lower level (read: tactical level), it is absolute essential to give more detailed and specific instructions for effective coordination. Doctrines do not cover specific information about military activities, consequently doctrines are rather useful for personnel in the higher echelons of command, and are not intended for junior officers. At tactical level it is vital to explain clearly what to do and what not to do, and the necessary detailed instructions are in tactical manuals, regulations, Standing Operating Procedures, etc. These publications are subordinated to doctrines, they are derived from doctrines, and thus their purpose and intended audiences are totally different. To summarize: doctrines are for high ranking officers about how to think, while the regulations (pamphlets, manuals, etc.) are for junior officers and NCO’s about what to do.

Last but not least, doctrines are publicly available documents and thus clearly express to the country’s opponents that the armed forces are ready, strong and unified, thereby doctrines contribute to the nation’s deterrent capacity as well.9

WHAT IS THE LINK BETWEEN DOCTRINES AND POLICY?

Policy and doctrines are very similar therefore it is not surprising that Hungarian politicians and generals confused them in the 90’s, but clearly policy is dominant. National policy leads and directs the development of military doctrines10 by giving the aims and the desired end states for the means and for the military implementation.

Doctrines, national security, and military strategy interact; they influence the creation of each other. Ideally, policy makers take into account the effective, proven military theories and principles while establishing the Security Strategy and Military Strategy of their nation. Extant and effective doctrines are the best summary of the latest result of military thinking therefore they can promote the military part of these national security documents. Doctrines can help especially by establishing ways necessary to turn the aims of National Strategies into reality.11 Doctrines provide information to policy makers responsible for the security of the nation about the core competencies of military forces. In general terms a doctrine is the link between the desired end state (what must be accomplished?) and means (what capabilities are available?) by providing the ways (how is to be accomplished?).

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10 MCM-077-00, Military Comitee Guidance on the Relationship between NATO Policy and Military Doctrine.
This logic works the other way around as well: doctrine writers are bound to ensure that the development of an upcoming doctrine is consistent with the established national policy. National security policy guides doctrine development by providing the aims and the desired end state. Thus policy makers and doctrine developers must closely synchronize their efforts in order to ensure consistency between strategy and doctrine.

Hungary’s National Security Strategy (NSS) was written in conformity with the new Constitution (called Basic Law). The NNS reflects the commonly accepted concept of strategy and emphasizes that the national military power is just one component of national strategy. Its most important finding is: ‘‘...the danger ... of traditional threats and major military confrontation among states has decreased.’’\(^\text{12}\) In the strategy the other components of security (e.g.: political, economic, financial and social dimensions) were given more emphasis than military aspects were. The National Military Strategy (NMS), which is consistent with the NSS, states that ‘‘The defence of the country ... rests on two basic pillars: sovereign national force and Allied cooperation.’’\(^\text{13}\) Interoperability is of great importance for the collective defence implemented in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which is one of the basic pillars of the security of Hungary. Interoperability must be one their most important characteristics for the Hungarian Defence Forces to fulfil their constitutional obligations.\(^\text{14}\)

In summary, Hungary attributes no importance to the military dimension of security and even in the military component relies heavily on cooperation with NATO. As the relevant strategies suggest the HDF will be likely to operate in the full spectrum of possible operations from low- to high-intensity, and mostly in crisis management operations as part of a NATO-based coalition far from the territory of our country.\(^\text{15}\) Having said this, it sounds very reasonable to adopt NATO doctrines as the cornerstone of interoperability, except where there is a specific national interest or doctrinal need. But do we have any?

Considering these objectives the budget (the means) of the HDF does not seem to be sufficient. Since 2008 the impact of the global economic depression on the national economy has significantly decreased the resources available to HDF. This negative trend aggravated the fact that national defense had been underfinanced in the previous period too. In order to stop and reverse the negative processes, in 2012 the Government of Hungary committed itself in a resolution that the budget of the Ministry of Defense for the years of 2013-2015 will be provided at least at the nominal value of the budgetary allocation for the year 2012. Subsequently, from the budgetary year of 2016, with an annual increase of no less than 0.1 percent of the GDP, the total budgetary allocation will have reached 1.39% of the GDP by 2022, which is close to the average of the European NATO Member States.

In my opinion, this constraint is the only serious national restriction or national limit on doctrine development. Any other argument about our specific national particularity or interest is empty twaddle. It is understandable that under these circumstances it is very hard for a doctrine writer to find the proper way, to write a military doctrine which connects the national goals with the sources available for the HDF. (It is not part of this study but I have to note here, that a longer range strategy may be based on non-existing military capacity,


\(^{13}\) ‘‘Hungary’s National Military Strategy’’. 2012. 11.

\(^{14}\) ‘‘Hungary’s National Military Strategy’’. 2012. 73.

but beware that these longer range strategies require improvements in military capacities and are not usable in short term.)

General Benkő stated in an interview, that the security of Hungary cannot be interpreted without NATO\(^\text{16}\) (see box), and therefore it is vital to enhance the effective cooperation with Allied Forces. The efficiency of the cooperation in peacetime, in crisis or in conflict depends on the capacity of the allied forces to operate coherently. Allied operations should be prepared, planned, conducted in a way that ensures the best use of the resources and capacities of member nations. Interoperability is the key for the effective fighting force. Interoperability of the HDF has three levels: technical (e.g.: compatibility criteria), procedural (e.g.: doctrines), and human (e.g.: terminology)\(^\text{17}\) therefore the Common NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) are vital for the success of NATO operation, thus vital for the HDF as well.

The HDF is struggling with deficiency in all three aspects of interoperability. No need to mention that there are no financial resources available to replace the combat equipment left over from the Warsaw Pact-era, therefore NATO has to accept the non-standard (Soviet) military equipment. But the other two dimensions of interoperability depend just on the military leadership of HDF and the shortfalls are far more serious in the human and procedural areas.

WHO MAKES DOCTRINES…?

The international examples for doctrine development mechanism are very similar to the Hungarian one and it is regrettable that we did not take over the real essential part of their practice.

The NATO doctrine development process is carried out by the Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group (AJODWG) under the auspices of the Military Committee’s Joint Standardization Board (JSB). The AJODWG consists of delegates from NATO member na-

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tions, the International Military Staff, Centers of Excellence and the Strategic Commands. The AJODWG reviews proposals that identify doctrinal gaps and recommend development of doctrine in order to fill the disclosed gaps. AJODWG associates other NATO elements (Tasking Authority, Delegated Tasking Authority, etc.) and provides guidance on doctrinal and terminological harmonization issues. Their careful work ensures vertical and horizontal harmonization of the NATO doctrines.\textsuperscript{18}

In the British Army the development of doctrines is the responsibility of the Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). The DCDC provides the United Kingdom representative to the JSB, the head of delegation to the AJODWG, and is custodian for some NATO publication. In order to influence NATO doctrine development process the DCDC directly liaises with relevant elements and organizations. The process of doctrine development is similar to NATO process.

Let’s see how it works in the HDF. Two questions arise: do we really need doctrines and who is supposed to produce it?

\ldots do we really need them?

First of all, even though the process is similar to that in NATO and to international experience, it is very specific. The top leaders of the Hungarian Defence Force do not follow the doctrine development process and do not show the necessary interest in doctrine, therefore their views are expressed poorly in military doctrines.

Although the need for independent doctrines in Hungarian military thinking has been existing for two decades, doctrine development has been a neglected area. One explanation for this contradiction and for the lack of human interoperability is the fragmentation of the Hungarian officer corps. The promotion system does not include or require a rotation among garrisons and units. As a consequence the flow among units, command organization and academic institutions is extremely slow. This low mobility\textsuperscript{19} of officers eventuated that we can distinguish „troop officers”, „central staff officers”, „education officers”. Obviously these categories are neither official nor clearly separated, and as a matter of fact in some cases they are overlapping.

The „central staff officers” usually serve relatively short tours in operational units, and as junior officers they are assigned to the defence staff, one of the military agencies, or some other large military institutions, typically in Budapest. They have a good command of English, many of them have served shorter or longer operational tours, or served in a NATO HQ somewhere in Europe. They have experience of a fundamentally different military leadership style and way of thinking. The comparison between the Hungarian and the NATO approach has convinced them that the adoption of a new philosophy, and of the NATO-standardized doctrinal system is urgent. The other two categories are not so convinced about that.

The „troop” officers have spent the majority of their carrier in provincial garrisons in various command or staff positions. They are the mainstay of the Army, extremely overworked, overburdened, exhausted and stuck in hectic daily activities. They are not interested


in theory-heavy books, many of them do not speak English, and their operational experience is uneven.

The „educational officers” are a relatively small caste in the Military University (or NCO Academy) with limited military or operational experience, but their effect on the future generations and thus on the entire officer corps is huge. The performance of the cadre of Military University is especially disappointing. They are supposed to support doctrinal development by identifying those unique national characteristics and interests which require national reservation or comment to NATO doctrines. Instead, the majority of the professors believe (and many field officers share this opinion) that doctrinal thinking is rigid, inflexible, and dogmatic – reasoning that it should be ignored.

This attitude rejects the potential value in a scientific approach to warfare and related activities and concentrates only on practical, daily military activities. Those who are convinced about the uselessness of doctrines consider the officers as just one contributor to the battle, with limited authority and not as rational leaders. This is a „regulation heavy” view: it requires detailed, prescriptive, normative pamphlets and even those only for the lowest (tactical) level. In this „manual-centric” way of thinking the commander’s authority is very narrow and limited just to choose one from the possible course of actions.

To a certain extent even Clausewitz shared this view. At tactical level it is possible to work out a relatively strict, template-based regulation system, because „[At tactical level] The field of action is more limited, means and ends are fewer in number, and the data are more concrete: usually they are limited to what is actually visible.”

At operational and strategic levels, however, a competent commander has to consider the ends of a battle, the ways for achieving those ends, the available means and the given logistic resources. This puts a military leader into a new dimension and in this much bigger dimension the detailed regulations and rigid standards cannot help, because the operations are full of bilateral interactions which are different from one case to the other and there are no stereotyped solutions for them. One size does not fit for all. Doctrines help the commander to open his mind, to develop his analytical skills, and to achieve a flexible approach, which is a must to adapt to the ever-changing situation.

**HOW DO WE MAKE THEM?**

In the HDF the Training and Doctrine Center (TDC) is responsible for the standardization and adoption of NATO publications and managing the production of strategic and operational level doctrines, tactical level regulations, manuals, etc. The TDC is also supposed to ensure coherence in both NATO and national doctrine publication. It must be emphasized that the TDC is a so-called „mid-level organization.” This designation clearly indicates that the doctrine development issue is not represented at strategic level, as the TDC has no right to liaise directly with NATO and other international partners, or to co-operate with other relevant counterparts. Under these circumstances it is difficult to influence NATO doctrine development or even to learn about the latest developments.

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21 Idem.
The events of the past two decades indicate and the recent circumstances determine that the likelihood that the HDF will continue to operate as part of joint multinational forces increases, so its doctrine should reflect common NATO practices as far as possible. Therefore it is policy to adopt as many NATO doctrines as applicable. The majority of the NATO doctrines (43 out of the most important 44 AJP-s and ATP-s)\(^{23}\) have been ratified and implemented by the HDF, and only four were ratified with reservation or comment.

After this seemingly seamless adoption of NATO’s common thinking, it may come as a surprise that the HDF has a doctrine hierarchy that differs from that of NATO. The function of the Hungarian doctrines is to ensure interoperability and bring together the allied and Hungarian strategic and operational thinking, highlighting the relationship between them and pointing out the national differences. Considering that the HDF has officially declared national reservations on only four occasions, an independent doctrine system seems an exaggeration.

The doctrine development process does not have any written rules. The TDC manages the Standardization and Doctrinal Committee (SDC) which is an advisory body chaired by the Deputy Chief of Defense Staff (DChoD). It gives guidance on doctrinal development, terminology, operational and material standardization and meets every two months. The Committee approves the Doctrine Development Plan (DDP), which is a long term for the regular revision and rewrite of all doctrinal publications. The SDC does not wait for proposal for doctrine, and does not identify doctrinal voids – it works in accordance with the timeline in the DDP. Based on the SDC’s decision in accordance with the plan the TDC Doctrine and Regulation Development Branch manages the projects for each doctrine.

The development starts with a formal invitation to the Project Working Group (WG), which is expected to produce a synopsis. All the relevant military organizations receive an invitation to the WG, which does the actual doctrine development. At the first meeting of the WG the representatives of relevant military organizations discuss the synopsis with the project officer. Once the draft synopsis is finalized, it is submitted for approval to the DChoD. The concerns start here, since the synopsis is prepared by an officer who is usually not an expert of the given specialty, while the members of WG are not released from their primary positions, so essentially they work in two full-time positions. There is no recognition for this extra effort\(^{24}\), therefore they delegate much of their actual work to lower ranking officers with less experience and a more limited vision of doctrinal questions. At this level there is obviously no chance to consult and synchronize efforts with policy makers in order to ensure the consistency between strategy and doctrine, to which I had drawn attention earlier. Doctrine development is just a burden for the participants of the procedure therefore the WG members make shortcuts wherever they can: copy and paste as much as possible. There is no question of harmonization with other doctrines or of using agreed, current terminology.

The first draft is circulated to appropriate establishments and departments within the HDF, but the problem is the same: overworked officers with no time trying to give competent comments and amendments on the study draft. They have no time to acquire an overall view of the whole doctrinal system, therefore there is no consistency among Hungarian doctrines.

\(^{23}\) 41 doctrines are ratified and implemented, two ratified and future implemented, three doctrines ratified and implemented with reservation, one doctrine ratified and implemented with comment. One doctrine is not responded up to December 2015.

\(^{24}\) The only occasion when recognition was extended occurred in 2012, when the Minister of Defense wrote an acknowledgement in the foreword of the National Joint Doctrine.
The HDF’s Lessons Learned system is not involved in this development process. The operational experience of HDF is rather insignificant and the system is very badly managed. In fact, the Lessons Learned database contains only four strategic level lessons, but these are not campaign- (or operation-) related. Not having a decent Lessons Learned system, it would be advisable to use the Alliance’s Lessons learnt or to use the doctrines containing the processed experiences instead. As an alternative, we are developing our own doctrines without using relevant operational experience.

One example should suffice to illustrate the inconsistency within the Hungarian doctrine hierarchy and between that of NATO and the HDF. In NATO doctrines the land tactical activities are divided into offensive, defensive, stability and enabling activities. In the Hungarian doctrines we find three different groupings for the same. The HDF Joint Operations Doctrine says: offensive, defensive, special (!) and other combat-related activities. In the HDF Land Doctrines there are: offensive, defensive, delaying (!), special (!), and other combat related activities. The Hungarian doctrines are not consistent with the lower tactical manuals either: the Platoon Tactics Manual covers the same subject differently: offensive, defensive, non-war operation (!) and supplementary activities (!). This ought to be a really serious concern: even the basic concepts are not in agreement with NATO doctrine, moreover the HDF has literally no clue about the discrepancy. This is just one of the many instances which reveal that the Hungarian Doctrine system faces many serious problems.

Surprisingly, in spite of the significant inconsistency within its doctrinal system, the HDF does not seem to be concerned about it, there is no sign of any recognition that the system is broken. Presumably the majority of the doctrines were never read by Hungarian officers. This assumption has to be proven by a survey later.

The Hungarian doctrine hierarchy was based on the model of the NATO doctrine hierarchy which was converted into a doctrine architecture in the meantime. The change of designation seemed marginal therefore the Hungarian doctrines did not copy that. The hierarchy is currently based on the standard headquarters staff divisional system. The numbering sequence within provides functional and subject matter linkages.

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25 Ált/38 Magyar Honvédség Összhaderőnemi Műveletek Doktrína (MD 3(1)). Magyar Honvédség, 2013. 1-7.
26 Ált/29 Magyar Honvédség Szárazföldi Műveletek Doktrína (MD 3.2(1)). Magyar Honvédség, 2015. 1-16.
At the highest level we find the (National) Joint Doctrine\(^{28}\), which is currently in its third edition. Even this doctrine reveals the HDF’s daily budget problems, the continuous concern about financial restrictions on military expenditures.\(^{29}\) The doctrine, however, is supposed to find the way (read: balance) between the designated ends and the given means, but we cannot find a clear solution or concept for the implementation of the tasks of HDF. Practically, the Hungarian top military doctrine just repeats the basic principle of NSS and NMS: the HDF is most likely to take part in managing a low-intensity conflict which is expected to take place at far strategic distances\(^{30}\), therefore the HDF must have well-equipped, well-trained, flexible and effective, interoperable\(^{31}\) deployable and sustainable capabilities\(^{32}\). In 2016 a revision process will start, which will probably affect this and five other doctrines.

At the second level of the hierarchy there are the publications containing overarching joint knowledge: Intelligence, Operation, Logistics, CCIS. The substantial differences at this level are that in the Hungarian system there is no Operational-level Planning doctrine,

\(^{28}\) Ált/43 Magyar Honvédsg Összhaderőnemi Doktrina (ÖHD (3)). Magyar Honvédsg, 2012.

\(^{29}\) Idem 2-4.

\(^{30}\) Idem 2-10.

\(^{31}\) Idem 2-12.

\(^{32}\) Idem 2-11.
but there are two doctrines which do not exist in NATO’s architecture: one is the Training Doctrine\textsuperscript{33} (revision in 2016) and the other is the Medical Doctrine\textsuperscript{34}.

At the third level of the hierarchy there are also some differences: in the Hungarian doctrine hierarchy there are two extra doctrines (FD-2.4: Geoinformation Support Doctrine and MD-3.3.1: Air Transport Operation Doctrine) which have no counterpart in NATO\textsuperscript{35}. Conversely, there are several doctrines in the NATO doctrine architecture without any similar ones in the Hungarian hierarchy. It does seem logical that since we theoretically ratified and implemented them, there is no need to repeat them. But the problem is still there: we did not incorporate them into our doctrines or manuals therefore the knowledge was not absorbed and this is a significant problem indeed because of the language barrier.

Another serious deficiency is the Host Nation Support Doctrine, or more precisely, the lack of one. Considering that the HDF is not able to defend the country independently (see the words of the Hungarian ChOD) it is a surprise that the Hungarian version of NATO’s Host Nation Support (HNS) Doctrine is not elaborated and the relevant NATO HNS doctrine\textsuperscript{36} will be ratified with reservation and with future implementation\textsuperscript{37}. Hungary has some concerns about the financial status of NATO-suppliers and the tax benefits provided for them. The HNS Memorandum of Understanding is currently under discussion with NATO and depending of the outcome of the negotiations, the HDF reserves the right to announce further reservation.

**SUMMARY**

In summary, the Hungarian military doctrine system is complete, but is probably not used. No need however pity for it, since their content is contradicting itself and non-standard with NATO doctrines. If we recall General George H. Decker’s cited word at the beginning of this paper about the meaning of doctrines, we can conclude that the HDF has neither common philosophy, nor common purpose, nor unity of efforts with NATO.

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\textsuperscript{33} Ált/24 Magyar Honvédség Kiképzési doktrína. Magyar Honvédség, 2012.  

\textsuperscript{34} EÜ/7 Magyar Honvédség Összhaderőnemi Egészségügyi Doktrína (MH DOFT-code: EÜD 4). Magyar Honvédség, 2012  

\textsuperscript{35} NATO’s STANAG 3998 Tactics, techniques and procedures for NATO Air Transport Operations - ATP-3.3.4.3 (A) is similar to the latter, but it is not a doctrinal publication but a tactical-level manual.  

\textsuperscript{36} STANAG 2234 AJP-4.5  

\textsuperscript{37} At the time of writing (2015. December) the doctrine has “No response” status from Hungarian side.
Contemporary warfare

Ált/43 Magyar Honvédség Összhaderőnemi Doktrína (ÖHD (3)). Magyar Honvédség, 2012.