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THE EU'S HAT-TRICK IN AFRICA

ABSTRACT: The article aims to introduce three EU missions which are launched in Africa. These missions are EUTM Mali, EUTM Somalia and EUTM RCA. What do these operations have in common? All of them are mainly military operations with training tasks, which makes them unique among the other EU missions. Hungary deployed soldiers to two theatres of operations from the three. This article will also introduce the current tasks of these contingents to the reader.

KEYWORDS: Mali, Somalia, Central-African Republic, EU, mission

There are a lot of conflict zones on the African continent. In these territories different international efforts are aiming to reduce the damage caused by these local clashes, and trying to restore law and order in most of the affected countries. The European Union takes part in these international military operations. There are a lot of EU missions on the continent, but I only want to introduce the three ongoing military missions operating on African soil. These are EUTM Mali, EUTM Somalia and EUTM RCA. For the better understanding of the missions led by the EU, I will present a brief summary on the origins of the conflicts and the preliminaries of the mentioned military operations.

When it comes to EU, we have to mention Hungary's role in the operations too. In this article I also want to introduce the Hungarian involvement in these missions.

EUTM MALI

The origins of the conflict

The roots of the Mali conflict dates back to the colonial era. In governing the colonisers preferred the settled black African tribes, who lived in the southern part of the country, and the marginalisation of the nomad Arabic, Tuareg tribes started. Later, in 1960, when Mali gained its independence from France, the new Bamako government continued the segregation policy against the Tuaregs. And the first Tuareg insurgency started in 1963.¹ The peace agreement declared that the government would stop the marginalisation of the Tuareg population, and development programs would start in the northern region of the country. However, the agreement was violated soon, similarly to the four succeeding agreements until 2012.² The northern part of the country remained underdeveloped, the segregation policy has n

¹ Besenyő, J. "Háború Európa előterében: A Mali krízis" (War at the background of Europe: The crisis of Mali). *Seregszemle*. 2013/1. 7.

² Bondersholt, S. F. and Gyldenholm, K. C. K. "Conflict in North Mali – Tuareg Livelihood". Thesis presented for BA in International development Studies. Roskilde University, 2012. [http://dspace.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/8067/3/zConflict%20in%20North%20Mali%20-%20Tuareg %20Livelihood.pdf](http://dspace.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/8067/3/zConflict%20in%20North%20Mali%20-%20Tuareg%20Livelihood.pdf). Downloaded: 2013. July 18. 33-34.

ot stopped, and the Tuaregs started an insurgency in 2012 again, to establish their independent country, the Azawad.^{3,4}

The insurgency started at Menaka on January 17th, when the MNLA⁵ captured the town. The advancement of the fighting was fast, mainly because of the incapability of the armed forces, in which the better trained Tuareg units refused to fight against their own tribesmen, and deserted the Malian Armed Forces, in favour of the insurgents. Bamako failed to solve the situation this time, and the unease of the population reached a peak on March 22nd, when Captain Armadou Haya Sanogo led a military coup against Amound Toumani Touré.⁶ The MNLA and its allied organisations took advantage of the chaos in the south and continued their advancement. By 6th April the MNLA had captured the three main northern regions, Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, and the organisation announced that it had achieved its aims.⁷

The MNLA may have been the leading organisation in the beginning of the insurgency, but by April Islamist groups, Ansar Dine,⁸ AQIM⁹ and MUJAO¹⁰ had hijacked the fighting, and they continued their way to the south. In January 2013 the fighting reached Konna and Mopti, placing Sévaré¹¹ to immediate danger. At this point Dioncounda Traore, the interim president requested help from France.¹²

The French intervention started on 11th January 2013. It pulled in the international community into the country. The AU started to deploy troops to AFISMA in January, the EU followed in February, and finally the UN went in to replace AFISMA with MINUSMA in July.¹³ In 2013 Dioncounda Traore, with the help of Burkina Faso, started peace talks with the

³ The name of the Tuareg state. It contains the northern part of Mali, the southern part of Algeria, the southern part of Libya, the eastern part of Niger and the northern part of Burkina Faso. The area is approximately 2 million km²

⁴ Besenyő, J. "War at the background of Europe: The crisis of Mali. *Academic and Applied Research in Military Science*. Volume 12 / Issue 2. 2013. 247-248.

⁵ National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad-Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad

⁶ Marsai, V. "Külföldi katonai beavatkozás Maliban – Az Operation Serval és háttere". NKE SVKK. 3-4. http://hhk.uni-nke.hu/downloads/kozpontok/svkk/Elemzesek/2013/SVKK_Elemzesek_2013_1.pdf. Downloaded: 2013. May 21.

⁷ Besenyő, J. "Háború Európa előterében: A Mali krízis"(War at the background of Europe: The crisis of Mali). *Seregszemle*. 2013/1. 13-15.

⁸ Iyad Ag Ghali established the Islamist group in 2011. "Mali Islamist group Ansar Dine on US terror list". *Deutsche Welle*, 22 Mar 2013. <http://www.dw.de/mali-islamist-group-ansar-dine-on-us-terror-list/a-16692076>. Downloaded: 2013. July 20.

⁹ The Al-Qaeda in Maghreb is a jihadist group with Algerian headquarters. It started its operations in the northern part of Mali in 2003. The group uses its current name from 2007. Its leader Abdelmalek Droukel. The group strengthened its position in 2012 in northern Mali. We can find veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan among its warriors. "Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)". NCTC. <http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqim.html>. Accessed: 2013. szeptember 25.

¹⁰ MUJAO-Mouvement pour le Tawhid et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest-Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa. The MUJAO separated from the AQIM in 2011-2012. The members of the organisation are mainly Lamhar and Songhai black Africans. The leader of the organisation is Mokhtar Belmokhtar.

¹¹ Sévaré owns the only airfield on which bigger airplanes can land besides Bamako. It is a strategic site in the fields of logistic support in Mali. Its fall would have meant the fall of Bamako too.

¹² Marsai, V. Külföldi katonai beavatkozás Maliban: Az Operation Serval és háttere. NKE SVKK. 1-8. http://hhk.uni-nke.hu/downloads/kozpontok/svkk/Elemzesek/2013/SVKK_Elemzesek_2013_1.pdf

¹³ Vecsey, M. "De mi lett Malival?" *Szakmai Szemle*. 2014/3. 208.

rebel groups. The process resulted in an agreement in July which made it possible to hold elections in August. In September the new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was sworn in.¹⁴

The next milestone was the Algiers Declaration in June 2014, in which the Tuareg organisations declared their will to cooperate with the Malian government. The peace talks started after this process, and the final agreement was signed 15th May 2015 by the Malian government and 20th June 2015 by the Coordination of the Azawad Movements.¹⁵ Signing the Peace deal however did not mean that the security situation is stable in the country. The Islamist groups are still active in the northern region of the country and they are capable to commit attacks even in the southern regions.¹⁶

The mission's background

The talks about the possibility of launching a new EU mission started in October 2012 and the mission concept was accepted in December. On the 17th January 2013 foreign ministers' meeting a decision was made to launch EUTM Mali.¹⁷

The claims of the mission were the UN Security Council Resolution 2085, and the agreement signed on 4th April by the Malian government and the EU.¹⁸

The EU started to deploy troops to the operational theatre in February. The deployment of the personnel finished in April. Right now there are 580 soldiers in EUTM Mali from which 200 soldiers are assigned to training tasks. 28 nations are involved in the mission: 23 EU member states, and 5 non-member countries.¹⁹

The first mandate of EUTM Mali was just for 15 months, until May 2014. Since then the mandate was extended twice. The current, third, mandate lasts until May 2018.²⁰

The original task of the mission was to train 4 battle groups, but with the extended mandate the task system also changed, and the aim was to train 8 battle groups and lead other necessary courses for the Malian Armed Forces.²¹ During the third mandate of the mission the main effort is on the commanders' training.²²

¹⁴ "Mali's new President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita sworn". *BBC*, 4 Sep 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23957259>. Downloaded: 2016. August 28.

¹⁵ "Algeria: Mali – Peace Agreement Signed in 2015, Its Implementation Still Top of Mind". *AllAfrica*, 26 Dec 2015. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201512281896.html>. Downloaded: 2016. May 03.

¹⁶ Farge, E. "Mali deepens probe into deadly attack on luxury hotel". *Reuters*, 22 Nov 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-attacks-idUSKBN0TB0ZF20151123>. Downloaded: 2016. May 04.

¹⁷ Besenyő, J. "Az Európai Unió kiképző művelete Maliban és a magyar szerepvállalás". (The training mission of the European Union in Mali and the role of Hungary). *Honvédségi Szemle*, 2013/5. 69.

¹⁸ "Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Mali on the status in the Republic of Mali of the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali)". <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:106:0002:0006:EN:PDF>. Downloaded: 2013. October 17.

¹⁹ EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali). *EEAS*. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/pdf/factsheet_eutm_mali_en.pdf. Downloaded: 2015. January 24.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Interview with WO Zsolt Holczer, the member of the 3rd Hungarian EUTM Mali contingent. Tata. 2014. July 06.

²² EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali). *EEAS*. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/pdf/factsheet_eutm_mali_en.pdf. Downloaded: 2015. January 24.

Hungary's role in the mission

Hungary has been taking part in the mission since the beginning. At first the contingent consisted of 10 soldiers, 1 liaison officer, 3 medical personnel and 6 sniper instructors. The task of the training team was to lead a 10-week-long course for 27 snipers per battle group.²³ The original plan was to do this course in turns with the Portuguese contingent, but since the third 6-month-long deployment the two nations have worked together. At first it was 4 Hungarians and 2 Portuguese, but these figures changed by turns too.²⁴

In the beginning of the mission the Hungarian soldiers faced different difficulties. For example, they had to train the interpreter too, to make him be able to translate the military terms to the trainees. The equipment of the Malian Army is old, and the quality of the ammunition varied. The first three Hungarian rotations had to face the problem of a non-existent shooting range too, which finally became operational when the third Hungarian contingent accomplished its mission. Despite these problems the instructor teams also had positive experience since the trainees were motivated and involved.²⁵

Right now the sniper instructor team has 2 Hungarian, 2 Portuguese and 2 Spanish members, under the command of a Portuguese team leader. Since the training for the battle groups finished, the current task is to help out other teams with the ongoing courses and to train the appointed cadets as snipers at Koulikoro Training Centre.²⁶

EUTM SOMALIA

The brief introduction of the crisis

The crisis in Somalia has cultural reasons, since the clans in the region have never experienced a strong governing power. The Somali culture always consisted of dynamically changing connections within the clan system. This situation did not change after the area became independent in 1960. Former Italian and British colonies united under the name of the Republic of Somalia. But this was not enough, and the newly established country claimed all of the areas in which Somali ethnic groups lived. This openly communicated viewpoint made foreign policy difficult in the region.²⁷

In 1969 a military coup, led by Siyad Barre, ousted the former political leaders. Barre introduced communism in the country, and he wanted to exploit the Somali nationalism at the expense of the still existing clan system. The failed war against Ethiopia led to internal struggle, and in 1991 Barre left the country. That year Somaliland announced its

²³ Interview with 1st Lieutenant Richárd Zámboi, the commander of the Hungarian sniper instructor team in EUTM Mali. Debrecen, 2013. October 25.

²⁴ Interview with WO Zsolt Holczer the member of the third sniper instructor team in EUTM Mali. Tata, 2014. July 06.

²⁵ Interview with WO Zsolt Holczer the member of the third sniper instructor team in EUTM Mali. Tata, 2014. July 06.

²⁶ On the account of a JFC officer. 2016. August 23.

²⁷ Marsai, V. and Hettyey, A. *Szomália, Állami összeomlás és konszolidációs kísérletek Afrika szarván*. Pécs: Publikon Kiadó, 2013. 22-26.

independence, and later, in 1998 Puntland defined itself as an autonomous region. The southern and central area of the country, however, sank in to deep anarchy and internal war.²⁸

There were several international missions conducted in the country to normalize the situation, but the deeply rooting xenophobia in the Somali community and the fear of neo-colonization made it difficult to intervene successfully.²⁹

The anarchy on land caused problems on the seas too. Close to the Somalian coasts piracy raised its head. This activity meant danger mostly to the East-African region since the pirates captured the food supply ships sent in the framework of the World Food Programme. So besides the military operations which were already operating on land, in 2008 the EU launched a maritime mission by the name of EUNAVFOR Atalanta to defend the WFP ships.³⁰

Besides the difficult clan system religion is also important to the Somalis. They are mainly following Sufi, a tolerant school of Sunni Islam. But, of course, with the modernisation new, fundamental tendencies also showed up in the country and more fundamental organisations were founded. The most successful of them is al Shabaab. The al-Qaeda linked organisation got help from foreign instructors, so their methods and tactics are not coincidentally similar to that of the Afghan organisation.³¹

Since the international forces occupied Mogadishu and most of the regional capitals in 2014, al Shabaab has had to face another problem too. The radical group is not only suffering heavy losses, but now it is not the only fundamentalist Islamic organisation in the country either. ISIL/DAESH has also showed up in Somalia, and it is trying to recruit warriors.³²

The Federal Government of Somalia barely rules the country, and the continuous fighting between AMISOM, the Somali National Army and al Shabaab will mean a threat to the elections planned to take place in September-October.³³

The mission's background

It was clear, that the Somali government needs to take the leading part in the peacemaking process in the country. But for that, Somalia missed a functioning military. The Somali National Army was more or less a complicated system of clan militias fighting not just against al Shabaab, but each other too. To create an effective military, the EU started its training mission in Somalia in 2010. At first, the political environment was positive about EUTM Somalia, however, the security situation did not let the mission operate in the country through its first 4 years.³⁴

²⁸ Kiss, Á. P. "Szomália: a világ legveszélyesebb helye" (Somalia: the world's most dangerous place). In *Afrikai terrorista- és szakadárszervezetek*. Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2015. 349-350.

²⁹ Marsai, V. and Hettyey, A. *Szomália. Állami összeomlás és konszolidációs kísérletek Afrika szarván*. Pécs: Publikon Kiadó, 2013. 23.

³⁰ "Az EUTM Somalia rövid mérlege". In Koller, B. and Marsai, V. *Magyarország Európában, Európa a világban. Tanulmányok Gazdag Ferenc 70. születésnapjára*. Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2016. 399.

³¹ Kiss, Á. P. "Szomália: a világ legveszélyesebb helye" (Somalia: the world's most dangerous place). In *Afrikai terrorista- és szakadárszervezetek*. Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2015. 360.

³² Kuo, L. "ISIL is competing with al-Shabaab for recruits in Somalia and appears to be gaining traction". *Quartz Africa*, 28 Apr 2016. <http://qz.com/672302/isil-is-competing-with-al-shabaab-for-recruits-in-somalia-and-appears-to-be-gaining-traction/>. Downloaded: 2016. August 27.

³³ Osman, A. "Somalia Releases New Election Dates". *Voice of America News*, 7 Aug 2016. <http://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-releases-new-election-dates/3454540.html>. Downloaded: 2016. August 27.

³⁴ "Az EUTM Somalia rövid mérlege". In Koller, B. and Marsai, V. *Magyarország Európában, Európa a világban. Tanulmányok Gazdag Ferenc 70. születésnapjára*. Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2016. 400.

In the beginning the headquarters was in Kampala, Uganda, the training centre was in Bihanga Training Centre, in western Uganda, a liaison office was in Nairobi, Kenya, and only an advisory team was deployed to Mogadishu. 12 European nations are taking part in EUTM Somalia, 11 member states, and 1 third state.³⁵ The situation changed in 2014, when Mogadishu was captured by AMISOM. In the first months of the year the EU decided to relocate the training centre to the safest place in the Somali capital, to the international airport. The mission's 4th mandate ends in December 2016.³⁶

The first courses of EUTM Somalia were successful. The political will aimed to build a strong military force, and president in charge Mohamad Abdullah Mohamad Farmajo implemented a political program to reform the military. The soldiers got their salary on a regular basis, and the weapons storing policy changed, the soldiers could not take them home. Even the introduction of a biometric system was planned. With these favourable conditions the main problem was the still existing clan system, so during the first phase of the training programs the trainers emphasised the development of a strong team spirit among the trainees.³⁷ This was useful in practice since the soldiers could intervene in inter-clan conflicts with impartiality. But the political situation changed, the government failed, and in late 2011 the supportive environment became non-existent.³⁸

During the first three mandates of EUTM Somalia, basic trainings dominated, while specialised courses like engineer, intel and military police courses, and non-commissioned officer's training, platoon leader, company commander courses, or even train-the-trainer sessions dominated in the fourth mandate of the mission. During these general trainings there were modules where the instructors taught human rights and the defence of civilians to the trainees.³⁹ Later on higher level trainings and advisory teams were included in the training activities.⁴⁰ Because of the lack of information about the usefulness of the specialised trainings the mission will lead basic trainings for complete subunits, since the current security situation in Somalia needs more infantrymen and engineers instead of specialists.⁴¹

The always changing political situation was not favourable from the training point of view because the trainees came mostly from Mogadishu and the neighbouring areas and not from a large scale of clans as the EU had agreed with the Somali government before. The Somali National Army's salary is financed by the USA, so the EU could not use any instruments to make a pressure of the government. Although in the past few years the training conditions and the soldiers' morale was not as good as it was expected in the beginning, the EU has not given up its aims. The mission with almost 200 personnel has trained more than 5,000

³⁵ Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom + Serbia

³⁶ "European Union Training Mission – Somalia Factsheet". EEAS. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-somalia/docs/factsheet_eutm_somalia_en.pdf. Downloaded: 2016. August 27.

³⁷ Besenyő, J. "Magyar kiképzők az Európai Unió Szomáliai Kiképző Missziójában". *Afrika Tanulmányok*. V. vol. Issue 2. 2011. 30-38.

³⁸ "Az EUTM Somalia rövid mérlege". In Koller, B. and Marsai, V. *Magyarország Európában, Európa a világban. Tanulmányok Gazdag Ferenc 70. születésnapjára*. Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2016. 401.

³⁹ Marsai, V. "Az Európai Unió afrikai műveletei". In Türke, A. I., Besenyő, J. and Wagner, P. (eds.). *Magyarország és a CSDP: Magyar szerepvállalás az Európai Unió közös biztonság- és védelempolitikájában*. Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 2016. 197.

⁴⁰ European Union Training Mission – Somalia Factsheet.

⁴¹ On the account of one of the members of the current Hungarian contingent in EUTM Somalia. 2016. August 25.

Somali soldiers, in the past six years and the operational capabilities of the Somali National Army are higher than a few years before.⁴²

Hungary's role in the mission

Hungarian soldiers have been involved in EUTM Somalia since the beginning of the mission.⁴³ The current Hungarian contingent consists of 4 soldiers, who are based in Mogadishu International Airport. Hungary deployed a legal advisor and 3 logistics NCOs to the mission. These positions make sure that our soldiers are connected with every nation in the military camp, and they maintain a good relationship with all of them.

During the preparation for the mission the soldiers were given briefings about the administrative framework of the mission, the operational theatre, the Somali community and culture, and it even included discussions with some members of the previous contingents. Based on the account of the current contingent the most important was to get familiar with the administrative framework of the mission, the operational theatre and to build personal contact with the former and current contingent members.

The circumstances of the Hungarian contingent are good, not only the working conditions but the recreational opportunities too. Besides the well-equipped offices, in their rooms they have Wi-Fi and they can use the camp's gym, or they can go to the small beach, which is also in the airport area.

The contingent has contact with every nation in EUTM. The 3 NCOs are responsible for the transportation within the airport zone and they have other logistic tasks too, for example procurement, handling storages, and making minor repairs. They are in contact with the Somali airport authorities. The legal advisor prepares the agreements with other international organisations, reports on contracts and other questions.⁴⁴

EUTM RCA

The origins of the conflict

The history of the area is rich in wars and conflicts. The seeds of the ongoing conflict were planted in the one-party system implemented in 1960, when the country became independent. David Dacko, the reigning president kept the influence of the French companies in the country, and the economy started to deteriorate.⁴⁵ Dacko managed to win the 1964 elections, but the country-wide strikes and the bankruptcy led to a coup. But Jean-Bédél Bokassa's presidency was not better for the country either. Under the Bokassa regime the debt and the unrest grew. Before 1991 there were several coups, and the one-party system was maintained

⁴² "Az EUTM Somalia rövid mérlege". In Koller, B. and Marsai, V. *Magyarország Európában, Európa a világban. Tanulmányok Gazdag Ferenc 70. születésnapjára*. Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2016. 403-404.

⁴³ Besenyő, J. "Magyar kiképzők az Európai Unió Szomáliai Kiképző Missziójában". *Afrika Tanulmányok*. V. vol. Issue 2. 2011.

⁴⁴ On the account of one of the members of the current Hungarian contingent in EUTM Somalia. 2016. August 25.

⁴⁵ Van Hoogstraten, J. S. F., Giles-Vernick, T. L. and O'Toole, T. E. "Central African Republic". In *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/102152/Central-African-Republic/40700/The-colonial-era>. Downloaded: 2014. January 12.

in the country.⁴⁶ Then the democratic movements grew stronger, and the 1992 multi-party elections were won by Ange-Felix Patassé, but the new government brought no changes in the life of the country and the abuses against the population continued.⁴⁷ The result of the worsening situation was a UN mission, MINURCA,⁴⁸ which started in 1998.⁴⁹ The UN mission was not successful, because a few years after its withdrawal another coup occurred. The new president, Francois Bozizé wrote a new constitution in 2004, but the general situation had not changed in the country and fighting flared up among different militias.⁵⁰ The so called ‘bush wars’ ended in 2007, with separate peace deals with every armed group. The deals were violated and fighting flared up in 2012 again.⁵¹ When the major militia, the mostly Muslim Seleka captured Bangui in March 2013,⁵² Bozizé left the country. This allowed the Seleka to name one of its members as president so Michel Djotodia became the first Muslim president of the primarily Christian country. Djotodia wanted to secure his power, and soon lost control of the Seleka, who committed massacres among the Christian population.⁵³ Self defence groups were organised against the Muslim militia under the name Anti-balaka. The anarchy deepened in the country with the tit for tat killings between the two armed groups.⁵⁴

Djotodia left his position because of the pressure of the international community, and after a short interim period Catherine Samba-Panza became the new leader of the Central-African Republic.⁵⁵ In December 2013, upon the invitation of the interim president, French soldiers arrived in the country in the framework of Operation Sangaris to stabilize the situation, and in 2014 the EU decided to start a mission in the country.⁵⁶ In 2016 elections were held in the country and a new president, Faustin-Archange Touadera came to power. Despite the international intervention, the security situation in the country remained unstable, and atrocities committed by either Seleka or Anti-balaka groups against the population are still ongoing.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ UN Mission to the Central African Republic.

⁴⁹ Van Hoogstraten, J. S. F., Giles-Vernick, T. L. and O’Toole, T. E. “Central African Republic”. In *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/102152/Central-African-Republic/40700/The-colonial-era>. Downloaded: 2014. January 12.

⁵⁰ Marsai, V. “Válságok Közép-Afrikában II.: Polgárháború a Közép-afrikai Köztársaságban”. NKE SVKK. 2. http://nit.uni-nke.hu/downloads/Elemzesek/2014/SVKK_Elemzesek_2014_4.pdf. Downloaded: 2014. February 22.

⁵¹ Marsai, V. “Válságok Közép-Afrikában II.: Polgárháború a Közép-afrikai Köztársaságban”. NKE SVKK. 1.

⁵² Van Hoogstraten, J. S. F., Giles-Vernick, T. L. and O’Toole, T. E. “Central African Republic”. In *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/102152/Central-African-Republic/40700/The-colonial-era>. Downloaded: 2015. April 09.

⁵³ Smith, D. “Unspeakable horrors in a country on the verge of genocide”. *The Guardian*, 22 Nov 2013. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/22/central-african-republic-verge-of-genocide>. Downloaded: 2013. December 29.

⁵⁴ Balogh, A., Besenyő, J., Miletics, P. and Vogel, D. *Országismertető – Közép-afrikai Köztársaság* (Country book: Central African Republic). Budapest: Honvéd Vezérkar Tudományos Kutatóhely, MH GEOSZ, 2015. 96-105.

⁵⁵ Marsai, V. “Válságok Közép-Afrikában II.: Polgárháború a Közép-afrikai Köztársaságban”. NKE SVKK. 10.

⁵⁶ European Union. Council Decision 2014/775/CFSP. 7 Nov 2014. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ.JOL_2014_325_R_0007&from=EN. Downloaded: 2015. April 11.

Introducing a new mission

EUTM RCA is the third EU mission in the central African country. EUFOR RCA started in April 2014, and its aim was to establish safe and secure environment in Bangui and its surroundings.⁵⁷ After the mission's mandate ended, another EU mission was implemented in the country by the name of EUMAM RCA. Its goal was to support the reform of the security sector, and to establish an effective and modern defence force.⁵⁸

After EUMAM RCA completed its mandate a new mission was deployed to the Central African Republic, this was EUTM RCA.⁵⁹ The authorities of the Central African Republic invited the EU mission in the country and the new CSDP training mission has its headquarters in Bangui. The mission was launched on 16th July 2016, and its mandate is for two years. The task of the 170-soldier-strong⁶⁰ mission is to provide strategic advice to the Ministry of Defence of the country in order to prepare and implement the security sector reform. The mission also has to provide education and training to the Central African Armed Forces to allow them to meet future challenges.⁶¹

THE EVALUATION OF THE EU TRAINING MISSIONS

The EU launched several missions on the African continent, 3 training missions among them. Is this contribution enough? The total personnel of the training missions is below 1,000. In comparison with the AU and UN missions on the continent it is really an insignificant figure, since AMISOM in Somalia consists of 22,000 soldiers alone. But we have to consider the difference between the task systems of the two types of missions.

Besides the obvious, the EU takes part in financing the AU and UN missions, which is a great amount of contribution. Because of this practice the international community often accuses the European Union with buying soldiers' lives, since the training missions are relatively safe.⁶² For example, in Mali the members of the mission are not allowed to go to the northern part of the country, or in the Central African Republic the mission headquarters is in Bangui, the safest place in the country, and in Somalia the mission did not even start in the country because of the poor security situation. In Somalia AMISOM, in Mali MINUSMA, and in the Central African republic MINUSCA make great efforts to stabilise the situation in the theatre of operations. Despite the occasionally flaring up complains this practice is favourable to the partner states.

⁵⁷ "Fact sheet, Central African Republic". http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/car_en.pdf. Downloaded: 2015. April.11.

⁵⁸ "Information zur neuen Beteiligung Österreichs". <http://www.bundesheer.at>. Downloaded: 2015. April 09.

⁵⁹ "Central African Republic: EU military training mission approved for two years". http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/04/19-fac-eu-car-military-training/?utm_source=dsms-auto&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Central+African+Republic%3a+EU+military+training+mission+approved+for+two+years. Downloaded: 2016. August 28.

⁶⁰ The soldiers are provided by 10 countries: Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Spain and Sweden. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-rca/docs/20160716_press_release_en.pdf. Downloaded: 2016. August 28.

⁶¹ EUTM RCA launched in Central African Republic. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-rca/docs/20160716_press_release_en.pdf. Downloaded: 2016. August 28.

⁶² „Az EUTM Somalia rövid mérlege”. In Koller, B. and Marsai, V. *Magyarország Európában, Európa a világban. Tanulmányok Gazdag Ferenc 70. születésnapjára*. Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2016. 404.

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