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1956 in the History of the 20th Century (1.)

Szöveg: hungariandefence.com |  2011. április 6. 14:17

According to the calendar, 1956 fell at about the half-way point of the twentieth century. It also occupies the middle position of any construction of the last century as a historical era. The “short twentieth century” started with the First World War in 1914-18 and ended with the break-up of the Soviet empire in 1989-91. If this historical period is defined precisely as 1917–1991, then 1956 falls exactly half way. This periodisation inevitably suggests a definition of the (short) 20th century as the period when the radical world-changing ideology of Marxism-Leninism was implemented in the Soviet-model experiment.

In a certain respect this is certainly true. It was a process in which the 1956 Revolution represented an important stage, and formed part of this internal history. There are three aspects of events in Hungary at that time which have an important bearing on this. Until 1956, the Soviet Union had never been faced, in the (outer) perimeter region of its empire, or at least in Eastern Europe, with a challenge like the Hungarian Revolution. Then there is the fact that the failure of the Soviet-type socialism project was one of the Revolution’s causes. Finally, 1956 resulted in the creation of one of the most viable versions of Soviet-type socialism (of course, like the classic version, ultimately unviable), because the reformed Kádár system was nothing more than a permanent reflex to 1956. (1956 remained as the point of reference even when the conditions prevailing in 1956 had long since passed away.)

We might venture, however, that both the short 20th century and 1956 can usefully be viewed from a broader perspective. Another “short" version of the previous century may be defined as the period of crisis of the world-order defined by competitive capitalism, liberal democracy and the world-order of nation-states in the north-west hemisphere. The totalitarian responses to this crisis (Fascism and Bolshevism), and the great struggle against them, also defined the short 20th century. That struggle represented another great experiment, one which retained the legacy of the 19th century and then reformed it to create new systems of market coordination, political freedom and human rights, and nation-transcending political and cultural integration.

The question is, does the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 have a special place in this historical construction of the last century other than merely in the – albeit very important – “internal" history of Soviet-style communism? The answer to this question – yes or no – will determine whether 1956 takes a place in the system of national tradition. It will determine whether the “great story" of 1956 establishes itself in the collective memory or remains as a diffuse and fragmentary image more liable to generate division and debate than unity. The answer will also determine whether 1956 becomes anything more than a transient episode in the history of a cul-de-sac, if one of world-historic dimensions.

We look back at 1956 and the 20th century from a time which looks set to depart from the previous century in almost every respect. It is possible that no single event of the previous century will occupy a place in the collective memory of our post-modern century in the way that 19th century events did in the 20th. The modern age is the age of endless uncertainty and permanent relativity, and the previous century is more than capable of providing nourishment for that. It is thus unreasonable to expect, for example, that the 1956 Revolution will occupy anything like the place in the collective memory that the 1848-49 Revolution does. The opposite is more likely, that the great fixed stories of the past will be deconstructed and eroded.

Hungary – “the 1956 vision"

The crucial moments of Hungary’s 20th century history have fundamentally affected the lives and thinking of its entire population. The Treaty of Trianon, the assignment to the Soviet zone, and the political transition, all have undisputed places among these. The place of 1956 in this coordinate system is not so definite. Although the 1956 Revolution was indisputably the first concerted reaction of Hungarian society to the imposition of the Soviet system, in many ways it harked back to the pre-Second World War era. After all, the Soviet regime had offered no answers to the fundamental questions of the period – economic and political modernisation, independence as a nation state, and territorial revision. Quite the contrary, it had reformulated all of them in more severe forms. And although 1956 clearly haunted the Soviet-type system in Hungary from then on, it did not appear to exert an immediate, deep and direct effect on the lives of the Hungarian people. The Soviet empire had shown it had the strength to prevent Hungary’s departure, depriving Hungary of its most exciting experiment in its 20th century history.

Even the ideals of the 1956 Revolution only formed up over a long period. The people who went out on to the Budapest streets on 23 October were rising up against a regime that had formed in the late 1940s; they were demanding the departure of an army which had occupied the country since the end of 1944. The democratic transformation of the country and the restoration of the independent nation-state, however, had preoccupied Hungarians interested in public affairs for much longer. The aims and demands of 1956 were in direct relation to these ideological currents.

The Revolutionary demands formulated around 23 October echoed the real desires of Hungarian people with a rare unanimity. First of all, demolition of the Rákosi system, independence for the country, reformulation and preservation of national traditions, respect for basic democratic freedoms, a multi-party system, and free elections. Most of the political manifestoes clearly stated that the property relations established by 1949 (i.e. land reform and nationalised manufacturing industry, wholesale trade and banking system) should not be changed by what we might now call “reprivatisation" (a word which did not yet exist in any language). What was proposed was the retention of state ownership of some sections of the economy and financial affairs, and real socialisation of other, broader sections (collective ownership by workers represented by works councils). The people who joined the Revolution were therefore led by a vision of some kind of “third way". This meant, above all, a political system based on representative democracy (but containing some forms of direct “self-management") and a social (state) economy based on broad public ownership.

This can of course only be explained by looking at what had gone before. In 1956, political experience meant the system of before and during the war, and the coalition period of 1945-46. The Horthy system had been utterly discredited by the recent and very painful memory of its end, and every political current distanced itself from “restoration". The coalition period, however, had appreciated in value in the light of the years which had followed. Although this period was not the subject of direct references by anybody, its memory is apparent in the overall tenor of the demands. Nobody, of course, wished for an actual return to the coalition period, which is what gave the communists their chance to take power. The political programme of the Revolution basically embraced a Western pattern of democracy, with all of its institutional and legal appurtenances. This Western-like democracy, however, would have been populated by Hungarian figures disinclined to make any basic changes in the Stalinist/socialist-style social and economic apparatus. Capitalism and the market economy belonged to a legacy which was condemned to obscurity. Illusions of the state-led economy were also widespread in the West both before and (several decades) after the war. And in Hungary, seven or eight years after socialism had been introduced, hopes that the system might more closely approach the ideal of justice were still very much alive. The general feeling seems to have been that, given the restoration of independence and freedom from the need to copy Soviet patterns (as had happened so far), Hungarians could do their own version of socialism. The third-path nature of the 1956 political and social programme thus appears democratic and left-wing.

Excerpt from M. János Rainer’s essay 1956 a 20. század történelmében (“1956 in the history of the 20th century"), from the book “Tizenhárom nap, amely…" (“Thirteen Days that…", MoD Military History Institute and Museum, Budapest, 2003).