Hungarian Military Aviation Started In The 1910s Already

The Hungarian air force celebrates the 70th anniversary of its existence this year. At the same time, perhaps it is not a big mistake if I say that Hungarian military aviation did not start in 1938. When was the first so-called Hungarian air force set up?

Due to our specific historical conditions it is difficult to define when the Hungarian air force was set up, since in the early 1910s so-called ’Airborne troops’ were created in the military of the Austro-Hungarian Monarcy. One of the most important aspects of this question is whether Captain István Petrócy was the 9th or the 10th to gain a field pilot’s licence on 22 July 1910. The fact that he is recorded as the 13th, is just a Hungarian peculiarity. The reason for this is that his licence had to be issued in his native language, that is in Hungarian. Irrespectively of all that, he was the first Hungarian field pilot. Thus, in those times only the Austrian airborne troops were established, and these had Hungarian pilots. What is more, not only were they given a role, but there were several Hungarian pilots among the first ten aces of the First World War. By and large, these are the roots of Hungarian military aviation. But we are talking about a joint air force in those years.

Did a joint air force also mean that the equipment was owned by the Monarchy? Perhaps Hungary had airplanes as well?

The Royal Hungarian Army did not have air corps, there were Austrian-Hungarian airborne troops, therefore the Monarchy owned the equipment.

How advanced these planes had been?

The results indicate that there were excellent Austrian and Hungarian pilots. But in those years, technology was developing so rapidly that the aviation weaponry of the great powers improved much faster, as regards technology. However, in combat, our pilots were able to counterbalance it to a certain extent. They had excellent achievements in the Italian theatres of operations primarily.

Yes. After the First World War, military and naval air corps were dissolved as well. But we wouldn’t be Hungarians, if we hadn’t found the remedy for all the above. I have come across a document saying that in August 1918, in the Hungarian Ministry of Defence a comprehensive study was carried out on how the country could outwit the truce that was yet to be made. It appears that we awaited the 1921 decisions very preparedly. This is exactly why there was a cat-and-mouse game going on between the Entente and us for years. Hungary set up flying corps and operated them in the framework of civilian aviation. It meant that in return for various forms of support, civilian air traffic was obligated to employ a certain number of military pilots, and provide storage for the technology and equipment. Nevertheless, the arms controllers had found out, and we had to come up with new things. In spite of this, the powers supervising the disarmament did a very barbaric job, overstepping their authority by far. Virtually, they almost completely eliminated the fast-developing Hungarian aircraft industry, but to say the least, they set it back very much. The same industry that started to develop considerably in the 1910s in Budapest, Aszód and elsewhere. They sawed up propellers and did other barbaric jobs. I’d like to stress here, that all this happened beyond the Trianon mandate.

Under these circumstances, what was the way out?

In the framework of the Ministry of Commercial Affairs, special department XI (air traffic) was created, led by Colonel István Petróczy. In a short while, it evolved into an Aviation Bureau – practically an undercover Air Force Command. It was specifically a military aviation organization, fulfilling this role until 1938. Right until we managed to close the Trianon dictate with the Treaty of Bled.

Does this mean at the same time that between the two world wars, military aviation had to be started again practically from scratch?

Perhaps this is an exaggeration. We did not have to start building from scratch, for we had our experts. Such as for instance Captain István Petróczy, whom we have mentioned – in the 1910s, he was the commander of the pilot training school of Wiener-Neustadt for years. Moreover, he was the first leader of the Aviation Bureau as well. We can also mention Captain László Háry, another WWI veteran pilot. In the beginning, he organized interesting aviation demonstrations with the so-called Háry Circus. And after a while, in the late 1930s, he became the first commander of the air force, the open air force. Thus, we had the experts. What was new though, was the theoretical foundation of military aviation. This is partly connected with the name of an Italian general, Giulio Douhet. In the 1920s, he was the one to create the so-called ’Independent air force’, alternatively called ’The unlimited aerial warfare’, or ’The command of the air’ theory in a number of his works, causing huge turmoils among his contemporaries. In his opinion, only the air force can and must be developed at the expense of all the other branches. This theory spread all over Hungary as well, in which v. (’valiant’) Ferenc Szentnémedy, serving in the general staff, played a considerable role. As editor of the aircraft and aviation column of the Hungarian Military Review, he introduced the Douhet-theory to the audience in the 1930s, being a fanatic admirer himself. At the same time, the debates over the doctrine made him realize in two or three years what the exaggerated parts of the theory were. It is the indisputable merit of the officer – who was promoted to colonel of the general air staff – that he contributed to an intensive and fruitful debate on the Hungarian air force, in which aviation experts, and also land experts and officers of the general staff took part. Out of this debate a theory crystallized, which made it possible to create a relatively modern air force at the earliest opportunity. Not against the Americans or the Soviets, but compared to our level. Taking into consideration, that I think our 1944 results against the American air force are staggering.

What do you mean by that?

In June 1944, when American formations consisting of several hundreds, or sometimes thousands of aircraft appeared in Hungarian airspace, the 101st national fighter corps of Veszprém (popularly called the ’Cougars’) entered into battle with 8, 16 planes. A formation of 24 aircraft was quite a rare sight in those days. After September, 36 Hungarian fighters engaged in fight with the Americans. In spite of all this, in June, 45 American planes were shot down by Hungarian pilots, who, on the contrary, lost 10 aircraft only. In July, the loss of the Americans was 38 planes, versus 4 Hungarian ones. In August, the Americans shot down 4 Hungarian planes again, but suffered a loss of 16. This is difficult to comprehend for the ordinary mind.

If I understand this correctly, the Hungarian pilots earned these combat victories even though they were in a disadvantageous situation, as regards technology. In other words, they compensated for superiority by finesse and talent.

That’s right. The majority of these pilots were present in every drill since the beginning of the 30s, and in 1938-39, when the detached territories were returned, in every alarm, that is in every mobilization. In March 1939, near Szobránc and Ungvár, they went through what is called baptism by fire against the Slovakian air force without any casualties, but shooting down 8 enemy planes. In the beginning we were fighting with very experienced pilots, and later the courageous young people came.

Ordinary people think that the pilots were not only brave and talented, but chivalrous as well. For they were almost fighting body-against-body, like in a tournament.

From this aspect, the air battles of the First World War are amazing. Back then, if one side noticed that the enemy has no more ammunition, he just wawed, indicating the other that he is free to fly away. This gesture was common with the Germans, the French, and us, Hungarians as well. But in World War II, aerial warfare got rough as well. In the beginning, some traces of chivalry could be detected. I have mentioned the Szobránc-Ungvár air battle of 1939, where the 1st Hungarian fighter squadron clashed with the fighters and bombers of the freshly established Slovakian air force. Following the battle, an article, which is beautiful and painful at the same time, was published in the Hungarian military press about the funeral of one of the Slovakian pilots who was shot down – remembering him as a gallant comrade. It was like they were mourning their own comrade. The ’enemy’ said fairwell to 1st Lieutenant Svento with the following words at the funeral held with military tribute in Sislóc: "Your Slovak nation should be grateful to you. And we, as your chivalrous Hungarian enemies in flying, will preserve your memory with honour and respect." Nevertheless, during my research, this was the only chivalrous momentum I have come across.

Why was it that they still had these set of values in the First World War?

I think it’s an old virtue: I recognize the victory, the military achievements of the other, and he recognizes mine. If I were malicious, I could even say that this sheds a better light on me, too. Still, it rather recalls the atmosphere of the knights’ tournaments. I have mentioned the debates of the 30s on aerial warfare. In those years, an aged lieutenant general, Gusztáv Hellebronth wrote an article in which he attacked the passages of the Douhet-theory which were saying that first of all the resistance of the hinterland has to be broken by mass terror bombing raids. Consequently, the population would have forced their own government to make truce – at least this is what Douhet reckoned. The lieutenant general argued exactly this idea. In his opinion, the annihilation of unarmed civilians cannot be an option, a soldier must fight another soldier, face to face. In the Hungarian military press, this was the last declaration to emphasize chivalry.

Nevertheless, Hitler’s Germany had learned the lesson. It is enough to think about the Battle of Britain alone.

Look. The Douhet-theory had supporters and opponents everywhere. If we take the Battle of Britain specifically, Göring, being the air marshal of the empire, wanted to put himself and his branch forward. At the same time, this WWII battle had proven as well that it cannot be done alone. Those who had adopted many things from the theory but refused to develop the air force at the expense of the other branches and corps, were right eventually.

Couldn’t the reason for the dissemination of the Douhet-theory be that it was about a new branch, for which there was practically no antidote in the beginning?

This would be a rough simplification of the situation, which is more complex than that. Italy was a winner, but it was a ’disinherited’ winning power in the First World War. Its industry was relatively advanced, but out of the 25 basic strategic raw materials, the country had only 4. If we picture the shape of Italy now, we have to admit that the more than 3,000 km long coastline is very difficult to protect in case there is an attack. And the land troops had to face the Alps to the north, which are almost impossible to conquer – for the air force, it is easier. The fact that any military middle power can set up a fleet of 1,000 aircraft, which comprises 100 squadrons, cannot be neglected either. Of course, the third dimension applies as well: the air force is capable of getting behind the back of the attacking troops relatively fast, where the resistance of the hinterland can be broken easily with terror bombing raids.

Until now, we have spoken about technics and warfare mainly. What was the education of the Hungarian pilots like?

Similarly to every other thing related to military aviation, this was a covert activity. I had the honour of meeting Colonel János Németh of the general air staff in the 1970s. In my opinion, he is one of the most interesting personalities in Hungarian military aviation. He participated in the preparations against Romania as a major and chief of staff of the temporary air brigade in the spring-summer of 1940. He was serving in the same position at the time of the mobilization against Yugoslavia in 1941. In 1942, he was the chief of staff of the aviation troops which were operating beside the 2nd Hungarian army. He graduated the covert Military Academy in Hungary in the late 1920s as an officer of the general air staff. The reason being that when Ludovika Academy was split up, at Ludovika II they were training officers for the undercover air force. Later it became Bolyai Technical Academy, operating in Hûvösvölgy, Budapest. By the time it was allowed to train pilots openly, they were educated in Kassa, where Miklós Horthy Aviation Academy was established, which was named after lieutenant-governor István Horthy in 1942, following his death. A piquancy, that after several decades have passed, the pilots of the Hungarian People’s Army – by the time they were allowed to attend Checzoslovakian educational institutions, not just those in the Soviet Union – were studying at this academy. In the era of covert training, from the mid-1930s, officers and non-commissioned officers were trained in Southern Italy as well for a few years, but this opportunity ceased to exist by the end of the 30s. The study trips of officers of the general staff to the German and Italian air forces were of particular relevance in those years.

After the initial success, another lost world war came. How did the calvary of the Hungarian air force continue from that point on?

Major General József Szabó, who was the chief of aviaton in the Hungarian People’s Army, could tell you more about it. I would only add that after the war, for 6-8-10 years the new leadership relied on the pilots of the Royal Hungarian Air Force, although less and less. A few of these pilots also taught at the academy, and some of them were even department heads. But there were pilots who were sentenced on trumped-up charges in show trials, and what is more, some were executed.