The Battle of Pákozd – 29 September 1848

On 11 September 1848, Jellačić led his army
across the Dráva. The Hungarian military leadership,
divided by the political uncertainty, saw little
chance of resistance. This caused László Csány,
government commissioner for the Dráva line, to
send home the National Guard troops. Reduced
to 5000 men, the army retreated from the Jellačićled
army of 48,000 and 48 ordnance pieces.
The incursion of the main Croatian column
was followed 10 days later, on 21 September, by
a division from Baranya with 9100 troops and
12 ordnance pieces, led by Major-General Karl
Roth. The nearly 60,000-strong invading Croatian
army was joined in Transdanubia by a regiment
of cuirassiers and two companies of light cavalry.

Jellačić built his plans on overwhelming numerical
superiority. He hoped that the imperial
troops and officers serving in the Hungarian
army would not risk the liability of facing up to
the Croatians, who were also fighting under the
imperial flag, and would come over to him. But
he did not have any order from the Emperor
authorising action against Hungary. He also
thought that the sheer magnitude of his army
would have such a psychological effect on the
Hungarian forces as to hold them back from
attempting resistance. He was disappointed on
both counts. A delegation of the Hungarian
officer corps declared they would confront him
as soon as they had the chance (i.e. when their
forces were up to strength).

The Hungarian army which lined up on the
north shore of lake Velence in late September,
after the evacuation of Székesfehérvár, numbered
18,000 troops with 44 ordnance pieces, and
further reinforcements were on their way. Roth’s
column had been isolated and prevented from
uniting with Jellačić. The massed Hungarian
troops in the west of Transdanubia were now
35,000 strong, with 50 ordnance pieces. Jellačić
attempted to attack at Pákozd on 29 September,
without success. The general staff failed to
operate satisfactorily, so that one division (about
12,800 men and 12 ordnance pieces) arrived on
the battlefield only when fighting had ended.
Even so, Jellačić had a two-to-one superiority, but
an attack by his centre fell apart under Hungarian
artillery fire, and he was unable to advance against
the Hungarian right wing.

Understandably, with his supply lines cut off,
Jellačić did not attempt further frontal attacks.
Also understandable, however, was the Hungarian
side’s decision to make a truce, because Jellačić
still had a more than two-to-one superiority. The
retreating army under Jellačić was manned with
relief forces by early October. It was joined by
further imperial formations from North Hungary
and West Transdanubia.