The Outbreak of the Revolution – 23 October 1956

The events in Poland in 1956 undoubtedly
took effect on the situation in Hungary,
and in several respects. News of the Poznań
events and subsequent reprisals, and the events
of the second half of October, spread through
Hungary. In addition, what the Soviet leadership
had learned in “solving the Polish crisis" affected
the political plans for “settling the Hungary
question." Having placed the Soviet forces on
combat alert on 19 October and at the same time
issued instructions to the Hungarian People’s
Army connected with deployment of Soviet
units, they were in a good position to deal with
unexpected events in Hungary.

Khrushchev had indicated several times
before 1956 that the Soviet Union was prepared
to employ any means that might be necessary in
Hungary’s case. It was in direct response to the
Polish workers’ protests in Poznań on 28 June
1956 that instructions – in serious contravention
of international treaties at that time – were issued
to Lt General P. N. Lashchenko, commander
of the Special Corps stationed in Hungary, to
prepare a plan for the deployment of Soviet
troops “to maintain, protect, and if necessary
restore, the Socialist social order."

The plan, codenamed Volna (Wave), assigned
protection of the major installations in Budapest
to the 2nd Mechanised Guard Division, while the
main forces of the 17th Mechanised Division
would seal off the Austrian border. This plan for
the use of Soviet forces for security operations
is clear evidence that unlimited use of force was
the means preferred by the top Soviet political
leadership for dealing with a political crisis in
Hungary. Some Hungarian political leaders also
knew that Soviet military forces could be used
for security purposes in the country if necessary.

On 16 October, an initiative modelled on the
youth of March 1848 started out in Szeged, under
the slogan, What does the Hungarian Nation
wish? Foreign policy demands included a review
of Soviet–Hungarian foreign trade treaties on
an equal basis and the withdrawal of all Soviet
forces under the terms of the peace treaty. The
students also demanded a new national coat of
arms and military uniforms.

Organisation of the demonstration continued
on 23 October, in line with the students’ decisions
of the previous day. The Minister of the Interior
banned the march and threatened to prevent the
demonstration by armed force if necessary. The
Party and the government were playing with
fire. At a meeting of the Political Committee of
the Hungarian Working People’s Party (MDP),
György Marosán and József Révai openly
declared, “If necessary, we’ll have them shot!"
The Interior Minister’s ban, far from deterring
the students, actually hardened their resolve.
The demonstration broke down the barrier of
fear. The reformist slogans became increasingly
bold. “Rákosi into the Danube, Imre Nagy into
government!" “If you’re Hungarian, come with
us!" “Russians go home!" were the chants heard
from the crowd, now numbering two hundred
thousand, in front of Parliament. Thousands
also assembled at other points in Budapest.

Demanded back into the leadership by the
masses, Imre Nagy called on the Hungarian
youth now demonstrating for socialist
democracy to support order and discipline.
Events followed quickly on one another. At
about the same time as Imre Nagy’s speech, the
demonstrators pulled down the Stalin statue, and
the forces – mainly “state protection" political
police (ÁVH) – defending the Radio building
opened fire on the still-unarmed demonstrators.
After a conversation between Ernő Gerő and
Khrushchev, the main Soviet forces based in
Hungary started out towards Budapest.

After shots were fired at the Radio building
in Budapest, with several fatalities, some civilians
started to seek weapons from barracks in
and around Budapest and from police station
arsenals. Some large Budapest factories also had
stores of firearms and ammunition, which were
also seized and handed out.

At about 11 pm Moscow time (9 pm in
Budapest) on 23 October, according to
the minutes of the Soviet Politburo, Zhukov
informed the meeting that a demonstration of
“a hundred thousand" in Budapest had “set
fire to the Radio," and in Debrecen the “county
Party committee and the Interior Ministry’s
county headquarters have been occupied."
A majority of Politburo members considered
this sufficient reason to support Khrushchev’s
recommendation that “forces must be sent into
Budapest." To implement its proposals and
decisions, the Soviet leadership decided to send
Mikoyan and Suslov from the Politburo, General
Malinin, First Deputy Commander of the Soviet
armed forces and Ivan F. Serov, Director of
the KGB, to Hungary. Before taking the final
decision, Khrushchev called into the Kremlin
Mátyás Rákosi, who was in Moscow at the time,
who considered that the Soviet forces should
intervene immediately.

It is important to note that, whether the
Hungarian political leadership requested the
deployment of the Soviet troops on 23 October
or merely acknowledged the fact, the majority of
them agreed with it. They accepted the “advice"
of the Soviet leaders on how to handle the crisis,
and regarded the implementation of that advice
as binding on themselves. It has been definitely
established that the Hungarian leadership did
not diverge in any substantial particular from the
constraints set by the Soviet leaders, constraints
which were modified several times between
23 and 28 October as events unfolded. Until
31 October, the Soviet government regarded
the Party leadership under János Kádár, and the
state leadership (which formally did not exist)
under Imre Nagy, as capable of handling the
crisis in a way satisfactory to Soviet interests.