The Battle of Augsburg – 10th August 955

One of the bloodiest battles in the age of
Hungarian expeditions was fought on a field
next to Augsburg (Lechfeld) in 955. This
lost battle of the Hungarian army has a most
detailed documentation in military history. The
Hungarians did not reckon with the consolidated
royal power in Germany and the agreements
among German provinces and principalities
that enabled the German dynasties – that had
formerly been fighting against each other – to
raise a several-thousand-strong joint army made
up of heavy cavalry.

In the early days of August 955 the Hungarians
surrounded the city of Augsburg. There could not
have been a substantial military force defending
the city, but the Hungarian expeditionaries,
unpractised in siege warfare, attempted only to
starve them out. Led by Bishop – latterly Saint
– Urlich, Augsburg continued to resist. In the
meantime, the German relief force arrived.

The battle that took place on 10 August
at Augsburg started well for the Hungarians.
Some crossed the River Lech at night, went
round the German army, successfully attacked
what contemporary sources described as the
Bohemian “legion" allied with the Germans
as well as the German formations made up of
Swabians, and after scattering most of them,
sent them fleeing.

After their early successes, the Hungarians
started looting as usual, not realizing that the joint
forces of King Otto and his ally, Prince Conrad
displayed a tactical and technical superiority.
Underestimating the enemy, the main Hungarian
army did not launch a frontal assault and did not
sufficiently tie down the main German forces.

Having frustrated the Hungarian attempt
at encirclement, the German heavy cavalry
launched a general attack. The Hungarian
expeditionaries responded with their usual tactic:
after realising that resistance was hopeless, they
turned their horses and attempted to retreat.
Prince Conrad fell during the battle. It was later
in the retreat that the Augsburg defeat turned
into a tragedy, because the Hungarians were not
able to reorganize their forces. The Germans
even hindered their orderly retreat by holding
up and slaughtering the dispersed Hungarian
troops at riverbanks, crossing points and other
places. The Hungarians suffered heavy losses.
As the entire army of the German Empire was
concentrated to defeat them, the Hungarian
army had to retreat once and for all because it
had no means to counter heavy armoury.

The leaders of the 955 expedition, Lél (Lehel),
and then Súr and Bulcsú, were all executed shortly
after the battle in Regensburg. By ordering the
bloody execution of the leaders and rejecting
the customary exchange of prisoners, Otto was
displaying his intention to settle the issue once
and for all. The named leaders were at the head
of tribes from western Hungary, and it was
warriors from these tribes that bore the brunt of
the defeat. The defeat shook these tribes but had
no significant effect on the Hungarian armies
that settled in the Carpathian Basin.

The battle of Augsburg led to the
legitimisation of the power of the Saxon
dynasty in Germany, the coronation of Otto
as Emperor in 962, and thus the foundation
of the Holy Roman Empire; the relic of the
Holy Cross they had taken into the battle, set
into the imperial lance, took a place among the
coronation insignia after 962.

After the battle of Augsburg, the Hungarians
did not direct any major campaigns
against Western Europe (the last Hungarian
attack in the west before the millennium was
made at Wienerwald in 991), but rather only to
the south, towards the Balkans and Byzantium.
They even sent an embassy to Quedlinburg in
973, a symbolic act which normalised German–
Hungarian relations. In the Botond story, the
Hungarian historical tradition preserves the
memory of an expeditionary attack which got all
the way to Byzantium. According to this tradition,
Botond got the advantage in single combat with
the bravest Byzantine knight, and struck a blow
to the gate of the castle of Byzantium, making
such a hole in it that a five year-old child could
easily have passed in and out. Led against the
entire Greek Peninsula as well, the campaign
ended with victory.

Contemporary authors, such as Emperor Leo
the Wise and the Arab al-Masudi, described the
classic tactics of the Hungarian light cavalry.
According to Leo the Wise, “They have reserves
beside the main army, which they send to trap
those standing guard against them or hold to
assist sections which are under pressure […] They
favour fighting at a distance, lying in ambush,
encircling the enemy, feigning withdrawal and
retreat, and spreading out their forces. If they
put their enemy to flight, they put everything
else aside and mercilessly throw themselves in
pursuit, thinking of nothing but the chase."

The Hungarian cavalry regiments followed
closely on one another in the order of battle,
and the cavalry troops rotated like a millwheel,
maintaining a continuous rain of arrows.
There were always reserve detachments, and
they always marched with a great many reserve
horses to make the army appear larger and more
fearsome to the enemy. Their main strengths
were in encircling the enemy, feigning withdrawal
and retreat, and turning on their horses to shoot
arrows backwards.